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Affect and Desire: Museums and the Cinematic

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Declaration

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any other university.

Signature: ........................................

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# Contents

Acknowledgements

Abstract

Introduction

1 Critical Theory and the New Museology

2 Didactic Affect and Traditional History

3 Toward Non-discursive Affect

4 Delirious Affect

5 Show Time! Museums in Film

6 Coda

Works Cited

Bibliography
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Abstract

The museum continues to be broadly framed in the critical literature in terms of its Enlightenment legacy and related knowledge/power relations. To contend with this authoritative institutional legacy, critical theory within the new museology operates to ensure museums are inclusive of class, race, gender, creed and identity. Yet this vigilant, didactic focus on inclusivity limits the ability of the museum to engage in transformative, affecting ways with the very idea of alterity that is fundamental to any inclusive agenda.

As a theoretical investigation of museums and the cinematic, this thesis considers the potential for museum studies of engaging with affect and desire alongside the rational, inclusive museum. Two modes of affecting encounter are conceptualised to illuminate the resonance of affect in museums; the intentional use of didactic affect and the serendipitous intensity of non-discursive affect. Didactic affect arises from recognition and emotion, and is aligned to common sense notions of time, memory and history. However, affect is also generated outside didactic, discursive intent. This mode of affectivity assumes credibility in fictional museums presented in films; resoundingly these museums are sites of non-conformity, seduction and the irrational.

Drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s interest in cinema images and the production of new thought, the thesis appraises fictional museums in films. Deleuze rejects Lacanian-influenced cinema analysis and the axiom that desire is pre-programmed within an already structured and repressed Oedipal unconscious. In the focus on repression and
ideology, there is parallel between the limitation of cine-psychoanalytical approaches to museums in films and structuralist approaches to actual museums in the critical literature. An anti-Oedipal approach to the affective museum assembles visitors and artefacts not according to the subject/object dichotomy of structuralist modes of understanding but as desiring-machines capable of unfolding alternative ways of thinking the relation of the human and nonhuman. As such the thesis offers an ethico-aesthetic dimension for critical engagement with the field of museum studies.
Introduction

As an examination of museums and affect, this study offers a theoretical rather than a practical engagement with the field of museum studies. The project might be thought of as working in a recovery mode, for I argue that within the critical endeavour of the ‘new museology’ certain material things have never been properly understood. Sharon Macdonald and Paul Basu note that ‘in relation to exhibitions, we typically know rather little about how they are received’; they argue that ‘too much research remains rather crude’ (2007:21). My study is not empirical in the sense of collecting data to interpret how exhibitions are received, in the way that Macdonald and Basu seek to do in their excellent study of exhibitions. My intention lies elsewhere, in the ‘reception’ of the idea of the museum in theory through an approach that draws on the philosophical thinking of Gilles Deleuze and his collaborative work with Félix Guattari. The concepts of becoming-animal, desiring-machine, schizoanalysis, the time-image, and difference without repetition, are notions that I seek to adapt into possibilities of thinking about the museum. My aim is not to develop a ‘new’ new museology but to acknowledge the potential of what is already there — the potential of the museum to affect multiple subjectivities and complicate the common sense, binary formation of the human/nonhuman.

In engaging with affect, desire and the museum, the study necessarily confronts the delimiting function of linear time. Donald Preziosi and Claire Farago note that ‘the persistence of the museum idea can aid us in not reducing the past to a form of the present and the other to a form of the same’ (2004:8). The essence of their observation, that the potential of the museum lies in temporal concerns, is central to
the ethical position I accord the museum. This is an ethic arising through affect to disturb the dogmatic thinking that gives certainty to traditional history, collective memory and the representations that structure the Western concept of time. This affective disturbance is the product of museum assemblages that transform the milieus that structure common sense thought. The product of these un-common milieus is desire; a desiring-machine directly sensing the multiplicity of durations that exist alongside the increasingly complex gauge of what it means to be human. Thus the museum, an institution both extolled and condemned as a bastion of Enlightenment humanism, is nevertheless a space where assemblages of un-reason are constantly formed and reformed, where durations and ‘speeds’ of the nonhuman are integral.

In my exploration of the affecting museum, Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari do not provide a formal method of enquiry but instead open avenues for inventing new ways of thinking. With this invention in mind I offer the concepts of didactic and delirious affect to facilitate thinking about a proto museum that participates in transformation and becoming. One of the avenues to assist my stance is Deleuze’s Bergsonian approach to time, linked to the idea of the subject-as-multiple-subjectivities. Deleuze abandons the Kantian ‘passive self in terms of simple receptivity’ because this passive self assumes sensations already formed, ‘then merely relate[s these] to the a priori forms of their representation in space and time’ (1994a:98). Instead of a subject that repeats in linear space and time there is an alternative. In the doubling of time as virtual and actual, there are already two ‘present’ subjectivities. Deleuze writes, ‘the former and the present [time] form two series which coexist in the function of the virtual object which is displaced in them and in relation to itself, neither of these two series can any longer be designated as the original or the derived’. This allows for a
complex intersubjectivity ‘in which each subject owes its role and function in the series to the timeless position that it occupies in relation to the virtual object’ (1994a:105). Theorising multiple subjectivities in unfixed time opens lines of flight to the different durations of things; to the action of constantly moving thresholds or milieus of the animate and inanimate, a dynamic that is the specialty of the actual virtual museum. Lines of flight are the vital productions of life, as Claire Colebrook describes they are ‘the event: not another moment within time, but something that allows time to take off on a new path’ (2002a:57).

In their call for inventions of thought Deleuze and Guattari, unlike structuralist and poststructuralist theorists, do not focus on ideology or repression. This said, Deleuze recognises it is naïve to pretend that ideological and other structures do not exist; he is aware these structures are the infrastructure of our era. What matters for Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari is to advance whatever might arise to complicate established modes of being. They are un-fixers of things, interested in the invention of desiring-machines that are an outcome of neither ideology nor repression. The concept of desiring-machine is useful to my affirmation of a productive proto museum as it enables a theoretical shift away from the influence of Michel Foucault in museum studies. Deleuze-Guattari and Foucault differ quite significantly in relation to the concepts of desire and power. They give these concepts a different status; as Deleuze puts it, ‘lines of flight and movements of deterritorialisation, as collective historical determinations, do not seem to have any equivalent in Michel’s work’ (1997:np). For Foucault, desire in relation to power is about normalisation and discipline whereas for Deleuze desire has the ability to re-territorialise thought. Because of its re-territorialising capacity, desire has primacy over power. Desire, for Deleuze, is
‘affect, as opposed to feeling; it is “haecceity” (individuality of a day, a season, a life), as opposed to subjectivity: it is event, as, opposed to thing or person’ (1997:np).

Deleuze accords a different status to, or refutes, many of the notions considered axiomatic to critical theory. Given my argument that critical theory has been used in a delimiting way in museum studies, Deleuzean reconfigurations are useful to my stance. Deleuze rejects the implicit presupposition of thought he calls ‘a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image’ as it is in terms of this image ‘that everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think’ (1994a:131). The difficulty in renouncing ‘common sense’ notions of thought is that there is ‘no ally but paradox’ (132), notably the paradox that relates to the aforementioned doubling of time. Tied to common sense thought, and thereby disallowing thinking the actual/virtual doubling of time, is the ‘model of recognition’ which Deleuze describes as ‘the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object’. This occurs when one faculty (be this perception, memory, imagination or understanding) locates an object as identical to that of another faculty, ‘when all the faculties together relate … themselves to a form of identity in the object’. For Deleuze, this act of recognition ‘provides a philosophical concept for the presupposition of common sense’ (1994a:133). Important to my study of the museum are these connections between common sense, recognition, thought and identity. What evolves from these connections, for Deleuze, is that ‘difference is crucified’; ‘difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude’ (138).
When Deleuze writes of flight away from common sense and dogmatic thinking he is not advocating drugs, delinquency, perversion or ‘romantic madness’. These, he considers to be marginal elements that are not lines of flight but part of ideology and repression. He also points out that if everyone was to become marginal and resistant everything would deterritorialise, which would not be productive (1997).

It is, indeed, with production, with what something produces, that Deleuze is ever concerned; with what it does rather than what it might mean. This is the case with his philosophical interest in the time-image: cinematic images that produce unchronological time. While there are obvious differences between the medium of film and the museum, there are also viable likenesses that I develop to articulate the desiring potential of the ‘schizo’ museum as a contrast to structural and particularly psychoanalytical approaches to desire and the museum. The frequency with which the schizo museum is represented in films is indicative of its affective appeal as a desiring-machine, a capacity absent in the critical literature which is beholden to a common sense, rational museum.

**Structure of the argument**

The first chapter, *Critical Theory and the New Museology* examines the model of the rational museum in the critical literature of the new museology.¹ A dominant method in the literature is to adapt critical theory to support this model. Michelle Henning considers that the focus of recent museum discourse on the application of European critical theory to the Anglophone discipline of museology is a reason why critical literature does not give serious measure to non-rational perspectives (2006:1). In the

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¹ In this study I follow the American use of ‘museum’ which includes museums of art unlike Britain and Australia where a distinction is often made between art galleries and other types of museums.
rational museum model, architecture and displays act to form visitors as subjects, impressing a particular ideological content and reinforcing existing power relations. I suggest that as a result, encounters with museum artefacts tend to be subsumed into the structure of a knowledge/power relation; a structure that perpetuates the Enlightenment legacy of the museum. One forceful implication of critical theory on this legacy is an attachment in the literature to the compensatory idea of the inclusive museum. Assigning significance to the inclusive museum is the assumed raison d’être of the museum in the literature of the new museology. Following from this idea, I consider the difficulty of incorporating affect and notions of human agency into the structural discourses that support the model of the inclusive museum. When reviewing the range of critical opinions that perpetuate the inclusive museum, whether through a Marxist, feminist and/or structuralist perspective or through the lens of identity politics, a decidedly rational museum discourse emerges.

The case studies in chapter two, *Didactic Affect and Traditional History*, describe the use of affect as a didactic tool in exhibition practice to generate historical meaning. The exhibitions I focus upon are mid twentieth-century displays of modernist art designed in the USSR, Nazi Germany and Australia. I observe affect in these exhibitions via Friedrich Nietzsche’s reflections on the illusions that construct traditional history. In a sense this chapter is disingenuous as the mode of affect that I describe as didactic is not actually affect at all, but rather an attempt to produce a collective emotion. Didactic affect relies upon Deleuze’s model of recognition. In chapter three *Toward Non-discursive Affect*, I continue to focus on recognition and emotion as attributes of didactic affect in relation to contemporary ideas about the

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2 My use of the term artefact includes art.
efficacy or otherwise of interactivity in the museum. In the chapter I consider how critics variously deal with the issue of contrary meanings visitors deduce from exhibitions; meanings that may contest the interpretation that the museum intends. The implication of autonomous meaning-making despite, or in spite of, the efforts of the museum, raises the question of the museum’s influence. In probing this question, I find that critics do not move the interpretation of ‘meaning’ outside the discourse that frames their own critical analysis.

Yet there is a critical position primed to move beyond the axiomatic containment of the subject in structural and poststructural types of museum analysis; a fresh approach that contributes to the complexity and contradictions formative to the proto museum. These critics are quite disparate in their suggestions for the museum, some focus on art museums and others on ethnology or natural history museums. James Clifford called in the 1980s for a theoretical shift in museology to ‘reinvigorate the fetish’ in ethnographic museums while more recently James Elkins has tackled the issue of why people do or don’t cry in front of art. Both these critics, and the others whose work I investigate, are concerned with the realm of affect and the possibilities of infinite semiosis rather than the closure that limits affect in structural approaches to the museum. The idea of the museum as an autotelic entity encapsulates the approaches of many of these critics and gives autonomy to the museum outside structuralist concerns with knowledge/power relations and with the formation of the ideological subject.

In chapter four *Delirious Affect*, I draw together a range of extant thinking about affect. This is quite a complex task because what is called affect is often not, and what
is affect is frequently called something else. I seek to untangle some of these distinctions and to qualify between an emotion, feeling, sense, and the other phenomena that discursively construct perception. I argue the specificity of terms as I move toward a useful understanding of the implications of affect for the museum. The habit of blurring distinctions between cognitively perceived and abstract intensities is actuated in certain disciplinary areas of critical thinking about affect, and I raise here in particular the field of Affective Computing.

As part of the task to give acuity to affect I explore in some detail the tradition known as the sublime. This tradition offers an exemplar of the difficulty of positioning the meaning of affect within a discursive structure. Through my discussion of the sublime it emerges that the various approaches and definitions that attempt to produce an accurate, meaningful interpretation actually create the sublime lack. The notion of lack that arises from my discussion of the sublime is important to my thesis in relation to the Deleuzean concept of desire, and to the assemblage of the museum as a desiring-machine. For as humans constitute a desiring-machine, so does the autotelic museum. Lack is associated with the repressive forces of Oedipal psychoanalysis and capitalism, and with the structural containment of desire and subjectivity that Deleuze and Guattari are always probing to frustrate. Lack, rather than desire, is the tenor of the rational museum and will always move critical discussion away from the non-discursive mode of affect that I refer to as delirious. Delirious affect is the production of the schizo museum.

In chapter five *Show Time! Museums in Film*, I draw together critical theory and Deleuzean philosophy through a comparative approach to the way the fictional
museum is represented in films. I provide a series of analyses that structures these museums within a psychoanalytical, Oedipal narrative. I then offer a Deleuzean, anti-Oedipal approach to these museums. Deleuze’s approach to cinematic images describes their affective and inventive possibilities. Comparative readings of museums represented in films (including *Topkapi*, *Night at the Museum*, *Vertigo*, *La Jetée* and *Russian Ark*) offer both a critique of critical theory for its difficulty in acknowledging affect, and a sense of the affecting Deleuzean schizo museum. I suggest a corollary between the methodology that is used in film studies, which is strongly influenced by psychoanalytical theory, and the methodology of the new museology which subsumes expressive, affecting experience into structural or poststructural theory.

The thesis ends with a *Coda*, written in ficto-critical style, that acts itself as a line of flight, taking the project outside the strictly theoretical realm of an academic thesis. In the *Coda* I visit a whaling museum near the town of Albany on the southern coast of Western Australia. I also visit museums and memorial sites that are situated in and around Berlin. I leave the Coda to stand alone uncluttered by theory and citation out of respect for the intensity of affect that this study hopes, at least partially, to unfold.
1 Critical Theory and the New Museology

In popular representations, particularly films, the museum is a site of contradictory meanings: an architectural monument to Enlightenment reason and a maverick site where untimely events unfold to displace rational order. This fictional imagining is neglected in the critique of the new museology yet, as a signifier of the affecting museum, is worthy of critical consideration. A considerable proportion of the literature of the new museology tends to frame the museum in terms of its Enlightenment legacy; a didacticism not conducive to the museum as a site of affect and desire. Rather the museum’s ‘didactic’ legacy is entwined with the ambitions of Empire, colonial expansion and exploitation:

Britain and France were, for most of the nineteenth-century, locked into a vicious race for imperialistic expansion and global domination. Both the Louvre and the British Museum became cultural symbols of this, belatedly joined by the Berlin museums when Germany joined the colonial fray in the 1870s. (Schubert 2000:23)

The function of the national museum in imperial exploits and the aftermath of European imperialism make it unsurprising that the new museological literature is

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3 Michelle Henning notes that ‘the uncanny and fantastic qualities of museums and exhibitions are common themes in popular fiction’, but these ‘expressive’ attributes, have been given little attention in the critical literature (2006:100).

4 National museums across Europe and North America were modelled on the British Museum (established in 1759) and the Napoleonic Louvre. In Germany museums were founded from the 1870s with the proclamation of the German Empire. In America, major museums were also established during the 1870s including the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, the Museum of Fine Art in Boston and the Art Institute in Chicago.
vigilant about interrogating knowledge-power relations in the museum and that this
relation is generally held by critics to be an inherent feature of the museum.\footnote{The title of a wide-ranging anthology of essays on the modern European museum, *Grasping the World: The Idea of the Museum* (Preziosi and Farago 2004), links Enlightenment curiosity about the world with imperial ambition. A number of the texts are concerned with practices that stage and frame objects to privilege power relations. In this vein, the cover photograph of an earlier influential anthology *Exhibiting Cultures* (Karp and Lavine 1991), shows Indigenous Australian children waiting uneasily to perform at the opening of the 1982 Commonwealth Games in Brisbane; a white, uniformed guard appears to shun their presence. The image puts the issue of race relations and the continuing appropriation of living indigenous cultures, firmly in the purview of the museum, and the task of exposing and tackling this appropriation in the hands of the new museology.}

The inseparability of past museological practices with imperial exploitation is to a
certain extent ‘resolved’ in the present by the requirement of the Western museum to
implement, manage and comply with an agenda of social inclusion.\footnote{The idea of the socially inclusive museum is not new. It reframes nineteenth-century calls for social reform, and the idea that the museum should be open and accessible to all. See, for example, Tony Bennett *The Birth of the Museum* (1995) and Christopher Whitehead *The Public Art Museum in Nineteenth Century Britain* (2005).} It is the
museum’s commitment, or otherwise, to a policy of universal equity and access that is
a core concern in discourses of the new museology.\footnote{There is, for example, an annual conference dedicated to the idea of ‘The Inclusive Museum’ and an associated publication *The International Journal of the Inclusive Museum* \url{http://museum-journal.com}. For an article that suggests at the ‘exclusivity’ of the idea of the inclusive museum see Janice Baker ‘Beyond the Rational Museum: Toward a Discourse of Inclusion’ in *The International Journal of the Inclusive Museum*, vol. 1, 2008.} The Western concept of social
inclusion is primarily built upon the project of critical theory to understand and resist
exploitation whether based on class, gender, ethnicity, creed, or identity. Without
slighting the validity of this resistance, I am interested in whether the current
somewhat shaky theoretical-professional alignment in support of the ‘inclusive museum’ actually delimits affecting encounters in the museum; encounters that may
be an efficacious conduit to affirming alterity and the potential of new formations of
the human and nonhuman. There may be a telling cross implication here with the
problem that Michel Foucault discerned in the early 1980s arising from the increasing
legislation of personal practice, a trend he viewed as representing a new kind of
normative morality. He argued that this new morality required opposing by a genuine ethics of the self (McHoul 1996:386).

While the primary concern of this chapter is to review the application of critical theory to museological discourse and not to examine policies of social exclusion and inclusion, it is nevertheless relevant to acknowledge a certain dilemma for museums. Anwar Tlili has examined difficulties arising from the policy of social inclusion in British museums; difficulties applicable to European, Australian, and probably American museums. Broadly stated, these difficulties arise because the discursive strength of the concept of social exclusion stems from condensing complex processes into a manageable concept. A consequence of this truncation is that activities aimed at social inclusion, such as museum exhibitions and associated education programmes, are viewed as able to tackle unemployment, low education standards, crime and bad health (2008:130). A dilemma arises from the requirement to position museum practice in such a way as to enforce meanings that correspond to accessibility and the rhetoric of social inclusivity. The issue here is not the merit of inclusivity per se, but the normalising of a new didacticism as a discursive formation that ultimately may hinder the very renewal that the new museology seeks to facilitate.

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8 Tlili notes that, ‘in addition to the requirement that they should address the multiple barriers to access, and attract “priority groups” ie people from ethnic minorities and socio-economically deprived areas and people of disabilities, all of whom are underrepresented among museum visitors and users — museums are required to work in partnership with local communities and organizations from the public, private and voluntary sectors, to make themselves socially relevant and responsible through contributing to areas as varied as lifelong learning, community development and empowerment, urban regeneration and neighbourhood renewal, rehabilitation, health promotion and health care, all which are by and large unchartered territories for the conventional museum profession’ (2008:130). The mission of ‘getting more people in’ to museums also clashes with the fact that many social inclusion programmes are not cost effective (2008:142).

9 The dilemma is regularly raised in the media. For example, Christopher Allen in a review of the exhibition A Day in the Life of Pompeii at Melbourne Museum observes: ‘Aesthetically, the museum’s emphasis on accessibility results in a crowded and busy hanging [that] distracts from the experience of the frescoes included in the exhibition’. He describes, ‘a style of display’ that gives ‘the impression that it is designed for children or school groups, and in keeping with this family-friendly tone [we get] a somewhat sanitised view of a city’ (‘Frozen in Time’ Weekend Australian July 25-26, 2009, pp 8-9).
The method of the new museological literature

Jonathan Harris has identified a set of disciplinary methods and approaches, theories, and objects of study that comprise what he terms the shift from traditional art history to ‘new’, ‘radical’ or ‘critical’ art history. These sets of theories and approaches are useful in considering a not unrelated shift from traditional museology to what is often termed the ‘new’ museology:

(a) Marxist historical, political, and social theory, (b) feminist critiques of patriarchy and the place of women within historical and contemporary societies, (c) psychoanalytic accounts of visual representations and their role in ‘constructing’ social and sexual identity, and (d) semiotic (in Britain, ‘semiological’) and structuralist concepts and methods of analysing signs and meanings. (Harris 2001:7)

The use of these approaches (henceforth referred to as critical theory) to the analysis of museum practice has become the methodology of the ‘new museology’. Outcomes of the method relevant to my study include the above mentioned alignment with the politics of social inclusion; an alignment caught between affirming the didactic museum while simultaneously decrying it as nationalist, rational and bureaucratic. A second outcome arises from the postmodern ‘dissolution’ of the subject which makes it difficult to contemplate a subject-object position in the museum freed of the discursive structure within which it was formed.10

10 Catherine Burgass posits that the dissolution of the autonomous subject along with the invalidation of the metanarrative by postmodernism has cast an ‘irredeemable slur upon value’; it has disabled ‘the construction of any new object-or subject-centred ethics, aesthetics or axiology’ (1994:348).
A third outcome arising from critical theory in the new museology is the totalising negation arising from use of the prefix ‘NEW’ before new museology; what this implies is an opposition to all things determined ‘old’.\textsuperscript{11} By implication this positions ‘old’ ideas, including the notion of objects embodying meaning, as ‘uncritical’, anachronistic and/or romantic. Yet ‘old’ ideas are useful in considering the implications for museum discourse of complicating notions of the ‘subject’ and replacing static identity with a ‘body’ of multiple becoming subjectivities.

Prior to complicating the idea of the static subject it is necessary to consider the views of critics who have been influential in setting the parameters of the new museological project; views not able necessarily to affirm the potential that I discern in the affecting museum. A metaphor that sustains the discourse of these critics likens the museum to a mausoleum. Even if this metaphor is not engaged directly, it is implied. Daniel J. Sherman notes the museum as mausoleum metaphor ‘has become a discourse, a pervasive critique of the museum and its practices’ (1994:123). A useful starting point for this discourse is thus Sherman’s own contribution to it, in particular his response to the writings of the eighteenth-century French art critic Quatremère de Quincy (1755-1818).

\textsuperscript{11} In his editorial preface for The New Museology (1989), Peter Vergo declares a ‘widespread dissatisfaction with “old museology” which … resembled a “living fossil”’. He expands the metaphor by pejoratively comparing the museum and coelacanth, whose brain shrinks in the course of its development so that ‘in the end it occupies only a fraction of the space available to it’ (2000a:3).
The critical literature

Quatremère was aggrieved by the pillage of Roman antiquities to furnish the revolutionary Louvre and by Napoleon’s use of art purely for political advantage. Quatremère argued that a painting or a sculpture no longer had meaning once removed from the site it was originally intended to occupy. Although he had initially supported the Revolution, perceiving an opportunity for culture to play a leading role in the re-creation of society, he came to regret what he saw as the beginning of the decline of the Enlightenment model of Europe as a republic of art and culture, and the demise of Rome with the rise of the nation state (Déotte 2004). Quatremère’s Enlightenment utopianism, Catholicism and political activism were fully targeted toward a public rebuke of the Napoleonic Louvre. The rebuke was his means to counter the extreme nationalism espoused by Napoleon’s supporters, who amongst other things insisted France was not looting but saving Italy’s art.

While Quatremère’s statement that the museum ‘kills art’ relates to a particular revolutionary circumstance at a particular time it nevertheless echoes in modern and contemporary discourse. Sherman, for example, acknowledges the ‘sweep and

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12 The first modern museological text is said to be Samuel á Quiccheberg’s *Inscriptiones Vel Tituli Theatri Amplissimi* (1565) (Arnold 2006:15). This and other early museum criticism has a different tenor to the ‘mausoleum’ discourse I trace; it deals with different quarrels, for example, Galileo ‘had no complaints about a “regal gallery adorned with a hundred classical statues … and full of everything that is admirable and perfect”, but “the [studio] of some little man with a taste for curios who has been pleased to fit it out with things that have something strange about them” was, he felt, “nothing but bric-a-brac”’ (2006:15).
13 As part of Napoleon’s 1796 truce with the Duke of Parma, twenty major Italian paintings were ‘requisitioned’ for France. Henceforth, the looting of Italian art, including the Vatican collection, was ongoing. Also the treasures of the royal collections of Belgium, Austria and Germany were taken.
14 The Louvre was supposed to be a domain for the education and enlightenment of all citizens, and to play a central role in the ‘new society’, yet when it opened to the public the displays looked ‘suspiciously pre-Revolutionary’ (McClellan 1994:108).
15 In 1796 Quatremère was in hiding because his recent participation in a failed royalist uprising made him politically suspect.
16 The Louvre’s first director Francois de Neufchateau purported that works of art did not encounter their real meaning until they had been liberated by France. He writes of the Great Nation of France saving art from, ‘the decay in which religious prejudice and monastic ignorance has kept them buried for so long … At last, they have fulfilled their destination’ (cited in Déotte 2004:64).
passion’ of Quatremère’s counter-revolutionary politics but channels Quatremère’s counter-revolutionary agenda through Fredric Jameson’s concept of the political unconscious so that Quatremère becomes ‘a kind of pre-Marxist reworking a materialist subtext’ (1994:125,135). Sherman argues that the museum described by Quatremère operated within and tacitly ratified the ideology of the marketplace; objects in museums were about a system of value ‘a system of private commercial exchange transferred … abusively, to the public sphere’ (1994:129). Sherman elaborates: ‘Quatremère sees that, although museums ostensibly, and ostentatiously withdraw art objects from commercial circulation, the fetishisation they perform has the same effect as commodification’ (134). Although Sherman admires Quatremère’s writing as it ‘strips away the discourse of museums and exposes it precisely as discourse’, arguably Sherman makes this point from inside the discourse he suggests Quatremère exposes. It is telling to follow the trajectory of ‘unconscious discourse’ risen from Quatremère’s ‘nightmare … of an institution that “protects” art by depriving it of life’ (139). For example, in her study of the ‘museum as media’, Michelle Henning draws on ‘Sherman’s Quatremère’ when she suggests that if the market criteria of value and the aesthetic qualities which make something worth contemplating in the museum are identical, then ‘aesthetic contemplation in the museum is not too different from the contemplation of goods’ (2006:29). Although Henning does provide a concession in citing Didier Maleuvre’s view that a work of art is more than a commodity ‘it is a reflective commentary on the world’, she more strongly highlights the relationship between museums and department stores in terms

\[17\] Jameson’s premise is that cultural artefacts are an oblique representation of their historical circumstances and the role of the critic is to lay bare the roots of aesthetics in political and economic conditions and to explain why these roots have been obscured (Jameson 1981).
of commodification and signifiers of class (2006:30).18 Yet returning to the source (Quatremère’s writings), his affinity is neither with Maleuvre’s museum as a space for commentary and reflection, nor with commodity aesthetics.

Additionally, as Jean-Louis Déotte observes there are indications that Quatremère was actually sympathetic to the concept of the museum. Sherman discredits these indications yet Déotte writes that in Quatremère’s ‘writings on aesthetics, even and especially in his condemnation of the Museum, he always reverts, in spite of himself, to its state of “potentiality”’ (2004:57). Quatremère strongly supported that France restore and preserve the monuments of Nîmes, Arles, Orange and other Roman sites in order to provide exhibition space for local archaeological discoveries and he was intellectually attuned to the idea of the museum as a site for cultural encounters given that he held that Rome was already a museum of the world, ‘an entire world to be explored, a sort of three-dimensional mappamundi, which offers a condensed view of Egypt, Asia, Greece, and the Roman Empire, the ancient and the modern world’ (cited in Lavin 1992:57). As Déotte observes ‘the Museum of Rome [for Quatremère] already has all the characteristics of [a] centralized repository of all works of art, of the Louvre for example’ (2004:57).

18 Although Henning engages with a wide range of approaches to the idea of the museum, she does note that these engagements are underpinned by the fact that since the 1970s, economic systems have increasingly become dependent on high levels of consumer spending (2006:9). Thus, although Henning observes that ‘the objects in museums are not amenable to being reduced to documents, texts or representations’ (2006:2) yet it would seem that they are amenable to being understood as commodities. Her thoughtful survey does, nevertheless, represent a departure from received ideas about the museum exemplified by Emma Barker’s case studies in Contemporary Cultures of Display (1999).
‘Flood the museums!’ 19

Regardless of these indications, Quatremère continues to be seen by the majority of commentators as unsympathetic to the museum. Michelle Henning for example states that: ‘Many commentators from Quatremère de Quincy on, have seen museums as unable to provide an authentic experience since they sever things from their social context and their place in the world’ (2006:138). Within this discourse, Christopher Rovee, in a recent article on Keats’ museum poetry (Seeing the Elgin Marbles, Ode on a Grecian Urn) refers to a ‘connection between museums and refuse’ that goes back to Quatremère, who ‘considered museums’ “receptacles of factitious ruins”’ (2008). Rovee cites critics and artists who sustain ‘Quatremère’s idea of the museum’ and expand it to equivalence with ‘trash pits’. The discourse extends to: Baudelaire’s comparison of the modern poet to a raggpicker cum archivist; Victor Hugo’s ‘praise of the garbage heap as a perverse type of museum’; ‘F.T. Marinetti’s futurist manifesto with its stark analogy “Museums: Cemeteries”;’ ‘Theodor Adorno’s description of the museum as an “accumulation of excessive and therefore unusable capital”’; Kurt Schwitters’ Merz installations; Robert Rauschenberg’s combines; and Kelly Wood’s 1998-2003 Continuous Garbage Project (2008:994). Quatremère’s eighteenth-century counter-revolutionary propaganda has come to provide cultural meaning to an idea of the modern museum that carries into the twenty-first century.

The museum’s association with death and stasis held particular appeal for the early twentieth-century avant-garde.20 As Jean Cocteau drollly remarked: ‘The Louvre is a

19 F.P. Marinetti The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism, 1909.
20 Prior to the avant-garde, the museum as mausoleum metaphor was fuelled by dissatisfaction at the Victorian encyclopaedic obsession with the past, apparently accentuated by the sheer size of collections crammed into overcrowded galleries. Karsten Schubert writes of museums being ‘buried under the volume of acquisitions’ and notes: ‘The image of the British Museum as a dusty and unwelcoming
morgue; you go there to identify your friends’ (cited in Henning 2006:37). Museums are graveyards covering Italy according to Marinetti who proclaimed their destruction in the *Founding and Manifesto of Futurism* (1909):

> Today, we establish Futurism because we want to free this land from its smelly gangrene of professors, archaeologists, ciceroni and antiquarians. For too long has Italy been a dealer in second-hand clothes. We mean to free her from the numberless museums that cover her like so many graveyards. (cited in Henning 2006:38)

As with Quatremère, Marinetti’s iconoclasm needs to be contextualised. Marinetti’s politics were anchored in nineteenth-century Italian nationalism. Marinetti envisaged a ‘sublime violence’, a poetic anarchy, that would destroy the conventions of the past, including pasta and museums. Henning points out it was not the disorder of museums as a jumble of dead things that Marinetti decried (she notes his partiality to disorder), but a contempt for the past, for history and historicism. Marinetti had lived in Egypt and witnessed the appropriation of antiquities to furnish museums. He was sympathetic in this regard to Nietzsche’s understanding of antiquarianism as an excess of history (Henning 2006:40). Marinetti’s anarchism and Quatremère’s humanism reflect their intense aversion to the pillaging of antiquities to create national monuments to political power.

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storehouse was probably born during the late Victorian age. So overcrowded were the galleries that it took a long time to make amends and instigate reform’ (2000:29,25).

21 Italian nationalism, or Risogimento, led Marinetti and most of his followers into Italian colonial war mobilisation and later, into Fascism (Therborn 2003).
The zeal of Futurism resonated with the European avant-garde and museum/mausoleum discourse can be discerned in all the cultural and intellectual movements of the early twentieth-century. ‘Merde’ to ‘Académismes … Historiens … Museé!’ declares Apollinaire in *L’Antitradition Futuriste* (1913) (Storrie 2006:13).

In Russia polemic assumed an ideological urgency consistent with the fervour for change that followed the 1917 Revolution with Kazimir Malevich writing in 1919 of the need for representatives of the old culture to ‘crawl out of their cracks and come with their worn out old teeth to gnaw themselves a piece from the hem of the new coat’ (cited in Harrison, Frascina et al. 1993:241). *Le problème des musées* (1923) sees Paul Valéry expansive on the notion that the museum is ‘an accumulation of excessive and therefore unusable capital’ (Henning 2006:41). A statue of ‘Venus becomes a document’ as a result of the museum’s over accumulation of artefacts. Valéry’s ‘superficial’ museum is frequently alluded to in museum literature; a view of the museum brought on by his feeling physically constrained in the Louvre by various restrictions (having his cane removed and not being allowed to smoke). In this ‘unfamiliar state’ he experiences the confusion of too much stuff, projecting that, ‘cold confusion … reigns among the sculptures, a tumult of frozen creatures each of which demands the non-existence of the others, disorder strangely organised’ (cited in Adorno 1990:176).

Theodor Adorno, in his essay entitled the *Valéry Proust Museum* (c1940), compares Valéry’s adverse criticism of the Louvre with the pleasure Marcel Proust associates with museums. Adorno positions the opposing stances of the two writers within the ‘museums-kill-art’ discourse. In this essay Adorno pens his oft cited lines that ‘the German word “museal” has unpleasant overtones’, the museum and mausoleum, ‘are
connected by more than phonetic association. Museums are like the family sepulchres of works of art’ (1990:175). He frames the shift from use value to exchange value enshrined in the museum, in terms of death. Just as Sherman champions Quatremère’s ‘unconscious Marxism’, so Adorno applauds Valéry’s realisation that the museum is about excess and unusable capital, a view he relates, as did Marinetti, to Nietzsche’s reflection that all excesses of history are an abuse.

As with Sherman, it is outside Adorno’s theoretical purview to consider that ‘unconscious Marxism’ is the outcome of an affecting encounter in the museum. It seems ironic that the affectivity of the museum is reconfigured to evidence a theory that cannot accommodate the affective museum. Adorno further theoretically distances the museum from affect when he suggests that any critical force the museum might yield happens by the museum serving as ‘a metaphor … for the anarchical production of commodities in fully developed bourgeois society, [a] “magnificent chaos” set apart from and (for that very reason) critical of means-end capitalism’ (Rovee 2008:996).

Marcel Proust’s affecting experiences in museums are quite dissimilar to Valéry’s discomfort. Proust discerns that museums benefit his pleasure of viewing art; that painting and sculpture exhibited together increase his appreciation of the encounter. He writes of:
the exhilarating happiness that can be had in a museum, where the rooms, in their sober abstinence from all decorative detail, symbolise the inner spaces into which the artist withdraws to create the work.\(^22\)

(cited in Adorno 1990:179)

Proust’s pleasure is not separated from memory created anew with each museal experience; ‘works of art return home when they become elements of the observer’s subjective stream of consciousness’ (1990:184). Against this expression of reinvention, Adorno argues that Proust returns again and again to the mortality of artefacts because in becoming a part of the life of the person who observes them, they must die in order to be reborn. Adorno understands Proust’s affecting encounters,\(^23\) as he does Valery’s, not as affirming and generative but as a loss.

Museum/mausoleum discourse in the late twentieth-century is epitomised in Ian Burn’s *The art museum, more or less* (1990); the museum is an institution in which, ‘Decisions are made to exclude, segregate, disenfranchise, marginalise, affiliate, homogenise … This provides the basis of authority of the art museum and the organisation of its physical spaces … a spatial expression of power relations’ (1991:168). This statement articulates the manifesto and practice of *Art & Language*, a Marxist inspired art collective whose response to the museum’s authority is to invent taxonomies of order that expose the schemas of knowledge that underscore

\(^{22}\) There is an echo of Proust’s notion in Svetlana Alpers study of the artist’s studio as a simplified space where ‘the artist was able to withdraw “from the world for the purpose of attending better to it”’ (Arnold 2006:28).

\(^{23}\) Interestingly, Adorno connects Proust’s encounter with the notion that this event has transformed a painting into an alienated object. This implies that the artwork (before it ‘died’) had the power to ‘speak for itself’ which raises the spectre of meaning embodied in art being serendipitous, a notion surely antithetical to Marxist materialism.
museum practice. In Documenta Index (1972) for example, filing cabinets are filled with texts by the group arranged by compatibility, incompatibility and incomparability. The concept is to use the index to suppress conventional emotive responses in both the artist and the spectator while Index: Incident in a Museum (1986) deals with the idea that conceptual art is unwelcome in major art museums.

A shift from conventional ‘non-linguistic’ forms of art to theoretical or conceptual practice based in political action and community was seen by Art & Language as a way of responding to an ideological crisis in art. A crisis that unfolded in part because: ‘The corporate-like institutions of the New York art world and its international art marketing system were increasingly acting to determine the public meaning of works of art’ (Burn 1991:107). These views recall Adorno’s dismay at the commodification of art: ‘The perpetuation of galleries depends on the trading of unique objects, which might be acquired as property and/or investment’ (1991:108).

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24 An impressive body of art has accumulated that exposes, tackles and/or reconfigures the museum’s knowledge/power schemas. Macdonald and Basu suggest that this ‘institutional critique’ or ‘reflexivity’ appears to have become a new orthodoxy (2007:20). A few examples will suffice. Mark Dion’s installation Scala Naturae is a ‘chain of being’ using single objects to represent grand narratives to convey the illusionary construction behind master narratives and techniques of display employed by natural history museums and the ideology embedded in them (McShine 1999:98). Damien Hirst’s Isolated elements swimming in the same direction for the purpose of understanding (1991) accords a display of fish as didactic specimens a pleasing, decorative appeal; the glass case fetishises them as objects, conferring them with preciousness. Jac Lierner’s Names (Museums) (1992) creates an appealing taxonomy out of museum shop bags with the repetition of logos and designs a distinctive branding that comments on commodity fetishism.

25 Art & Language are critical of the exclusivity, elitism and exploitative practices of art museums, yet in 1999 had a major survey at PS1 MoMA, NY, The Artist Out of Work: Art & Language 1972-1981. Also, notably, Ian Burn’s conceptual art is represented in all major public Australian collections. It is a contradiction that runs through the avant-garde project. Claes Oldenburg’s installation The Street 1960 set out to reject the modern art museum: ‘I am for an art that does something other than sit on its ass in a museum’ (Barker 1999:38) yet he set up the Judson Gallery in New York to display his art. Boris Groys discusses this contradiction in relation to the artists of the Russian avant-garde who were ‘well aware of the internal contradiction arising between, on the one hand, the demand for a rejection of the museum and historicism in favour of an immediately experienced reality, and, on the other, the specific, historically innovative nature of their own works, which acquired significance only within the museum system of representation’ (1994:152). Grunenberg also observes that no matter how determined and radical the attempts of counter-culturalists to disrupt the confines of the museum, pragmatics ensured ‘most of them returned to the white cube’ (41).
‘On the museum’s ruins’

Donald Crimp begins his essay *On the Museum’s Ruins* (1985), by quoting Theodor Adorno’s ‘museal mortality’ before arguing that postmodernity represents the commencement of a new episteme and the foreclosure of modernism. Within this new postmodern episteme the museum and art history are ‘ripe for analysis in Foucault’s terms’ (Crimp 1985:45). The implication is that the museum sits alongside the asylum, the clinic, and the prison; that there is conceptual contiguity between these institutions of confinement through their discursive formation of specific forms of social order.

Yet Tony Bennett (1988), while taking up Crimp’s suggestion, does not view the museum as a place of confinement like prisons and asylums, but instead as a site of exhibition forming part of a larger ‘exhibitionary complex’ of discipline and power, ‘a set of cultural technologies concerned to organize a voluntarily self-regulatory citizenry’ (2004b:416). The exhibitionary complex includes: art museums, history and natural science museums, dioramas and panoramas, national and, later, international exhibitions, arcades and department stores. This complex serves as a linked site for ‘the development and circulation of disciplines (history, biology, art history, anthropology)’ and ‘their discursive formations (the past, evolution, aesthetics, Man)’ (2004b:413). One dissimilarity Bennett notes between the exhibitionary complex and the formation of Foucault’s ‘carceral archipelago’, is that the former provides context for the permanent display of power while the latter, via the ‘spectacle of the scaffold’, is ‘episodic’, that is, a ‘system of power in the absence of continual

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26 In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault describes how governmental programs, such as welfare and education, expand from the disciplinary control of the carceral archipelago to create a society of appeased bodies submissive to the state (1995).
supervision’ (2004b:419). The museum is part of a larger endeavour to make populations self-managing so they do not need forced direction. It functions as a ‘capillary system for the distribution of culture’, radiating out according to ‘the principle of the multiplication of utility’ (1998:110). In the notion of the self-regulating subject it is perhaps the school, university or library, rather than the prison that is the more appropriate Foucauldian institution of comparison with the museum. And indeed, in discussing his idea of ‘heterotopia’ (addressed below), Foucault compares the museum to the library (and cemetery), rather than the prison (Foucault 2004).

Tony Bennett’s ongoing project to discern the management power of museums extends to the museum’s early relation, cabinets of curiosity. Although Bennett does not specifically connect cabinets with the exhibitionary complex he positions them, along with the pre-Napoleonic Louvre, within a Foucauldian framework: ‘The cabinet of curiosity became a key locale for ritualised forms of social exchange that were calculated to forge and strengthen bonds of civic solidarity’ (2004a:171). But he then concedes, citing Stafford (1993), that the cabinet of curiosity ‘resembled the apparent disorganisation of talk in which a miscellany of objects “chatted” among themselves and with the spectator’ (2004a:171). The regulatory role of the curiosity cabinet as a ‘ritual form’ seems somewhat tenuous in this concession as it allows that the Renaissance spectator creates their own stories ‘by filling in the bits, the spaces, between objects’. Tenuous because Bennett’s ‘spectator’ and the objects on display have the attributes of autonomous agents generating meaning, rather than a subject discursively proscribed through social ‘calculation’ and ‘ritual’. Multiple events seem

27 The distance between ‘exhibition’ and ‘confinement’ is conveyed in Bennett’s observation: ‘It seems unlikely, come the revolution, that it will occur to anyone to storm the British Museum’ (2004b:422).
to be *co-occurring* here: the subjective act of individuals filling gaps to create meaning, the objects embodying meaning, and a collective meaning that represents a form of ‘disciplinary’ regulation through strengthening of civic solidarity. Bennett considers these events operating together within the Renaissance episteme. He then notes the transition from curiosity cabinets to museums, ‘the cabinet of curiosity was transformed into the museum of natural history, and in the process, became charged with the task of public instruction’ (2004a:173). Here, in the eye becoming ‘disciplined’ and the ‘uncompromising visual didactics’ of the museum, Bennett suggests: ‘It was this that Foucault had in mind when, in his account of the classical episteme, he refers to natural history as “nothing more than the nomination of the visible”’ (172). This does not seem to negotiate a fundamental shift that Foucault identifies between discourse of the classical episteme and the modern. Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan note this shift, explaining that classical discourse ‘ensured the initial, spontaneous, unconsidered deployment of representation in a thing’ while ‘nineteenth century knowledge, by contrast displaced representation. In its place there arose the subject, man, who bases his knowledge … upon the factual nature of his historical perspective’ (1977:314).

This raises a difficulty with Bennett’s application of Foucauldian theory. Bennett seeks to connect rather than distinguish a basic epistemological difference between seventeenth-century curiosity cabinets and the modern museum. A difficulty given expression in Michel de Certeau’s observation: ‘When a theoretical point of view is extended beyond the field within which it was elaborated, where it remains subject to a system of verification, does it not … cross the line between scientific “theories” and scientific “ideologies?”’ (de Certeau 2004:40). As Stephen Bann observes, at the very
least, cabinets of curiosity were a personal, authored display, ‘a display as a subjective act of enunciation’ whereas museums aspire to ‘a display without an author’ (2003:123). Hence cabinets tend toward the non-discursive rather than being pulled into the public discursive realm of meaning. ²⁸ De Certeau’s theory of the tactical production of meaning in the everyday is useful in relation to the idea of non-discursive affect that I outline in chapter four, for the moment though it is notable that de Certeau does not view human ‘tactics’ as an instrument of an agency of control. On the contrary he proposes that, ‘Foucault’s “microphysics of power”²⁹ needs … to be inserted into the microphysics of human agency itself (Frijhoff 1999:94).

Andrea Witcomb also articulates a difficulty with Foucauldian approaches to museums, notably that by framing the discursive practices of museums solely within disciplinary imperatives, these approaches limit ‘museum practices and institutional contexts that stand outside of them’ (2003:12). Witcomb distinguishes between different uses of Foucault in museum discourse. One approach views the museum as an entity of surveillance that needs to be unmasked. The other approach she relates to Bennett’s use of Foucauldian themes to ‘bear against the simple oppositional politics of many Marxist approaches to museum critique’ (2003:16). What this approach articulates is that Bennett does not support the idea of the ‘ruling-class hegemony’ of

²⁸ In terms of discourse theory, a distinction can be made between the public and ‘private’ museum. For example, in the collections that formed the public museums in England such as the British Museum, artefacts were given definition in terms of the public gaze and thus became open to discursive takeover. In contrast, the private collections and curiosity cabinets that are the antecedents of University-based museums such as the Ashmolean and Pitt-Rivers Museums in Oxford, along with ‘house museums’ such as Sir John Soames Museum and Dennis Severs’ House in London accord with Foucault’s fascination for the non-discursive potential of the marginal. Discourse theory thus departs from a critique in the new museology that is interested to establish a continuum between early cabinets and the rise of the public museum. Early European princely collections of treasures are inherently non-discursive, that is, even though intended to signify a certain type of power, this is removed from the public authority of the modern state, bureaucracy and rationalisation. Rather these collections were rooms that served as a ‘secret non-public transactive space between its owner and his guests’ (Arnold 2006:26).

²⁹ The microphysics of power; ‘in which power exists in and through the technical forms in which it is exercised’ (Bennett 2004a:6).
museums; instead he explores the ‘very rationality’ of museums themselves. Sherman’s reading of Quatremère de Quincy’s ‘unconscious Marxism’ described earlier, is probably the kind of hegemonic analysis that Bennett seeks to rethink. Witcomb points out that while Bennett’s view is useful in terms of rethinking power relations, it does not move to conceive ‘of the museum as an institution that may not be always concerned with relations of power’ (2003:17).

**Donna Haraway and the ‘Teddy Bear Patriarchy’**

Tony Bennett’s response to Donna Haraway’s (1985) analysis of the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH), which she refers to as a ‘Teddy Bear Patriarchy’, indicates the difference he discerns between ruling class hegemony and the museum’s power as ‘rationality’. Haraway’s study reflects her feminist positioning of the Museum as an institution of class power instilled through a patriarchy embodied in the ethos and politics of Theodore (Teddy) Roosevelt (whose father founded the AMNH in 1869) and the Museum’s wealthy trustees. There is no space in her reading for considering the generation of meanings that are outside those intended by the Patriarchy. Haraway’s influential case study examines the activities of the early years (1908-1936) of the AMNH. She argues that the ‘natural sciences’ were used by the Museum as an antidote against what the great American capitalists perceived was a looming class war. To this end, the Museum’s ‘public health role’ was achieved through racial doctrines contained as knowledge and realised in its activities of exhibition, conservation, and eugenics (Haraway 2004:248). ‘Hygienic intervention’ was thus presented to the public as moral and educative, with the Museum’s trustees pleased to observe that through visiting the museum, children had
‘become more reverent, more truthful, and more interested in the simple and natural laws of their being’ (243).

Bennett does not disagree with Haraway’s analysis of the AMNH’s activities, rather he heightens its potency by taking issue with her view of the Museum as a vehicle solely for promulgating a ruling class ethos established as a private institution owned and controlled by New York’s major capitalist families. He contends that this interpretation is too narrow and that rather than a ‘private’ Museum, the AMNH was, in a Foucauldian sense, actually the very model of a governmental institution (Bennett 2004a:117). Bennett is particularly interested in this and other museums’ link to political and social theory. He reveals that cultural governance at the AMNH was part of a larger social and political apparatus than Haraway’s institution dominated by a coterie of powerful men. This apparatus has to do with American neo-liberalism and the museum using objects in typological displays to produce evolutionary narratives that underscore political agendas. Bennett argues that the focus on ‘Civilization’ reflected the values of American neo-liberalism, values that differed to the previous moral agenda and reforming zeal of museums which underscored mid nineteenth-century liberalism (Witcomb 2005).

In his study, Pasts Beyond Memory: Evolution, Museums, Colonialism, Bennett describes how museums of the past invented the systems of classification and exhibition that produced distinctive forms of knowledge that rationalised and ranked human beings hierarchically (2004a). He describes how museum objects were used by various scientific disciplines to make evolutionary histories visible and perceptible through the temporal sequencing of artefacts. There is no disputing the acumen of
Bennett’s analysis. However, in its focus on the production of meaning to advance the
tenets of liberalism, that is, the museum’s knowledge/power relation, there is little
concerning the *physical* affect of a ‘civilizing’ sequence upon a visitor. Yet an
artefact, even while positioned within a didactic narrative sequence, remains a distinct
entity with the capacity to affect in ways not only outside the intent of the display, but
that may contest it. In Bennett’s rational museum, there is little chance for a visitor’s
encounter with an artefact or display to annul or contradict the meanings imposed by
the exhibitionary complex. Ultimately, Bennett’s Foucauldian motivation is to avoid a
Marxist critique of the museum that offers ‘resistance’ to institutional hegemony
because Bennett views this form of resistance as hopelessly romantic. Despite Bennett
counterpoising governmentality to ideology and refusing to cast his own analysis in
terms of hegemony, the effect on critically understanding the museum does not really
change. They are still ‘authoritative’ places concerned with power.

**Museums as ritual**

The tenor of museum/mausoleum discourse gained potency with an influential
semiotic feminist analysis (1978) of the Museum of Modern Art, New York (MoMA)
by Carol Duncan and Alan Wallach. They read the layout of art across the Museum as
a gendered narrative in which American abstract art is transcendent over other art,
notably paintings and sculptures of European female nudes. Their proposition is that
the Western museum is an ideological instrument that creates a ritual. They describe
MoMA as a ‘ritual walk’ that commences for visitors at the Museum’s entrance
where: ‘Separated from the movement of the street, you are released into the space of

30 They view the Museum’s layout as a labyrinth, the effect of which, as in tradition, is about
overcoming the experience of being ensnared by the Goddess. The labyrinthine ordeal, is a ‘male
spiritual endeavour in which consciousness finds its identity by transcending the material, biological
world and its Mother Goddess’ (Duncan and Wallach 2002:493).
the interior like a molecule into a gas’ (Duncan and Wallach 2002:486). In this state you ‘walk through an irrational world in which everyday experience looms as monstrous and unreal compared with the higher realm of dematerialized spirit’ (295). The ‘irrational world’ experienced by the visitor is part of the ritual to maintain the Museum’s dominance as a patriarchal, capitalist entity. In common with Haraway and Bennett’s critiques of the AMNH, there is no option to consider a visitor to MoMA encountering the ‘irrational world’ of the Museum in an alternative way.31 Duncan contends that museums are ‘excellent fields in which to study the intersection of power and the history of cultural forms’ (1995:6). She explores this notion in Civilizing Rituals (1995) where she expands her study that public art museums are environments structured around specific rituals. Her concern is ‘with the way art museums offer up values and beliefs — about social, sexual and political identity — in the form of vivid and direct experience. Her study culminates with the recognition that museums are ‘gendered ritual spaces’ that accord ‘with the consumerist culture outside’ (1995:2).

During the 1990s, Alan Wallach continued to examine the role of North American art institutions as producers and conveyers of ideologies, including his study of The West in America (1991), an exhibition that sought to reinterpret paintings of ‘wild west’ subjects as instruments of domination. The exhibition was described by the art historian Simon Schama as: ‘A relentless sermon, phenomenally condescending to both the painters and the painted’ (cited in Wallach 1994:93). In considering the disdain the exhibition generated, which appears to have been largely due to tactless

31 Christoph Grunenberg also describes MoMA’s various ‘capitalist’ techniques and identifies its role during the late 1960s and early 1970s as ‘the cultural arm of American Imperialism’. However, he does acknowledge that this is a critique, also exemplified by Duncan and Wallach, that ‘no less than the museum itself, can be seen as political or even ideological in the assumptions on which it is based’ (Barker 1999:37).
Wallach determines that museums are incapable of providing a critique of ideology as this would strike at the very heart of their traditional function; ‘already inscribed in any given museum space is a set of meanings that work against any sort of critical narrative’ (1994:98). Wallach’s view frames the museum as an institution in perpetual stasis. Yet this is overly pessimistic, for alongside the ‘set of meanings’ that he claims work against change, there always exists the possibility of another set of meanings.

In relation to *The West in America*, it seems that an outcome of a trend of the museum reflexively examining its past hegemonic practices is a heavy moral stance towards these past practices (what Simon Schama decries as a ‘holier than thou’ attitude). Thomas Seligman expresses concern with this kind of ‘morally imperialistic’ approach in his discussion about the collection of cultural property: ‘[A]re we now guilty of trying to impose our new-found values on the responsible methods for dealing with another culture’s property, on that culture?’ (cited in Bal 1999:203). I argue that an invigoration of affect offers a response to this postmodern moment in exhibition culture, a moment which seems to evade both art and viewer.

Wallach’s critique (2003) of the exhibition *Norman Rockwell: Pictures for the American People*, held at New York’s Guggenheim Museum in 2001, restates his view that the museum is an immutably authoritative institution. The authority in this case is corporatisation. Rockwell (1894-1978) was a popular illustrator whose work Wallach opines is ‘almost entirely devoted to bland patriotic myths of American goodness and innocence’ (2003:98). Rockwell represents, for Wallach, everything that modernism abhorred. Thus the re-branding of Rockwell by an iconic modernist
museum represents for Wallach ‘a triumph of corporatisation’. Wallach contends that American art museums in late capitalist society: ‘In their operation and their approach to the public, have increasingly come to resemble the corporations that, for the most part, now support them’ (2003:100). Wallach divides the history of the American art museum in the twentieth-century into two phases he calls, ‘Robber Baron and Blockbuster’ (102). The ‘blockbuster age’ of the museum he observes kicking off at the Metropolitan Museum in 1963 when corporate wealth began to supplant the individual donations of ‘robber barons’. Wallach views the reach of corporatisation as totalising: ‘[A]t the museum, visitors simply put themselves in the hands of professionals and experts who furnish them with information and insight. In this respect, they are not very different from corporate clients in need of specialized services’ (107). He determines that a museum visit is no different, in a structural sense, from a trip to a shopping mall or Disneyland.

It may be that there is a ‘structural’ similarity between walking through a shopping mall and a ‘walk through’ of a public art museum, nevertheless in notable ways the two events are experientially distinct. An anticipated adrenalin rush achieved at Disneyland with like-minded thrill seekers in a space craft simulating warp-drive is akin to an exciting group sport. It is very unlike the surprise of tears when viewing Emily Kngwarreye’s painting Big Yam or encountering the bones and bottled blubber of a harpooned whale in a whaling museum. For Kngwarreye’s yam and the dead whale’s body parts transmit a discernable some-thing that is affectively assembled as a relation between the viewer and artefact before an emotional response is formulated.

32 I refer here to Emily Kame Kngwarreye (c.1910-1996) Big Yam (1996), synthetic polymer on paint on canvas, 4 panels, overall size 245 x 401 cm, collection of the National Gallery of Victoria (exhibited in Utopia: The Genius of Emily Kame Kngwarreye, National Museum of Australia, August-October 2008), and to artefacts on permanent display at Whale World Albany, an industrial museum in Western Australia.
A compensatory exhilaration

Like Alan Wallach, the art historian Rosalind Krauss dislikes the museum as an industrialised area of leisure, ‘a simulacral experience’ like Disneyland (2004:612). In her critique The postmodern museum without walls (1986), she extends André Malraux’s 1947 idea of le musée imaginaire to the contemporary museum. Malraux’s imaginary ‘museum without walls’ conceived a virtual museum made up of reproductions; a space where the viewer’s imaginative play is welcome, a utopian view of the universalisation of modernism. The fate of this idea in the late twentieth-century, according to Krauss, is a museum where ‘high art and mass culture are busy imitating each other, in which bits and shards of the entire history of art as well as the entire field of advertising and kitsch production get collaged into a single picture, and in which the reigning style is pastiche’ (1996:346). Echoing Duncan, she describes museums as a ritual walk, ‘a sort of narrative trajectory with each room the place of a separate chapter, but all of them articulating the unfolding of the master plot’ (343). Recalling Adorno and Valéry she writes of objects ‘ripped away from their sites of origin’ and ‘transplanted to the site of reproduction’ where they are ‘unmoored from their original scale’ (344).

Krauss carries forward the argument that the ritualising mode of the museum is complicit with corporate capitalism in her essay The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalist Museum (1990). Here she notes a shift in museum collections from cultural patrimony to capital; collections are ‘stocks or assets whose value is one of pure exchange and thus only truly realized when they are put in circulation’ (2004:602). She associates this ‘radical revision’ in museums with the serialisation of Minimalism. The idea behind the 1960s project of Minimalism was to erode idealist
notions of creative authority and to resist consumer culture by restoring an immediacy of bodily experience. Drawing on Fredric Jameson’s logic of ‘cultural re-programming’, Krauss argues it was a project that backfired:

[W]hile the artist might be creating a Utopian alternative to, or compensation for a certain nightmare induced by industrialization or commodification, he is at the very same time projecting an imaginary space which if it is shaped somehow by the structural features of that same nightmare, works to produce the possibility for its receiver fictively to occupy the territory of what will be a next, more advanced level of capital. (2004:608)

She discusses this phenomenon as an outcome of Minimalism’s project to engage at the ‘knife-edge of perception’, to ‘decode signs that emerge from within a no longer mappable or knowable depth’ (2004:609). The outcome of this attempt is that an ‘older subjectivity’ has been suppressed in the museum. In what Jameson calls ‘the waning of affect’, there is now the experience of ‘hysterical sublime’ or what Krauss describes as ‘a strange compensatory decorative exhilaration’ (610). The waning of affect, or of ‘older emotions’, is compensated by a form of simulation that Krauss calls ‘a free-floating and impersonal feeling dominated by a peculiar kind of euphoria. The Baudrillardian experience of hyperspace Krauss would argue is occurring in tandem with ‘how the museum itself is being reprogrammed’ (610). There is a sense here of what Foucault calls a ‘heterotopia’, a site he contrasts to a utopia. A utopia is a fundamentally unreal place (Heaven, Valhalla, Hell etc). A heterotopia is a real-time, real-space human construction that can be pointed to on a map but that functions to accumulate time. It acts as a ‘sort of absolute break with … traditional time’, a place
where ‘time never stops building up and topping its own summit’ (Foucault 2004:377). A heterotopia is ‘a placeless place’ like a mirror, ‘an unreal, virtual space that opens up behind the surface; I am there, there where I am not’ (374). The museum, Foucault suggests, represents such a place. So too does the cemetery, ‘since for the individual … it begins with loss of life … dissolution and disappearance’ (377).

In relation to Krauss’s study, a qualification is required. Krauss allows for a certain form of affect having meaning in the past and she is not against pre postmodern forms of understanding, nor does she have a fixed view of what museums are or are not. This is unlike Bennett for example, for whom any consideration of affect reverts to a romantic idealism that is akin to putting a fox in the chicken coop. This is a timely point to concede that critics may acknowledge affect but that often this is deferred into an emotional form of learning I contend is not actually affect because the intensity is subsumed in a discursive focus on meaning. I unfold this idea across later chapters.

Returning to the corporatisation of museums, Wallach’s views revived an earlier critique of the museum by Hans Haacke (1984). Haacke was particularly bothered by the phenomenon of trained arts managers: ‘Trained by prestigious business schools, they are convinced that art can and should be managed like the production and marketing of other goods’ (2004:401). Haacke provides numerous examples of what he deduces the outcome of this ‘mentality’ in museums: ‘[T]he Museum of Modern Art, having erected a luxury apartment tower over its own building, is also now actively involved in real estate’ and, ‘Directors in private US museums need to be
tuned primarily to the frame of mind represented by the *Wall Street Journal*, the daily source of edification of their board members’ (2004:403,407). In England he cites the mutually beneficial connection between the Saatchi advertising empire, the Tate Gallery, Whitechapel Gallery and the election of Margaret Thatcher. In Germany he cites the relationship between museums, the chocolate empire of the collector Peter Ludwig and various tax rorts that mean ‘the ordinary taxpayer winds up subsidizing Ludwig’s power ambitions in the art world’ (2004:404).

Drawing into his argument Marx’s notion that consciousness is a social product and not private property, Haacke states that museums that claim to offer impartial scholarship suffer ‘from idealist delusions about the non-partisan character of consciousness’ (2004:406). Haacke’s concerns anticipate those of Wallach: ‘Through naïveté, need or addiction to corporate financing, museums are now on the slippery road to becoming public relations agents for the interests of big business and its ideological allies. Rather than sponsoring intelligent, critical awareness, museums thus tend to foster appeasement’ (2004:411). It is difficult to refute the force of Haacke and Wallach’s arguments not the least because this situates the refutation in the realm of ‘idealistic delusion’. Yet, alongside the power relations operating in the ‘corporate’ museum is a myriad of intellectual activity distant from sponsorship and real estate deals. Additionally, the very force of corporatisation stimulates critical response within the museum. And surely museum directors and curators with an understanding of the corporate world are far more able to claim their own critical voice within this world. Knowledge is after all, power.
Museums as text

Andrea Witcomb contends that critics, such as the art historian Mieke Bal, who apply textual readings to museums are those most strongly focused on questions of power. She describes Bal’s analysis of the American Museum of Natural History as ‘an exercise in the deployment of representation as domination’. A consequence being that: ‘Bal builds a picture of the AMNH in which the power of the curator to control their audience’s reading of an exhibit is never questioned. Meanings are fixed and by extension so are the power relations between the museum and its audiences’ (2003:14).

Bal argues that her project is not a case of exposing a linguistic imperialism but an ethical pursuit that ‘denies the museal practice of its innocence, and provides it with an accountability that its users are entitled to’ (1999:214). Yet, while Bal may rethink the way that museums are thought of, she does not move outside the parameters of the discourse she maps. This said, her analysis of painting differs from her reading of museums. Bal does seem to argue for what a painting might do as opposed to what it means. An example is her reading of Johannes Vermeer’s Woman Holding a Balance (c1663) in which she includes depressions in the plaster above its hanging position as part of the viewing experience. Norman Bryson points out that while this kind of interpretation might seem a ‘recipe for finding infinitely “open” texts’, Bal argues that works of art cannot ‘signify indefinitely in all directions, for the reason that it is particular viewers who activate their potential, in their specific circumstance’ (2001:5). This position has merit but is not a perspective that Bal extends to the idea of the museum as an affecting space. There is thus a need to distinguish in Bal’s work between reading an artwork with the ‘autonomy’ she extends to the subjective voice
Bal develops her narrative theory of the museum across a number of essays. In *The Discourse of the Museum* (1999) she argues that in the use of rhetoric and narrative, cultural imperialism is the core of the problem of art and ethnographic museums. She cites the dispersal of Mark Rothko’s paintings across Western museums as replicating a colonialist legacy in that a particular, single meaning is repeated in many different contexts. She draws attention to the ‘blinding effect of sameness’ in this form of repetition (Bal 1999:205). Bal’s museum narratology is intended to help ‘understand the effectivity of the museum’s rhetoric’ (208) through reading the discursive strategies the museum puts in place. Her essay *On Show: Inside the ethnographic museum* is an extension of Donna Haraway’s (1989) critique of the early years of the AMNH (discussed above). Where Haraway describes and criticises the way in which the collection was compiled in the past, Bal considers how the Museum justifies or passes off the legacy of that past in the present (2001:122). The narrative presented in the AMNH, she argues, is ‘that of fixation, of the denial of time’. In line with Haraway she relates the monumentality of the Museum in terms of its primary meaning inherited from its history; ‘comprehensive collecting as an activity within colonialism’ (Bal 2001:119,121).

Explicating Bal’s narratological reading further: in asking who is the ‘I’ speaking in the AMNH, Bal concludes it points to itself. It points to its own complicity in ‘practices of domination’ while continuing to pursue an educational project that is based upon those practices. The form of this address is:
‘I’ says to ‘you’ what ‘they’ are like.

In this mode ‘the representation of the peoples of Africa as visually graspable actively deprives them of their history, in a manner that does not break radically with the colonial imposition of “foreign influences”’(Bal 2001:153). What is told is not the story of the peoples represented, nor of nature, but of knowledge, power, and colonisation — of power/knowledge. Bryson explains: ‘Visitors to the museum cannot take the position of I, cannot answer back to the museological narrative. The I that speaks the museum’s story obscures itself, presenting the displays in the museum as if they spoke for themselves’ … ‘I vanishes, you is silenced, they are presented in effigy’ (Bal 2001:17). (A comment, I note, in line with the museum/mausoleum metaphor).

Bal argues that the AMNH should provide a sense of its own historical embedding. For example, it could critically interpret the monumental texts exalting *Manhood, Youth, Nature,* and *The State* written by Theodore Roosevelt and engraved on the Museum’s walls. She writes: ‘The agency of these statements, which in the first half of the twentieth-century were intended to have everlasting, universal value, could be inscribed within the chain of history by pointing out how they demonstrate what history most prominently is — change’ (2001:123). This form of institutional revisionism accords with Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s theory (expanded upon later) that museum collections ‘hold within them a history of sensibilities, their rise, demise, and potential for recuperation’ (2004:4). Acknowledging the transformative potential of objects *alongside* the view held by Tony Bennett that museums are blunt ‘instruments for the shaping of sensibility’ (2004:4) allows for the inherent
contradiction of the museum to be seen as potentially affirming rather than solely exploitative.

Bal’s narratological approach is less accommodating of such contradiction. Her approach invites a comment drawn from James Clifford’s work on textualisation and ethnographic authority (Clifford 1988). He writes that: ‘Interpretation, based on a philological model of textual “reading”, has emerged as a sophisticated alternative to the now apparently naïve claims for experiential authority’ (38). This interpretive process, which arose in the 1970s, involves the translation of research experience into ‘a textual corpus’ that is separate from its occasion of production. He observes that such a textualised ritual is no longer closely linked to the production of that ritual. The point being that the ‘data’ reformulated by this process of textualisation need no longer be understood as the communication of specific persons (1988:39). If this notion is applied to Bal’s reading of the museum’s deformation of ‘I, you and they’ (2001), is she not distancing her data from the possibility of alternative meanings being generated by a specific person?

Bal continues to examine narratological meaning in her essay On Grouping: The Caravaggio Corner (2001) where she interprets what happens when groups of paintings are placed and viewed together in a gallery. But her interest is not to discern what happens as an affecting encounter. Rather what happens for Bal is the narrative that unfolds. It is too complex for the purpose of this discussion to detail her insightful reading of three paintings, two by Caravaggio and a third by Baglione,33 but in brief, she unfolds the way that the installation has enabled her to understand a particular

33 Caravaggio, Amor Vincit Omnia (1602) and Doubting Thomas (1600-01); Giovanni Baglione Heavenly Amor Defeats Earthly Love (1602-03) Berlin-Dahlem, Gemäldegalerie.
homoerotic narrative. She writes that ‘the intricate relations this story tells me about while staging the story before and for me — connections between social and private pleasures and pains, power and submission, and above all the fragility of these positions, and the place of vision in all that — leave me breathless’ (2001:186).

Bal is transformed by an unexpected physical intensity: a ‘breathless’ state. It is giving attention to the autonomy of this affective state that is overlooked in Bal’s and in much museum discourse. Bal positions her ‘feeling’ within a didactic framework, as an operation built into the installation’s narrative. She recounts being breathless as the result of understanding a narrative she was previously unaware of; a narrative about male power relations. But this may be missing the point. Although her reading of the narrative gives concise expression to the unexpected story about male relations it imparted to her, perhaps it was not the narrative that made her breathless. Rather it was the sensation of an intricacy outside her usual subjective state; a corporeal awareness swept into her conventional set of subjective references, a sensation Gilles Deleuze affirms as becoming human.

Summary
A miniature, carved wooden canoe on display at Pitt Rivers Museum in Oxford is seen through a glass vitrine in Lothar Baumgarten’s photograph *Unsettled Objects* (1969). The diminutive vessel is the smallest of a crowd of canoes; a decorative object rather than a working vessel. In the photo the canoe appears overwhelmed and forsaken. The title suggests it has lost its way by removal from its origin and relocation in a museum. The artist states, ‘The uprooted character of their new existence reduces them often to the aesthetic or curious nature of their appearance …
In the name of science, they have been stripped and deformed, reduced to research material. There is no peace to be found for them as acquisitions’ (cited in McShine 1999:94). The statement recalls Paul Valéry’s ‘cold confusion’ of objects displayed too closely together in the museum and removed from their original meaning. Yet, as I view the photo, the tiny canoe and its miniature occupant cross the vicissitudes of time. The act of evoking an unsettled object gives the canoe a tenacity that is both inanimate and human; the affect of the work is both outside the intent of the artist at the same time as it arises from that intent. What Theodor Adorno negatively determined was the ‘afterlife’ of an object once placed in the museum is the potency of this particular artefact; endowed with intensity not perhaps that far removed from the anonymous craftsperson who whittled the object into life a century or so ago.
The previous chapter concludes by identifying a particular affect that I call serendipitous or delirious, one of two modes of affect relevant to a study of affect and the museum. Delirious affect, which is neither intended by a museum nor anticipated by a visitor, will be the topic of investigation in forthcoming chapters. Didactic affect is my term for the museum practice of intentionally setting out to create an affect. In the critical literature didactic affect goes unnamed as a specific practice, subsumed into the museum’s interpretative strategies and production of knowledge. This chapter considers the use of didactic affect as a museum practice in the following exhibitions of modern art:

1. The avant-garde and propaganda exhibitions designed during the 1920-30s by Russian artist El Lissitzky,

2. Two exhibitions held simultaneously in Nazi Germany in 1937: *Grosse Deutsche Kunstaustellung* (*Great German Art Exhibition*) and *Entartete Kunst* (*Degenerate Art*).

34 ‘Didactic’ is a familiar term in museum parlance; interpretative texts in exhibitions are referred to as didactic panels, and labels alongside artefacts are didactic labels. The term didactic affect thus has symmetry with museological practice.

35 This comment requires a qualification, as Michelle Henning offers an astute reading of affect in exhibitions; however, her interest lies in the museum as a media of communication and as a form of new media, for example she notes that the use of computers has found the gallery turned into a quasi-domestic space, ‘the digital media “lounge”’ (2007:26). My concern lies elsewhere with the museum as an affective space for the generation of direct sensations that complicate object-subject relations.

The intended outcome of these exhibitions was to affect a specific collective response that can be usefully examined drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche’s reflections on the uses and disadvantages of traditional history. Traditional history has either a monumental or antiquarian dimension. The monumental looks to heroes and great actions of the past to evince a ‘practical’ source of moral inspiration and example in the present. Antiquarian history differs from monumental history as rather than ‘mimic’ the past it aims to preserve it. For the antiquarian:

All that is small and limited, mouldy and obsolete, gains a worth and inviolability of its own from the conservative and reverent soul of the antiquary migrating into it and building a secret nest there. The history of his town becomes the history of himself. (Nietzsche 1976:18)

Antiquarian history does not seek to transcend but ‘to revive, restore and even re-enter the past’ (Davison 2000:13). The intent is to maintain social and national identity through continuities, whether of ‘soil, language [or] urban life’ as if these were there all the time (Foucault 2003b:251). Nietzsche argues that when monumental and

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36 Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditation, On The Uses and Disadvantages of History (1874) was written shortly after Otto von Bismarck’s victory over France, an act of aggression that Nietzsche believed reflected Germany’s burdensome excess of history. Douglas Smith describes that Nietzsche was in a sense advocating a new historicism to replace the old as he ‘rejects the progressive notion of history as a necessary, rule-governed development which finds its fulfilment either in the present or in some deferred future. In this he dissents both from the Enlightenment view of history as progress and from the deterministic theory of historical development associated with Hegel’ (cited in Nietzsche 1996:iv,xiii).

37 Graeme Davison observes that, ‘when contemporaries decry the “death” or the “end of history” it is the demise of this prophetic, monumental sense of history that they mainly mourn’ (Davison 2000).
antiquarian types of history become tyrannical a critical response is required: ‘Should the injustice of something ever become obvious — a monopoly, a caste, a dynasty, for example — the thing deserves to fall. Its past critically examined, the knife put to its roots, and all the “pieties” grimly trodden under foot’ (1976:22). Nietzsche concedes that although history is necessary for life, each dimension is too easily misused: ‘Monumental history lives by false analogy; it entices the brave to rashness, and the enthusiastic to fanaticism by its tempting comparisons’ (16). Antiquarian history degenerates from the moment that it ‘no longer gives a soul and inspiration to the fresh life of the present’ (20). Critical history can become a cynical and destructive force; ‘the history that merely destroys without any impulse to construct will in the long run make its instruments tired of life; for such men destroy illusions’ (42). Critical history can try too hard to seek ‘truth’ and so, like the traditional history it condemns, end up as a search for causes and origins. In short, the use and misuse of history, for the purpose of the studies below, has an affective dimension that arises from historical ‘truths’ being illusions that spring from interpretations.

**Affecting utopia**

The first study considers the intended affect of the exhibitions designed by Russian artist and designer El Lissitzky (1890-1941). Lissitzky’s early, innovative designs extended his creative project to advance socialist revolution. The critical dimension of Lissitzky’s avant-garde project was at odds with the Communist Party’s political focus on continuity and tradition; a traditionalism deemed necessary to unite and pacify the largely illiterate and impoverished population.\(^{38}\) Despite this variance in how to advance revolution, for a brief period between the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution

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\(^{38}\) Literacy of the masses was Lenin’s main cultural priority (Laing 1986:25).
and the mid-1920s, the cultural avant-garde and the Party were broadly aligned based on the task of ‘renewing’ history through the removal of the bourgeois state and its replacement with a dictatorship of the proletariat. As the intelligentsia were excluded from this vision, members of the avant-garde, including Lissitzky, found themselves occupying positions of cultural influence within Party structures, from where they were able to devise, revise and disseminate theories and experiments to advance the future socialist society (Bowlt 1988; Groys 1992).

The complex alignment of avant-gardism and politics in Russia during the 1920s, exemplifies the difficulty of simultaneously developing critical modes of historical and aesthetic practice. The Party looked to tradition while the avant-garde sought to destroy traditional values and beliefs believing these would only perpetuate the destructive effects of technology and capitalist ‘progress’ (Groys 1992:15). Kazimir Malevich for example, intended his Supremacist art to cause ‘the prayer to die on the lips of the saint and the sword to fall from the hand of the hero’ (cited in 1992:17). Destroying ‘pieties’ was a complicated iconoclasm in post Tsarist Russia given the ‘anti-aestheticism’ of the projects that emerged appealed to few beyond the avant-garde and its supporters. Based on non-objective principles, factional avant-garde stances embraced radical change based largely upon repudiating monumentalism.

The traditional imperative of the Party was reflected in policy. For example, the anti-modernist 1918 Plan for Monumental Propaganda saw Tsarist statuary replaced by not dissimilar monuments to celebrate individuals deemed important to the Party. As Arthur Danto notes, echoing Nietzsche, ‘Monuments make heroes and triumphs, victories and conquests, perpetually present and part of life’ (cited in Pickford
The propensity to represent the Revolution and its aftermath as an heroic achievement is why, ‘apart from a restrained modernism, the sculptural language they utilized could have been used for Tsarist monuments’ (Lodder 1983:55). In this respect, the Party’s monumentalism was an historical gesture contiguous with the past.

Developing a critical response to reflect the ‘true’ ideological aims of the Revolution is exemplified in projects such as Vladimir Tatlin’s *Monument to the Third International* (1920). Described as Russia’s ‘first monument without a beard’ (Lodder 1983:61), Tatlin’s rotating iron and glass tower was to include:

> a garage housing special motorcycles and cars to move and distribute agitational apparatus, a gigantic screen to show the latest news in the cultural and political life of the whole world, a radio station capable of transmitting world wide, a telegraphic and telephone exchange, a projector for throwing messages onto the clouds, art workshops and a printing shop.

(Lodder 1983:56)

Tatlin’s anti-monumental monument (which was only ever constructed as a model) conceived that new uses of technology would unite the proletariat through a culture, not of heroes and saints, but of mass communication. Although a faction of literary formalists dismissed Tatlin’s design as fantasy, a mystique and too political (Groys 1992:24), its utopianism was to pervade the work of other Russian artists. This included Lissitzky whose goal was to create a new universal language through his

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39 Robert Hughes muses of the Russian avant-garde: ‘With hindsight, one can perhaps see that unachievable projects were the right monuments to an ideal. Because they could not be built, they could not be destroyed’ (1991:92).
visual project known as *Proun* (1919) (Project for the Affirmation of the New). Lissitzky’s *Proun* paintings were intended to de-familiarise perception, an intention that recalls the sound poetry known as *Zaum*; a ‘non-literary’ poetry espoused by *Opoiaz* (the St Petersburg *Society for the Study of Poetic Language*). Viktor Shklovsky, the Society’s founder, ties de-familiarisation to perception.40

The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar’, to make forms challenging, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. (cited in Tupitsyn 1996:6)

*Proun* paintings and *Zaum* sound poems were intended to make obsolete the bourgeois notion of aura surrounding the unique art object. *Prouns* are basically Constructivist in appearance; abstract compositions with multiple perspectives intended to convey rotation in space, a rotation to move the viewer into a space unlike that of traditional representation. Yve-Alain Bois describes their ‘radical reversibility’, and the intention to overthrow ‘the spectator’s certainty and the usual viewing position’ (cited in Tupitsyn 1996:13). *Proun* paintings were intended to produce a revolution in spatial recognition of the everyday. ‘*Proun* begins as a level surface, turns into a model of three-dimensional space, and goes on to construct all the objects of everyday life’ (cited in Storrie 2006:45).

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40 For Boris Groys the avant-gardist and formalist theory of a ‘shift’ that ‘lifted things from their normal context [and] made them strange’ was actually ‘an explanation of the Russian citizen’s everyday experience’. That is: ‘The country was reduced to ashes, normal life was utterly disrupted, housing was uninhabitable, the economy had reverted almost to the primitive state, social relations had disintegrated, and life gradually began to resemble a war of everyone against everyone’ (1992:20).
Lissitzky translated everyday ‘revolution’ into his early exhibition designs. He deemed this necessary because the salon style hangs and focus on auratic objects in the traditional museum represented an institution redundant to the needs of mass, proletariat society. Museums were a predicament in the Soviet Union. The Party ‘inherited’ the vast imperial and private collections of Russia’s cultural heritage and faced the problem of what to do with these collections and museums. The Party solution was to discard all ‘unsuitable’ artworks and put the rest in museums to educate the proletariat about an ideal of beauty (Groys 1994:146). The process of this transformation involved a clash with the avant-garde who sought a new critical museum that would break with the past, and particularly with bourgeois notions of beauty. As Lissitzky put it: ‘We reject space as a painted coffin for our living bodies’ (1970:140). He determined to create museum spaces that would excite visitors and encourage them to negotiate their own actions within a gallery and its exhibits.

Lissitzky’s most innovative designs were installed in museums in Germany where he had studied and had many contacts. For the First Russian Art Exhibition held in Berlin in 1922 he designed a Prounenraum for the presentation of Proun paintings; a three dimensional space intended to affect the dynamic tension operating in the two dimensional Prouns. In conceiving a new type of affective space he was cognisant of engaging the movement of visitors:

Given were the six surfaces (floor, four walls, ceiling); they are to be designed, but, mind you, not as a living room, for there is an exhibition going...

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41 Lissitzky’s project extended to his teaching and architectural design work. From 1925 to 1930 he taught architecture and furniture design in the wood and metalwork faculty of the Moscow VKhUTEMAS. He designed functional furniture and design projects for the interiors of communal housing blocks and flats as well as a utopian (and impractical) skyscraper (the Sky-hook).
on. In an exhibition people keep walking all around. Thus, space has to be organized in such a way as to impel everyone automatically to perambulate in it. (Lissitzky 1970:139)

Lissitzky’s space for automatic perambulation accords with Susan Best’s more recent appreciation of three contemporary art installations as an experience of intense movement. The installations stimulated her to physically move; her body was engaged ‘in order to crouch, walk around, touch, listen, look’ (2001:209). A corporeal engagement reminiscent of Lissitzky’s participatory aesthetic of viewing a Proun ‘round which we must circle, looking at it from all sides, peering down from above, investigating from below’ (Tupitsyn 1996:13). Best contends, following Silvan Tomkins’ work on affect which I examine in chapter four, that igniting a viewer’s interest is vital to further engagement with an object.

Activating visitors was Lissitzky’s plan for a display of Constructivist art at the 1926 Dresden International Art Exhibition and the permanent display of modern art that he designed for Hanover’s Landesmuseum in 1927. In the Dresden exhibition visitors in the space were to be physically engaged:

While passing along the picture-studded walls of the conventional art exhibition setup, the viewer is lulled into a numb state of passivity. It is our intention to make man active by means of design. This is the purpose of space. (Lissitzky 1970:149)

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43 The Dresden exhibition included work by Fernand Léger, Francis Picabia, László Moholy-Nagy, Piet Mondrian, and Naum Gabo as well as El Lissitzky.
Unsurprisingly then, descriptions of all the most striking features of the Dresden exhibition are ‘commentaries on movement and change’ (Storrie 2006:46). The visitor’s new found activity was to herald participation in the socialist culture of the future; a corporeal interaction and changed perception to overcome the stasis and apathy associated with tradition. Thwarting passivity associated with museum encounters would stimulate the proletariat, activity would ‘jolt people out of the ‘numb passivity’ of their situation (Lissitzky 1970:149).

The ‘jolt’ was affected through distinctive uses of colour, texture, and lighting. Stretched unbleached calico across the ceiling acted as a light source to allow colour to be projected onto the walls. One wall was blue and the opposite wall yellow; some walls had vertical slats painted alternate colours so that as visitors ‘perambulated’ the colours shifted ‘depending on the position of the viewer, the paintings appear against a black, white or gray background — they have been given a triple life’ (Lissitzky 1970:150). Sliding screens attached to the walls slid up and down allowing visitors to select the work that they wished to view. Lissitzky sought to achieve the quality of a game rather than the atmosphere of a high brow cultural event; ‘An optical dynamic is created as a result of human motion. The game actively involves the viewer’ (1970:151). He modified the ‘game’ for his ‘Abstract Cabinet’ at the Hanover Landsmuseum where once again the space was configured in such a way as to manipulate the light source. ‘The walls of the room were covered in vertical metal slats, white on one side and black on the other, so they changed colour as visitors moved through the space’ (Henning 2007:30). Watercolour paintings were installed in
rotating showcases, and there was ‘a horizontally movable display case (similar to a sliding door) to hold larger works’ (Lissitzky 1970:151).\footnote{Calum Storrie contends that in their juxtaposition of materials and techniques, the exhibitions of El Lissitzky continue ‘to exert an influence on exhibition design’ into the twenty-first century (2006:47) and echoing this Michelle Henning explores ways in which current developments in museums might resemble the exhibition ‘experiments’ of the late 1920s (2007).}

Lissitzky reworked the affective tonality of his innovations in a series of propaganda displays commissioned by the Party and held in Germany in the late 1920s. These large-scale exhibitions included the Soviet Pavilions at the \textit{International Exhibition of Newspaper and Book Publishing} (known as \textit{Pressa}) in Cologne (1928) and the \textit{International Hygiene Exhibition} in Dresden (1930). By the time Lissitzky received these commissions the Russian avant-garde’s transformative moment had passed. The ‘new’ was no longer devised to be ‘critical’, art was produced by organisations who combined the avant-garde’s rhetoric of change with ‘traditional aesthetic devices and the slogan “learn from the classics”’ (Groys 1992:8). Rather than jolting audiences out of passivity, artists increasingly used creative forms intelligible to the masses, a stylistic move which reached an apotheosis with a 1932 Central Committee decree that all creative workers be organised into creative unions to produce proscribed Party art.\footnote{Groys argued (in the late 1980s) that the doctrine of social realism continued to be as official, obligatory and formulaic as it had been during the Stalin era, with the Communist Party’s focus to restore ‘historical continuity’, imposing a new neotraditionalism upon culture and society (1992).} Lissitzky continued to innovate with media and staging techniques,\footnote{Lissitzky included into the design new lighting effects including a spectacular ‘star-shaped construction with spinning globes, lit from beneath by three electric spotlights’ (Henning 2007:30).} but the intent of the innovation was to create awe at the progress of the USSR; according, in a Nietzschean sense, with the illusory dimension of traditional monumentalism.\footnote{Michelle Henning considers that the use of modern technology by 1920s exhibition designers and artists stood synecdochally ‘for a whole range of possibilities through which audiences/citizens could realize their own social agency’. This impact of modern technology may well have occurred, however, what Lissitzky intended was to attach progress to socialist revolution. This was the intended affect. It is somewhat ironic if, as Henning argues, his exhibitions worked ‘to increase the legibility, accessibility and affective intensity of exhibits, and pointed towards the potential of exhibitions as democratic, participatory media’ (2007:29). The direction of the USSR was communist not democratic and yet it}
A major impact of Lissitzky’s propaganda exhibitions seems to have arisen from the combination of large-scale photomontages of resolute workers in Soviet factories, plants and mines, and striking, equally resolute typography. Lissitzky’s graphic skills were well honed from his designs for Supremacist posters and book covers.\textsuperscript{48} The didactic immediacy and legibility of typography saw the rise of the poster as a powerful tool of propaganda in Soviet Russia, and Lissitzky transposed this graphic meaning-making to his exhibitions. The Soviet Pavilion in Cologne was configured to excite awe in international audiences by linking the Soviet first Five Year Plan (1928-1932) which had just commenced, to the modern technology of the printing press. A giant floor to ceiling structure represented the rollers of a printing machine and attached to this simulation were the images it produced. Printing technology and revolutionary achievement were linked in descriptive imagery and augmented by vast wall and ceiling photomontages. At the entrance to the exhibition, visitors were greeted with a panoramic frieze that merged ‘male and female workers, grand construction sites, factories, and collective farms [with] marching soldiers, joyous sailors, and portraits of Lenin’ (Tupitsyn 1996:58). Progress, technology and everyday ‘work’ were connected through the sheer size of the display to create the sense of an indomitable energy. In propaganda mode, Lissitzky’s didactic affect was purposively teleological, to convey the USSR as a people moving forward in a utopia led and inspired by Lenin and the worker/proletariat.

\textsuperscript{48} Christina Lodder contends that the avant-garde were driven into tasks such as exhibition design, poster design and typography because they were unable to implement their radical Constructivist program for reasons that include shortage of materials and lack of access to industrial facilities (1983). However, Lissitzky had chosen to use graphic forms in his work, he recognised early its difference from traditional representation and explored its possibilities as a critical tool.
In the *International Hygiene Exhibition* in Dresden, Lissitzky again used the format of covering walls and ceilings with photomontages of Russian workers engaged in the modernisation of Soviet industry and agriculture. Images of workers peered down on viewers from on high, framed by strips of bold and repetitive type. A technique incorporating ‘different viewpoints, themes and subjects within the scope of one composite image, almost as a type of motionless moving picture’ (Lodder 1983:191). The cinematic impact of Lissitzky’s montage was noted at the time, ‘How well the Russians know how to achieve the visual effects their films have been showing us for years!’ (cited in Buchloh 1988:100).

Lissitzky’s propaganda exhibits were both triumphal and antiquarian. The future was not a space to be invented, (as in his *Proun* paintings and early exhibition designs), but aligned with the past. This is reflected in his affective ‘interpretation’ of Lenin which followed the Party line. Following Lenin’s death in 1924, the Party sought to perpetuate the illusion of heroic leadership guiding Soviet life and the nation’s progress. Portrayed as the nation’s father, Lenin was either a figure striding purposively toward the goal of industrialisation, or smiling and relaxed surrounded by children. It was an all pervasive effort to affect/effect continuity with the past. Even the composition of his image in photomontage used the same method found in the structure of his oratorical and written language (Tupitsyn 1996:19). The antiquarian ‘takeover’ of ‘Lenin’, which included the public display of his frozen corpse in a mausoleum in Red Square, preserved his presence to such an extent that Boris Groys observes, ‘Lenin became more important than Leninism’ (1992:66). The necessity for this illusion reflects the tenacity of antiquarianism, ‘Here one could live and will go on living; for we are tough folk, and will not be uprooted in the night’ (Nietzsche
It also reflects the political pragmatism of historical illusion which, as Nietzsche points out, ‘lies in the simple emotions of pleasure and content that it leads to the drab, rough even painful circumstances of a nation’s or individual’s life’ (1976:18).⁴⁹

**Skewing the modern**

The second study considers museum practices in Nazi Germany and in particular the use of the museum to mythologise modernity in the Third Reich. A complex twist of interpretation was achieved by conveying the purity and superiority of the German Aryan middle-class by excluding all those deemed ‘other’ as degenerate. The Nazis use of museums to exact this dual affect⁵⁰ is exemplified in two 1937 exhibitions: *Degenerate Art* (*Entartete Kunst*) and the *Great German Art Exhibition* (*Grosse Deutsche Kunstausstellung*). The *Great German Art Exhibition* (GGAE) opened the Nazis new national museum in Munich, the House of German Art, (*Haus der Deutschen Kunst*). *Degenerate Art* was a feint to discredit modernist art movements and to highlight the regenerative nature of the ‘true’ German art on display in the House of German Art.⁵¹

The intention to normalise the binary degeneration/regeneration illusion that ties these two exhibits together was a monumental fiction,

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⁴⁹ The artists of the Russian avant-garde, with their critical vision to reject the past in order to construct a better future for the masses, were eventually condemned for destroying traditional cultural values and then blamed as the cause of the demise of the USSR. The most radical group of the Russian avant-garde, *Lef*, was considered a shameful disease (Groys 1992:31) recalling the charge of degeneracy directed against the avant-garde and modernist art in Nazi Germany explored below.

⁵⁰ Walter Benjamin describes the politics in Germany in the 1930s as ‘the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic’ (1999:235). Benjamin was interested in the mass character of fascist aestheticisation, aimed at the masses, executed by the masses, but not in the interest of the masses.

⁵¹ The two events were intended to juxtapose one another and should be considered together although as Sandra Esslinger notes the contemporary focus on the *Degenerate Art* exhibition has tended to overlook the art historical importance of the *Great German Art Exhibition* (2002).
as long as the past is principally used as a model for imitation, it is always in
danger of being a little altered and touched up, and brought nearer to fiction …
Sometimes there is no difference between a ‘monumental’ past and a mythical
romance, as the same motives for action can be gathered from the one world
as the other. 52 (Nietzsche 1976:16)

The Third Reich’s regenerative power was constructed through events made to appear
contiguous with a past that was also constructed. This fictional teleology swept away
the discontinuities of life to replace uncertainty with the triumphant assurance of
progress. The smoothing of contradictions was a constant task for the Reich as
contradiction lay everywhere, for example while the propaganda spin was to present
the Reich as a restoration of classicism the use of propaganda in itself was a modern
contrivance. Technological innovations, particularly in relation to warfare, were
formative to Nazi achievement, yet propaganda made extensive use of folklore.
Contradiction encapsulated the Reich’s new national museum. Although it appeared
the epitome of a modern museum the art displayed in the clean white spaces was not,
in a generically art historical sense, actually modernist. These contradictions reflect
the Reich’s desire to appear modern, but progressive and superior to the modern
‘other’ (Esslinger 2002:336). Modern art was outside the affective parameters of the
Reich, it was anarchic, Bolshevik, Jewish and non-Aryan. This ‘other’ was boxed

52 Given this insight it is ironic that Nietzsche was himself elevated to the status of a mythical prophet.
His status moved from being a ‘hero’ of the left-wing prior to 1914, to a right-wing hero and
inspiration for the new Reich (Whyte 2008). Max Whyte interprets the ‘mythologised Nietzsche’ as a
process of transforming him into a ‘philosopher of “heroic realism”’ (2008:176,182). This
misappropriation involved a deliberate ‘altering and touching up’ of Nietzsche’s philosophical ideas.
Most notably what was deleted in this process was his, ‘overwhelmingly critical attitude toward
nationalism, and German nationalism in particular’ (2008:185). Whyte argues that appropriation of
Nietzschean ideas came largely from The Will to Power, ‘the posthumous collection of Nietzsche’s
fragments from the years 1883-88 compiled under the auspices of Elisabeth Foster-Nietzsche [who]
‘sought to popularize her brother as a German nationalist and posthumous comrade in arm’s’
together as ‘modern’ in order to identify ‘degeneracy’ as an emergency that Adolf Hitler would overcome.

For the Nazi elite to manage such a complex staging of modernity the conventions of monumentalism were harnessed to affect a distinctive form of antiquarianism. Hitler’s vision for museums and art exhibitions to assist in this monumental antiquarianism commenced upon being elected Chancellor in 1933. One of the first gestures was to lay the cornerstone for a national museum in Munich, the capital of the national socialist movement.53 Built between 1934 and 1937, Hitler supervised every stage of the Museum’s design and construction. The purpose of the Museum was to explicate his reading of art history which was based on the notion that the nineteenth-century was the golden age of German art and that modern art produced by ‘the other’ was a perversion of naturalism. Modern art was primitive54 and lacking national character, the product of an avant-garde responsible for the cultural disintegration of German society, cultural fakes brainwashed by international influences. Hitler’s solution was unambiguous:

From now on we are going to wage a merciless war of destruction against the last remaining elements of cultural disintegration … From now on — of that you can be certain — all those mutually supporting and thereby sustaining cliques of chatterers, dilettantes, and art forgers will be picked up and liquidated. For all we care, those prehistoric Stone-Age culture barbarians and

53 Hitler described the building as ‘a temple for genuine and eternal German art’ while ‘[i]rreverent locals nicknamed the Museum ‘the Athens railway station’ and ‘a sausage stand’ (Spotts 2002:170).
54 This was not just Hitler’s view. Ian Dunlop points out there were people in France, Britain and America who disliked modern art as vehemently as their counterparts in Germany. ‘The Nazis were not the only ones to believe that modern artists were playing the fool, were incompetent and were misleading the public’ … the outcome of ‘a kind of international conspiracy hatched by a small number of dealers, critics and artists’ (1972:224).
art-stutterers can return to the caves of their ancestors and there can apply their primitive international scratchings. (cited in Barron 1991:17)

The purpose of the new Museum was to defeat this influence and propagate an aesthetic that Hitler stated would correspond ‘to the ever-increasing homogeneity of our racial composition [and] what it means to be German’ (cited in Esslinger 2002:329).

In March 1933 Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels as Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and by September most directors of Germany’s major museums had been dismissed and replaced by Nazi ideologues (Schubert 2000:35). By November culture was centralised through Goebbels’ control of the Reichskulturkammer in Berlin, which by 1936 had 42,000 members (Dunlop 1972:234). Hitler soon found Goebbels’ personal inclination toward modern art too liberal and appointed Alfred Rosenberg, a ‘fanatical conservative’, to oversee ideological policy (Petropoulos 1996:35). In order to maintain his elite position in the hierarchy, Goebbels adopted an ‘intolerant’ cultural program toward the modern art he had once championed. Henceforth, any art revealing modernist ‘tendencies’ was classified as degenerate and the avant-garde movements previously celebrated in Germany, and feted in Europe and America were condemned. The

55 Karsten Schubert notes: ‘The Nazi Gleichschaltung of German culture moved at a lightning pace. As early as August 1933 the ““museum workers” of the Reich … ominously resolved that “museums too should cooperate in the great task and with all their powers contribute to the shaping of an amorphous mass of population into nation”’ (2000:35).
56 Consisting of sub-chambers of Fine Art, Film, Music, Radio Broadcasting, Press, Theatre, and Writers (Barron 1991:10) only members of a chamber were permitted to work. Thus the Fine Art chamber included only those artists, dealers, art publishers, interior decorators, and graphic artists deemed appropriate by the Reich.
57 In 1931 Alfred Barr, greatly impressed by art in German museums, curated ‘Modern German Painting and Sculpture’ for the MOMA in New York. He writes that, ‘Museum directors [in Germany] have the courage, foresight and knowledge to buy works by the most advanced artists long before
Kronprinzenpalais gallery of modern art in Berlin was closed, and across the country displays of modern art and collections were removed or decimated — including the destruction of El Lissitzky’s ‘Abstract Cabinet’ at the Hanover Museum (Dunlop 1972:235). Goebbels effectively banned art criticism: ‘From now on, the reporting of art should not be concerned with values, but should confine itself to description’ (cited in Dunlop 1972:235). Following a 1937 decree, around 16,000 artworks were confiscated from 32 art museums in 28 German cities and shipped to Munich and Berlin for distribution (Barron 1991:19). As well as centralising art ready for cash sales to buyers outside Germany58 (and providing valuable acquisitions for the private collections of the Nazi elite), the ‘purge’ of museums would provide the content for the Degenerate Art exhibition.

The 1937 Great German Art Exhibition which opened The House of German Art included around 600 sculptures and paintings of largely idealised figures and landscapes, and neoclassical themes that had informed nineteenth-century popular taste. Installed in the Museum’s ‘seductive’ and ‘comfortable’ environment, Sandra Esslinger observes that the use of ‘democratic’ practices in the Museum were intended to give the sense of the people’s ownership and right to the art on display (2002:325). The gesture of offering art in the exhibition for sale was intended to engender, ‘Illusions of empowerment and the importance of the citizen … within the frame of the museum space’ (337). The art in the exhibition was selected for an ‘easily legibility’ that would unambiguously reveal the racial purity and superiority of public opinion forces them to do so. Some fifty German museums … are a most positive factor … in supporting artists’ (Barron 1991:15). One of these museums, the Kronprinzenpalais in Berlin, if it had not been a section of the German National Gallery, ‘could lay claim to being the first museum devoted exclusively to present-day art, predating New York’s Museum of Modern Art by nearly a decade’ (Schubert 2000:34).

58 This included an auction in 1937 at Galerie Fischer in Lucerne which included major works removed from German museums by Matisse, Picasso, Beckmann, and Kirchner (Schubert 2000:36).
the Germanic race (329). The intention was to visually embody a certain standard of beauty to cement the unity of the nation by projecting a moral standard to which everyone should aspire (Mosse 1991:25). Uniting ‘moral truth’ and ‘beauty’ was supposed to impart realisation of Aryan supremacy in the Museum goer and to tie physicality to reproduction:

The notion of beauty in the Third Reich was primarily physical, for beauty was the result of purity of the race. A beauty that directly correlated to reproduction practices in Nazi society, which had as their ultimate goal the production of a pure Aryan race. (Esslinger 2002:330)

The ‘transformation’ of a select portion of the populace into good Aryans with a ‘true’ historical awareness of the nation’s past was a Nazi strategy to unify the fragmented middle-class in preparation for total war. The evocation of the German Aryan as inherently superior was forged by affecting a fantasy of the past that produced a collective forgetting:

If the monumental method of surveying the past dominates the others — the antiquarian and the critical — the past itself suffers wrong. Whole tracts of it are forgotten and despised; they flow away like a dark, unbroken river.59

(Nietzsche 1976:16)

59 As previously mentioned it is ironic, given this warning by Nietzsche of the dangers of monumental history, to see Goebbels, ‘monumentalising’ Nietzsche in his ‘total war speech’ in Berlin in February 1943. Goebbels pronounced: ‘As we so often have in the past, so again shall we now bear the hardest burdens. And we shall once more justify the words of the philosopher [Nietzsche]: “That which does not kill me makes me stronger”’ (cited in Whyte 2008:173).
To ensure the Aryan fantasy it was necessary for Hitler to prevent modern art having any critical force in German culture, he thus imposed his own artistic preferences upon museums and artists to create what he believed would be a new and genuine German art. Artists deemed suitable were paid to make a specific type of art in which,

Urban scenes were shunned; nature, simple people, rural life were common subjects. Nudes, usually female, were idealized, wooden and unerotic, often with references to classical mythology. Beauty without sensuality, the mode was aptly labelled. (Spotts 2002:177)

Organised to coincide with the opening of the new Museum and the inaugural GGAE was an elaborate street pageant in Munich that promoted ‘2000 Years of German Culture’, a spectacle intended to celebrate culture reaching its apotheosis in the Third Reich. The parade monumentally enacted a mythical past: ‘More than 6000 marchers, half of them clad in Nordic costumes, accompanied or drew twenty-six gigantic floats, many of them iconic representations of the Nordic tradition. Some 500 Nordic animals — horses, dogs and even falcons — participated as well’ (Spotts 2002:173).

As didactic affect, the pageant recalls Leni Riefenstahl’s ‘documentary’ of the sixth party congress held in Nuremberg, Triumph of the Will (1934). The conspicuous street

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60 This said, Hitler’s favourite sculptor was Arno Breker whose male nudes were quite brutal homoerotic caricatures expressing the ideals of camaraderie, discipline, and heroism. Spotts finds it revealing of their ‘innate character’ that Breker’s statues are used today by some American Aryan groups as ideological symbols (2002:186).  
61 Goebbels, who unlike Hitler was able to distinguish between a work of art by an amateur and professional noted: ‘The sculptures are all right but some paintings are a downright catastrophe. Pieces were hung that made one positively cringe’ (cited in Spotts 2002:171). Nevertheless, and despite the lacklustre quality of art produced as a result of Hitler’s decree, exhibitions in the House of German Art were an annual event until 1944.  
62 To make the mythic fantasy seem real, the Nazis utilised Bavarian Catholic practices and rituals to construct the visual imagery and pageantry of the parade (Esslinger 2002:323).
spectacle, like the presentation of Adolf Hitler and his Third Reich in Riefenstahl’s films, was an antiquarian fiction. The use of historical re-enactment in both spectacles featured dramatic costumes and props to preserve the continuity of a mythical Teutonic past. As Nietzsche describes, there is *no measure* in antiquarian misuse of the past:

> equal importance is given to everything, and therefore too much to anything. For the things of the past are never viewed in their true perspective or receive their just value [in] the nation that is looking back on its past’. (1976:19)

Antiquarianism mixed with monumental heroics pervaded Heinrich Himmler’s utilisation of feudal motifs and models to recruit an army of warriors. As Reichsführer SS, overseeing all police and security, he consciously adopted the trimmings and attributes of a mythic Teutonic knightly order. He embraced the fantasy that this order served as an antecedent to the Third Reich and it was within this context that he collected and displayed art and antiques: ‘Art works figure prominently in Himmler’s endeavours to create and indoctrinate a cohesive fighting elite’63 (Petropoulos 1996:213). The success of his ‘knightly order’ is exemplified by the expansion of the SS from ‘an armed paramilitary group of 165,000 men in 1941 to a full-fledged army of 800,000 in 1945’ (216).

*Degenerate Art* was intended to convey the degeneracy that the Reich, and its version of new German art, would overcome. The exhibition was installed across the park from the House of German Art in an unremarkable municipal facility. The display of

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63 The centre of Himmler’s feudal empire was a castle in Westphalia that he restored and refurbished: ‘Each room was furnished with genuine period pieces and often personal items such as garments, armour or shields that belonged to the hero for whom the room was named’ (Petropoulos 1996:213).
exemplary works of modernist art, included over 700 of the paintings, sculptures, prints, and books systematically removed from German museums since 1933. On view for four months in Munich and attracting more than two million visitors, the exhibition had 20,000 visitors on most days and over three years, travelling throughout Germany and Austria, was seen by one million more visitors (Barron 1991:5). *Degenerate Art* was intended to appall visitors at the dangerous impurities that had emerged in society during the Weimar Republic (1919–1933). The degeneracy of the modern movement was to provide ‘concrete evidence that the Nazis had saved German society from Weimar’s onslaught upon all the moral values people held dear: marriage, the family, chastity, and a steady harmonious life’ (Mosse 1991:25).

The affect of the degeneracy of modernism was enacted through the anti-aesthetic nature of the space; nine long, alley-like rooms crammed with paintings and sculptures (Dunlop 1972:248). Paintings were unceremoniously butted together on ill-prepared walls in the narrow, low-ceilinged rooms. The art was accompanied by misleading texts, for example, Kirchner’s expressionist painting *Peasants at Midday* bore the provocative Nazi interpretation ‘German peasants as seen by the Yids’ (1972:251). Throughout the cramped rooms, texts likened the works of art to that produced by ‘primitives’, children, and the mentally ill, a comparative strategy to categorise these groups of people together as irrational. The art was crowded amongst quotes from Hitler, Goebbels and Rosenberg and headings such as: *Revelation of the*

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64 Around 113 artists were represented including: Kirchner, Nolde and Schmidt-Rottluff (25 works), Mueller (13), Kokoschka (9), Heckel (7), Marc (6), Beckmann (10), Dix (10), Grosz (5), Feininger (7), Kandinsky (3), Klee (15), Schwitters (2), Gauguin (1), Picasso (1), Mondrian (1), Chagall (1), Moholy-Nagy (1) (Dunlop 1972:248).
The deliberately clumsy installation and emotive language were intended to arouse national moral indignation. ‘Texts were intended to emerge as the voice of reason in the midst of the Nazi-contrived atmosphere of visual terrorism’ (von Luttichau 1991:46). A review at the time discerned this affect:

Captions and pictures, juxtaposed or arranged in orderless confusion, are intended to stir the viewer’s emotions, triggering feelings of repulsion and indignation, these feelings in turn, like the opinions expressed in the captions, are intended to encourage a sense of satisfaction at the demise of this type of art and ultimately to inspire agreement with the ‘revolutionary’ new beginning and political succession. (cited in Zuschlag 1991:87)

Pamphlets and posters accompanied the touring presentation of *Degenerate Art*. Images of art by the mentally ill were placed beside photographs of modern art with captions such as, ‘Which of these three drawings is the work of an inmate of a lunatic asylum?’ (Barron 1991:22). The cover of an exhibition pamphlet featured *The New Man (Der neue mensch)* (1912), a sculpture by Jewish artist Otto Freundlich. The reproduction distorts the work so it appears ungainly and unfinished. Photographed from a low vantage it hangs aimlessly in space rather than displayed on a plinth. “*KUNST*” scrawled across the image in red crayon and in quotation marks, suggests the work of a child. The work was also reproduced as an exhibition poster ‘juxtaposed
with … a shadowy but unmistakably Semitic, slightly leering countenance’ (Vergo 2000b:55).

Degenerate Art was not the first Nazi art exhibition designed to instil anger and fear by interpreting the ‘other’ as a growing irrational force. In 1933, with Nazi recruited directors newly installed in German museums, a series of exhibitions commenced that became known as the Schandausstellung (shame exhibitions) (Petropoulos 1996:32). These were local events that attempted to generate interest through sensationalism: ‘In order to draw attention and to create excitement, the organizers forbade entry to anyone under 19 years of age … Another trick was to exhibit photos of traditional artwork that had been either kept in storage or de-acquisitioned to raise money for modern art, thus presenting these works as slighted or unjustly disregarded’ (1996:32). Titles of the ‘shame’ exhibitions convey their didactic purpose: Art in the Service of Decay (linked the Weimar Republic and modern art), Art Which Has Not Come From Our Soul (linked art and primitive spirituality) and Horror Chambers of Art (linked art and carnival) (1996:33).

The Nazi strategy of comparison exploited the fact that in rejecting conventional genres modern artists did find inspiration in the ‘irrational’. In this Hitler ‘spoke true’; the ‘perversion of naturalism’, primitivism, ‘lunacy’ and anti-Nationalist tendencies he loathed in modernist art, were integral to the avant-garde’s critical project. As with the Russian avant-garde, artists rejected that art must be rooted in triumphal history, and sought change through experimentation (Spotts 2002:159). Several texts exerted considerable influence on the avant-garde in Germany particularly, A Lunatic as Artist (Ein Geisteskranker als Kunstler) (1921) and psychiatrist Hans Prinzhorn’s book,
Artists drew on African and Oceanic art; *The Bridge (Die Brücke)*, for example, were drawn to the carvings and wall hangings in the Dresden Ethnographic Museum (Barron 1991:11). The art of children was also of interest. In the 1929 anthology *The Blue Rider, (Der Blaue Reiter)*, ‘children’s drawings and reproductions of primitive art assumed a prominent place’ (1994:169). The compelling power of the German expressionist art movement arose from artists’ exploration of techniques with which to give expression to these various concerns; concerns removed from traditional, universal notions of beauty and truth.65

Nazi channelling of unspecific public disapproval of modernism into a directed collective anger was facilitated by a general disillusionment of the populace, including mainstream artists who felt they had been left behind by the pre-war domestic and international attention given to the German avant-garde. Esslinger notes that: ‘The art world remained composed of the ‘elite’, while the general public remained bystanders’ and observes that ‘by constructing an “inclusive” frame in which the citizenry of the Third Reich could participate, the Nazis attempted to combat the prevailing alienation of the middle classes’66 (2002:325). The ill will felt in society toward avant-garde art was heightened by revealing the ‘outrageous’ prices

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65 A large body of racist literature also fed the Nazis use of didactic affect in *Degenerate Art*. In the late nineteenth-century the book *Degeneration (Entartung)* (1892) extolled the superiority of traditional German culture. In *Mein Kampf* (1925) Hitler refers to the avant-garde as ‘the product of spiritual degenerates’ and ‘the hallucinations of lunatics or criminals’ (cited in Spotts 2002:152). In 1927 Alfred Rosenberg wrote denouncing modern art, and in 1928 Paul Schultze-Naumberg’s *Art and Race (Kunst und Rasse)* had a wide influence with its pictures of modern art juxtaposed with photos of deformed or diseased people (1994:168). Another anti-modern thread was promulgated by German ‘agricultural expert’ Richard Darre, who in *The New Aristocracy of Blood and Soil (Neuadel aus Blut und Boden)* (1930) argues ‘Let us be rid of skyscrapers and asphalt and return to green German soil’ (Dunlop 1972:231). Esslinger contends by ‘utilizing the modernist myth of proof and evidence, relating to the “scientific” foundations of genetics and evolution, the Nazi myth was not only legitimated but also procreated’ (2002:328).

66 Esslinger contends that: ‘The construction of this “inclusive” frame strongly resembles the framing of public spaces and institutions in a modern democracy’ (2002:325).
previously paid for ‘degenerate art’. The exclusive nature of this art highlighted the inclusivity promoted in the German House of Art. It was made clear that public money had been foolishly squandered on worthless art with labels under many works indicating how much money had been spent by each museum in the acquisition of the piece: ‘Since every work of art had been taken from a public collection, the event was meant not only to degenerate the artists but also to condemn the actions of the institutions, directors, curators, and dealers involved with the acquisition of modern art’ (Barron 1991:20).

Gauging the affect of Nazi museum practices retrospectively is difficult. Peter Guenther recollects visiting Degenerate Art as a 17 year old and that the exhibition had an impact, but not in the way intended by the organisers. It was obvious the exhibition was intended to create a sense of discomfort and to inflame anger: ‘The rooms were quite narrow, as were the openings from one room to another and the ceilings low. In some areas people pressed up against one another to see the badly lighted works; the atmosphere was dense’ (1991:36). Many people appeared to visit the exhibition with an expectation of being outraged. They knew what they were expected to feel. One contemporary reviewer notes: ‘Whenever one set foot in the exhibition a great deal of indignation could be heard … It was in fact sincere. For on the whole, [visitors] had come with the desire and conviction that they would be outraged’ (cited in Zuschlag 1991:89). Whether this is the case or not is difficult to measure but probably much of the angry ‘chatter’ was stage managed. Peter Guenther found it odd that people talked, some loudly, and made comments to one another, even to strangers: ‘The large number of people pushing and ridiculing and proclaiming their dislike for the works of art created the impression of a staged
performance intended to promote an atmosphere of aggressiveness and anger (Barron 1991:38).

Despite concerted efforts by the Nazis to skew their own take on ‘modernity’ through the use of affect in museums and exhibitions, a number of critics observe that this particular effort turned out to be relatively ineffective. Schubert proffers that the fact that ‘more than a few visitors were deeply enthralled by works in the Entartete Kunst exhibition … cannot have escaped Nazi officials’ (2000:38). She argues that visitors ‘remained remarkably immune to manipulation’ and Peter Vergo similarly notes that despite the Nazis enormous propaganda effort ‘the works themselves remained curiously resistant to this kind of treatment’ (2000b:55). Degenerate Art with its compelling expressionist paintings and ‘over the top’ entertaining, Dada-like installation was by all accounts more popular than the exhibition across the park of officially sanctioned Nazi art.67 Despite the effort taken to construct the GGAE as a populist exhibition in which every Aryan ‘was sure to find a painting which communicated to her/him’ perhaps audiences were put off by, ‘The frame of the entire exhibit and surrounding events disallow[ing] any free play of meaning’ (2002:330). Spotts contends that even Hitler eventually gave up on the art in the annual GGAE at the House of German Art: ‘Lavish rewards, brutish threats and an annual art extravaganza to educate artists only brought forth paintings that left him despondent’ (2002:179). Historical ‘destiny’, interpreted through the lens of Hitlarian art history and given affect in Nazi museums and exhibitions, failed to produce any great artists or convince there was a great German art to be had in the Third Reich.68

67 Ian Dunlop observes that the Degenerate Art exhibition was ironically the greatest Dada event of them all, in using Dada methods to construct an anti-art demonstration (1972:252).
68 Despite Hitler’s love of the monumental, Goebbels shifted the affective stance of the Reich’s propaganda campaign as the war progressed because he became aware that the propaganda message at
Affecting Arcadia

The third study considers the use of didactic affect in the 1939 Australian Herald Exhibition of French and British Contemporary Art, a display that has been described as resonating ‘in the memories of those who saw it and form[ing] the experience even of many who did not’ (Chanin and Miller 2005:1). The exhibition presented the urban Australian middle-class with a representation of the modern with which they could identify. The exhibition attracted large audiences over a six year period (remaining in Australia during the war), in Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Hobart and Launceston. The public engaged with what I contend was the exhibition’s antiquarian modernism during a period of uncertainty about national identity. An uncertainty exemplified in the contrast between advances made by industry harnessing technological innovation and the conservative weight of tradition in cultural and public life (46).

a domestic level needed to alter. Germans were becoming weary of monumental heroics and the ‘spectacle of marching troops, torch parades, and political speeches’ geared to ‘organising disenchanted male youth into the party’ (Bathrick 1997:116). This affective shift is particularly apparent in film and radio production. The first Nazi sponsored film Hitlerjunge Quex (1933), exemplified the initial recruitment drive in featuring a courageous youth who is martyred embodying the ideals of the Reich. Leni Riefenstahl’s films contain the same monumental triumphalism and are often considered to epitomise the project of cinema in the cause of the Reich. However, this assessment overlooks the popularity of a form of film and radio broadcasting conceived to affect an antiquarian rather than monumental sensibility. Rundfunkkunst, or a ‘metaphysics of the radio’ was used to unite the people (Bathrick 1997) and represented a shift towards this ‘new’ antiquarianism. In this second propaganda phase the 1936 Wunschkonzert had its debut; a concert with orchestras performing requested pieces of music before a live audience for a donation. By 1939 this enormously popular event was broadcast in Germany twice a week. The programming was deliberately ‘light entertainment’ as the point ‘was precisely not to challenge the audience intellectually, culturally or above all politically, but rather to provide … a feel-good version of the Reich as national family’ (1997:117). The radio’s ability to ‘break down the demarcations of private and public, individual and community’ enabled the Fascist aim to integrate family, state and war (1997:118). A film of the same name, Wunschkonzert (1940), based on the radio program was ‘one of the most successful propaganda projects to take place in the Third Reich’ (1997:115). The project utilised broadcast and cinema as an antiquarian strategy to suggest a patriotic citizenry safely nestled together as a nation even as a generation of German youth were being sent to the slaughter.
In the late 1930s the efficacy of Australia’s two traditional myths of national identity — the rural pioneer and heroic digger — began to wane. Often accepted as forming a continuous narrative (Inglis 1965:26), the bush legend and the Anzac tradition extolled the Australian character as one of endurance, courage and mateship (White 1981:127). The monumental use of the past through ‘heroic’ mythology to inspire national identity, Graeme Davison observes as ‘the standard form of history in new nations’ (2000:11). The myth of the ‘digger’ emerged from war, yet the First World War dealt a heavy blow to Australian ideals of heroism and ‘as the sombre lessons of Gallipoli and the Western Front sank in, many Australian's recoiled from the unthinking patriotism that had sent so many of their countrymen to their deaths’ (46). The rural pioneer was also losing efficacy as a symbol of national identity, as, like the heroic digger this older symbol was in conflict with progress, and with the goals of manufacturers who ‘encouraged a view of Australia which stressed industrial progress, cultural ‘maturity’ and urban sophistication’ (White 1981:149).

The uncertainty surrounding national identity was reflected in debate about what should constitute a ‘national’ Australian art. This took various regional and international stances with progressive critics vying for a diversity of aesthetic engagement. Sydney artist Roland Wakelin argued that a national art could ‘not be achieved merely by painting such subjects as gum trees or Australian troops on the march’ and modern art aficionado Gibbo Nibbi argued that ‘we must believe in Australian artists rather than in a mythical Australian art’ (2005:48). In general the Australian public was not unfamiliar with the visual language of modernism. ‘Fresh ideas were circulated by way of publications, reproductions and exhibitions, and Modernist style had permeated popular culture’. Individuals considered themselves
‘modern’ through the possession of increasingly available commodities such as the car, the refrigerator and the wireless (2005:127,70).

During the 1920s, Australia’s isolation from Europe had been widely accepted as necessary, protecting the ‘young’ nation from the decadence, war and morbidity of Europe. However, by the mid-1930s with safety no longer the national priority, many came to believe that Australia’s isolation had led to ‘backwardness, insulation and lack of sophistication’ (White 1981:145). The mood for change was well gauged by Sir Keith Murdoch who argued, in convincing the Board of the *Herald* newspaper to finance an exhibition of European modern art: ‘Gallipoli had given us one kind of maturity. A great *Herald* exhibition of contemporary French and British art would give us another kind of maturity’ (2005:167).

The reception of art in Australia is tenaciously tied to images of landscape, images Ian Burn argues are ideologically informed by middle-class identity (1991). This identity goes back to the 1880s and the mythology surrounding the so-called Heidelberg painters who were deemed to have created the first ‘Australian School’ of art. Yet rather than a ‘new’ school of art, the Heidelberg painters worked in ‘an international style of academicized Impressionism’ (Sayers 2001:79). The ‘Australian-ness’ of this art has been interpreted by Burn as arising from imagery that is based on an idealisation of the bush for the consumption of the urban middle-class. The bush, as it appears in the paintings of the Heidelberg artists, is neither that of the small selector or bush worker, nor the bush of the squatter or pastoralist.
Burn observes how a set of pictorial devices and motifs are used to advance an Arcadian ‘type’ of bush landscape. ‘The portrayal of the landscape in a positive class-specific manner invoked the idea that the existing order of society was also positive, timeless and unassailable. In other words, the middle-class visitor identifies himself … in this youthful, expansive, unconstrained arcadian image’ (1991:35). The Herald exhibition offered an updated version of this idealisation. The intent was to display modern European art that reflected aesthetic tendencies that might preserve the integrity of Australian Impressionism. Hence the exhibition focussed on French Post-impressionist art and British art that demonstrated the impact of Post-impressionism. In essence, the exhibition dwelt positively upon Australia’s European cultural heritage. The modern world conveyed in the urban landscapes, pastoral scenes, portraiture, and still life, was that of an uncorrupted idyll. The exhibition validated middle-class identification with the ‘modern’ in such a way that the Arcadian experience remained intact.

In its preservation of Arcadia, the Herald exhibition gives expression to Nietzsche’s antiquarian: ‘He is careful to preserve what survives from ancient days … The possession of his ancestors’ furniture changes its meaning in his soul, for his soul is rather possessed by it’ (1976:18). The exhibition affected a form of assuagement, or mood of forgetting. It did not contest or confront the circumstances of the First World War or the Depression, nor did it respond to the rise of Fascism in Europe. It neither alienated audiences nor was critical of history. Instead the exhibition appeased national memory in an idea of the modern that updated, but did not interrogate, the traditional values held by what Judith Brett calls the Australian moral middle-class (2003).
Significant European artists and genres of Modernist art were absent from the *Herald* exhibition. Several Australian paintings were included in the British section of the exhibition but this work, by European modernist standards, was unchallenging and sentimental. Melbourne’s social realist art with its darker view of urban life was overlooked. Out of the 217 works in the exhibition, there were only two non-figurative works and no Futurist art, Soviet Constructivist art, or German Expressionism. The social satire of Otto Dix, Max Beckmann and George Grosz was absent, but not because their art was unavailable, as the Nazi purge of German museums ‘produced a glut in the market for modern German works, offering unbelievable bargains, such as Otto Dix *Self-Portrait* for US$40 and a Kirchner *Hanging* for US$10’ (2005:192).

The exhibition’s antiquarian modernism was supported by a rhetoric that aligned with the principles of liberalism. In his preface to the *Herald* catalogue, Sir Keith Murdoch states:

> The Collection is offered in the deeply-felt belief that, through those who will observe and study it, a force will go forth in ever-widening circles with useful effect upon Australian life. (cited in 2005:9)

Based on the notion that art is civilising, the ‘force’ of the *Herald* exhibition is here judged to lie in its ‘useful effect upon Australian life’. The liberal idea of the useful citizen is akin to the view that the middle-class is the bearer of moral virtue. Judith

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69 Nor was the selection of work the result of financial constraint or difficulty in procuring works from lenders. The exhibition curator Basil Burdett had ample funds to develop the exhibition and an impressive network of European collectors and galleries from which to select works for inclusion in the exhibition.
Brett has described the middle-class as ‘a projected moral community whose members are identified by their possession of particular moral qualities’ (2003:7). She evidences Robert Menzies’ belief that the middle-class, ‘are the backbone of this country’, a phrase that she notes makes the ‘moral qualities of the individual the basis of the nation’s identity’ (2003:8).

The moral ‘truth’ of Murdoch’s message was unquestioned by the liberal Australian reader. As well as an influential figure in business and cultural circles, Keith Murdoch was the nephew of Walter Murdoch, a writer of moral essays widely read and published in Australian newspapers. Brett argues that Walter Murdoch’s secular sermons were ‘evidence of the appetite for advice on moral improvement among his middle-class readers’ (2003:59). Walter Murdoch’s middle-class reader was the audience of the Herald exhibition. Comprising approximately half the population, the Australian middle-class was also the consumer of the ‘Murdoch press’ an influence that ‘through a network of shareholdings … extended over half of Australia’ (2005:162).

The assumptions of liberalism, notably democracy and individualism, are manifest in the rhetoric of the Herald exhibition and would have been assumed common sense by its audience, common sense always ‘appears obvious because it is inscribed in the language we speak’ (Belsey 1996:4). In the catalogue preface, Keith Murdoch accords artists’ success to their capacity for ‘allowing nothing to curb their complete freedom’ (2005:12). The ‘genius’ of artists is imparted to their individualism. In an advertisement for the exhibition, Picasso is: ‘The greatest legend of Paris, leading the

70 This figure is formulated on interwar statistics based on the markers of middle class socio-economic status, that is, non-manual occupation and home ownership (Brett 2005:8).
life of a hermit, remote and inaccessible, nobody knows what he is likely to do next’ (2005:208). Underlying the rhetoric is the notion that the free-thinking, independent man has transcended the dependent forces of an unfree society. This view has a long history drawing on Protestant commitment to the morally independent individual, the middle-class struggle for political representation, and the economic experience of the small entrepreneur who depended on disciplined hard work and self-restraint to survive (Brett 2003:11).

Insight into the affective use of rhetoric is provided in a stylistic analysis by Louise Ravelli which breaks down the language of exhibition texts into formal usage (2006). The power of rhetoric lies in using speech to incur the maximum impact of an idea or belief. In measuring the accessibility of exhibition texts, Ravelli highlights the importance of textual modality. The language of Murdoch’s preface fits, to a certain extent, the textual mode Ravelli associates with the ‘modernist museum’ (2006:72). She distinguishes between the modernist museum and the ‘new post-museum’. The interactions that are common to the modernist museum are authoritative. These interactions conceptualise visitors as an ‘undifferentiated mass audience, and as the recipients of a transmission mode of pedagogy’ (71). The role of the modernist museum is that of authority relating to a novice. Though authoritative, the style of Murdoch’s text is personal and the stance is subjective. His ‘offer’ and expression of a ‘deeply-held belief’ impart a personal opinion. Ravelli identifies personal style and subjective stances in exhibition texts with the interactional approach of the ‘new post-museum’ (72).
That the *Herald* exhibition was organised not by a museum but by a news corporation, accounts for its particular textual modality. The language of Murdoch’s preface implies an equitable form of partnership between the exhibition organisers and its audience. The functions of discourse are distinguishable as three modes of texts — declarative, imperative and interrogative (Belsey 1996:91). The imperative form is the most direct way of realising a command, and is a direct inscription of power. In its grammatical form, the ‘offer’ made to the audience in the preface is a modulated interrogative rather than a direct imperative (Ravelli 2006:77). The interrogative is a less direct ‘command’ and is a way of disguising the power of the exhibition organisers. It is the combination of subjectivity and interrogative command that endows the rhetoric of the *Herald* exhibition with its affective intensity.

Aligned with the subjective/interrogative mode that characterises the rhetoric of the *Herald* exhibition is the avoidance of unexplained technicality in its communications. The affect of removing specialist art jargon is to decrease the social distance between the organisers and audience (Ravelli 2006:61). This disguised didacticism also occurred in aspects of the organisation of the exhibition. In Melbourne and Sydney the exhibition was displayed in their respective Town Hall and not in the National Gallery of Victoria or Art Gallery of New South Wales which, for reasons of art politics, refused to take the exhibition. The Town Hall venues imbued the exhibition with an aura of civic importance while at the same time acknowledging a relationship of relevance to the citizenry. The elitism and connoisseurship associated with the display of culture in the modernist art museum was overwritten by a sense of inclusiveness that recalls the inclusive museum practices the Nazis employed in the *Great German Art Exhibition*. Decreasing social distance was achieved by clearly
conveying that anyone was worthy of owning the ‘masterpieces’ in the Herald exhibition. A number of the works in the exhibition were for sale and interested viewers were informed that ‘Enquiries should be made at the Desk’ (2005:12). Given that Australian State collections were notably lacking in paintings of such provenance, the prospect of their possession by ‘ordinary’ members of the public was novel and must have appealed to the middle-class.

The Herald exhibition was accompanied by an extensive press campaign that included daily feature articles, advertising, and promotions. Newspapers are a particularly favourable medium for dispensing rhetoric. The development of print ‘provided the technical means for “re-presenting” the kind of imagined community that is the nation’ (Anderson 1991:25). The reading of newspapers is a ‘mass ceremony’ involving large numbers of people who engage with selected events in simultaneous time. This facilitates the myth of a common entity between groups of people who are strangers. Benedict Anderson muses, ‘the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed on the subway, barbershop, or by residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life [and thus] fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations’ (1991:36).

A relationship of ‘intimacy’ connecting the Australian public vicariously with the Herald exhibition commenced with the articles that the exhibition’s curator Basil Burdett wrote while in Europe selecting work. Burdett was the art critic of the Melbourne Herald. Published in early 1939 in the Herald, the Adelaide Advertiser
and the Sydney *Daily Telegraph*, these articles, evoking the air of a last ‘grand tour’, captured the imagination of the Australian public: ‘Burdett’s readers met artists, gallery directors, writers, sophisticates, gourmets. His articles were from a reporter resembling Baudelaire’s ‘*flâneur*’, wandering in the culture, telling tales as if to an intimate’ (2005:5). Before the exhibition even arrived in Australia, Burdett’s readership had become a ‘community in anonymity’ sharing an antiquarian narrative in which they could recognise and preserve themselves.71

**Summary**

The innovative techniques employed by El Lissitzky evolved from an avant-garde desire for renewal and radical change, a critical project based upon a fundamental rejection of historical interpretations of the past. ‘Man must have the strength to break up the past … He must bring the past to the bar of judgement, interrogate it remorselessly, and finally condemn it’ (Nietzsche 1976:22). Lissitzky sought to liberate the museum visitor through affecting movement in space that would overcome the overbearing weight of the past. He utilised space to mould perceptions that would auger the socialist future. As the State increasingly dictated a monumental and antiquarian aesthetic, Lissitzky adapted his affective use of space to interpret this historical requirement.

In Nazi Germany, the use of didactic affect in museum practice was intended to annul any critical gesture toward the Third Reich as the Nazis moved the population into acceptance of the idea of total war and the necessity for genocide. The use of art history and art exhibitions to generate inclusion on the one hand, and exclusion on the

71 This antiquarian identification coincided with the onset of another war. Articles in the newspapers about individual genius and masterpieces of modern art shared space with news of mobilisation and requests for enlistment.
other, was intended to assist the Nazis achieve affective control of the population. In Australia between the two world wars, the use of didactic affect in the *Herald* exhibition was about a sense of measure; the measure of a nation gauging its relationship with Europe and the uncertainties of modernity through the comforting lens of pastoral antiquarianism. The use of didactic affect in the *Herald* exhibition generated an antiquarian modernism that resonated as a reassuring form of national security for the Australian middle-class.
3 Toward Non-discursive Affect

Didactic affect aligns with traditional history and is a mode of affect that might be called ‘second hand’. It is not the intensity that is more accurately described as affect. Didactic affect fits the model of recognition, an intended response to a pre-supposed position. In ‘pre-supposed’ meaning a museum visitor receives what they largely expect to receive, they remain contained within their usual thoughts, and both they and the object of attention remain relatively unchanged by the encounter. As Gilles Deleuze observes: ‘The form of recognition has never sanctioned anything but the recognisable and the recognised; [the] form will never inspire anything but conformities’ (1994a:134). Didactic affect operates discursively in terms of economic interests, ideological beliefs and psychological demands and it is within these structures that pre-supposition is framed. Yet within the parameters of the museum’s very institutionality multiple milieus are constantly assembling to disrupt recognition, assemblages that in dispensing with a fixed subjectivity play with the established values of the economic, ideological and psychological.

In an historical sense the disruption of established values is illuminated by Nietzschean inspired ‘effective’ history. Given the disadvantages of historical continuity with, or preservation of the past, ‘effective’ history as a genealogical approach to events, is an approach that records the singularity of events outside of any finality and search for origins (Foucault 2003b:242). Michel Foucault describes effective history differing,
from traditional history in being without constants. Nothing in man — not even his body — is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men. The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled … History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being. (Foucault 2003b:247)

The instability of history relates to the museum’s autotelicity as a site for the production of new thought through encounters with artefacts; events that disassemble the rational method of the museum’s own knowledge production. I move toward such a ‘museal autopoeisis’ by continuing to describe the delimiting realm of structural didacticism. Autopoiesis is used here in the sense that Félix Guattari borrows from Francisco Varela’s designation of organisms generating their own operation and their specific limits although, as Francois Dosse describes; ‘by broadening this biological application to social systems, Guattari also included technical machines and the entire evolving human entity’ (cited in Guattari 2009:28).

**Interactivity and recognition**

‘Interactivity’ designed into recent museum spaces is a practice of didactic affect that operates through emotional identification based on recognition, and the repetition of something already thought. The intended experiential outcome for visitors as a result of interactivity in the museum is aligned to a museum’s historiography (Witcomb 2003) in a way akin to use of didactic affect in the exhibitions described in the previous chapter.
Some critics approach the increasing technological interactivity in museums with caution. Hilde Hein believes that in an attempt to appeal to media savvy audiences the focus on technologically interactive devices in museums has resulted in a transformation away from art and artefacts and toward the fabrication of experiential events in the style of theme parks (2000). The concern that she expresses with this transformation of the museum away from ‘object-centredness’ is that ‘as yet, no set of clear criteria has been defined to judge the quality of experiences’ 72 (2000:66). In part, ‘quality of experience’ is the concern of the chapter as I describe the relation between didactic affect, recognition and the generation of meaning.

As well as interactivity based on technological devices, Andrea Witcomb observes spatial and dialogic types of interactivity in recent museums, each with its own quality of experience (2003). She shows that the type of interactivity used reflects a museum’s approach to narrative which in turn reflects the institution’s particular historical stance. For example, at the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles, technically oriented interactivity is strongly aligned to a narrative which frames intolerance, in accordance with the American ideology of individualism, as an individual problem (2003:130). Witcomb reveals how through the Museum’s interactive process an acute sense of emotive identification with victims of intolerance...

72 Yet there is a considerable critique based upon interpreting the impact of simulated experiences, such as theme parks, in relation to the postmodern condition. Umberto Eco argues that the hyperreal underpinning of American theme parks, Disneyland and pseudo museums erase the distinction between historical reality and fantasy (1986). Interest in describing ‘real’ experience versus ‘fantasy’ finds regular coverage in the dystopian worlds of cinema from Westworld (1973), in which a theme park replaces ‘real history’ with a trivialized, ideal new society of spectacle operated by androids (Eberl and Seifert 2003), to the simulated reality of The Matrix (1999), in which the human race is unaware that they live in a computer-generated illusion. Responding to the actual/virtual dichotomy in the museum, Hein believes that the shift away from material objects is aligned to an increasing propensity for people to accept simulations as adequate indices of reality. This reflects a wariness that recalls Fredric Jameson’s claim that feelings have been replaced by the affect-less-ness of postmodern culture (1991). In a museum context, perhaps affect-less-ness is an outcome when the simulation of an artefact generates more interest than the object itself. As museum practice is increasingly directed toward ensuring that the simulation projects its own level of authenticity, the medium (and not the artefact) is the message.
is achieved. She suggests however, that at the Museum of Tolerance, the forceful emotional identification that is intended does not leave space for critical understanding of the perpetration of events such as the Holocaust.

The ‘experience’ of the Holocaust in this Museum is formulated around the pre-supposed emotional response of the visitor. I wonder here about the quality of experience of Lissitzky’s propaganda exhibitions which were also largely based on technologically generated interactivity, although of course his affective devices were intended as signifiers of socialist achievement. The affect he sought is ideologically distant from the narrative of individualism at the Los Angeles Museum, yet both are framed around generating an emotional response. Lissitzky developed various devices to ‘make’ a visitor active and to physically move in specific ways within a space. As with more recent technically oriented interactivity, there is no space offered for contested meaning, the communication paradigm employed discourages alternative readings; these are closed and finite semiotic spaces.

Witcomb contrasts the technologically interactive displays at the LA Museum of Tolerance, with the Australian National Maritime Museum. In an attempt to avoid projecting a version of ‘emotional nationalism’, the ANMM employs a ‘serial’ or ‘media’ type of interactivity that involves viewers having ‘chance encounters’ with displays and being momentarily the subject of a narrative being presented. The concept behind this approach is to distance the signifier from the signified, which results in a visitor locating themselves within a display (text) in order to search for meaning (2003:144). The closed narrative of emotional identification with the other is replaced by personal identification with a text, (the interactivity central to the music
video genre). Again, this form of spatial interactivity is based on exacting an emotional response through recognition. Witcomb notes that overall this type of display can actually be quite disconcerting because the quality of the spatial interactive experience provides no overarching concept (such as the sea). This means that the various personal interactions visitors may experience are not part of a larger critical dialogue. The emotional experience that is delivered, as with the Museum of Tolerance, provides limited space for critical understanding.

At the Museum of Sydney, Witcomb describes the experience of a ‘dialogic interactivity’. Here the intention is to stimulate a dialogue through ‘sensual and sensory experience’ (2003:156). As well as many interactive devices, the Museum combines art installations into displays and aestheticises everyday objects rather than contextualising their function. The fragmented pattern of interactivity that is established suits the notion of history as being a set of fragments. This reflects the Museum’s interest in generating knowledge about cross-cultural exchange in colonial Sydney. Yet, for most visitors the fragmentation weakens their experience of this exchange, there is neither a strong narrative to guide their emotional response nor are there ‘texts’ for them to emotionally locate themselves within. There is no recognition. As Witcomb concedes, this is a ‘museum for museum lovers’ and as such its ‘dialogue has a limited voice’ (2003:163).

I situate Witcomb’s three types of interactivity as operating within a finite semiosis, no matter how subtle this semiotic may appear. While dialogic interactivity at the Museum of Sydney presents equal fragments of European and Indigenous Australian identity rather than ‘black’ history through ‘white’ eyes, for the ‘limited’ audience
that connects with this revision it is still a knowledge generated through recognition. This suggests a double-edged sword for museums dealing with identity politics. Because the meanings intended to be conveyed require recognition it is difficult for the ‘identity’ concerned to be given expression outside the conventional communication framework that the identification ultimately is seeking to reframe.

This dilemma for the museum of being tied to didactic affect through recognition, raises the vexed question of whether it is desirable to wrest the museum away from its rational/inclusive legacy as an apparatus of knowledge production? How can the museum rupture the organisation of this production even as it participates and perpetuates its creation? If this separation cannot be achieved, how is the museum as an institution different from any other capitalist, socialist or fascist venture? Articulating if not necessarily resolving these questions is perhaps at the heart of my thesis. For I contend that the museum is not inherently antithetical to the contemporary structure of politico-economic ventures (what institution ever is?), but on the contrary has an indelible closeness that enables it to deflate all ventures equally. It is closeness that enables critical distance. How is this so? Because museums as politico-economic ventures will always be disrupted by drifts of non-discursive affect generated through serendipitous encounters of visitors and artefacts. These encounters, produced from within the institutional bastion, are assemblages of desire. These hidden events transform what we know as traditional ‘history’, as Foucault puts it, ‘into a totally different form of time’ (2003b:249).

My proposal that the museum disrupts ‘traditional history’ and politico-economic ventures may appear disingenuous given the historical legacy of the museum’s
authority and production of knowledge. Nevertheless, it does seem viable to suggest that for the museum to sustain as a capitalist venture it has to enable experiences that function through finitude, through assuaging a perceived lack — that is, the experience has to provide recurring opportunities for instant gratification. This is the purpose of the production of commodities in the contemporary capitalist venture; they are directed to the accomplishment of activities, tasks, goals, or ends so that the production can be repeated. To this end, recognition is co-joined with emotion through a commodity production which ‘directs itself to the generation of pre-experienced sensations, sensations known in advance, guaranteed to affect in particular sad or joyful ways’ (Grosz 2008:4). For the fascist museum to function effectively as an entity of control, it also has to produce and manage a perceived lack. The annual Great German Art Exhibition held by the Nazis at Munich’s German House of Art exemplifies the difficulty of sustaining an ‘effective’ fascist museum. The exhibitions were intended to fill a cultural gap left by the Weimer Republic, yet not even the totalitarian might of the Third Reich was able to convince audiences on this score.

What matters here is that consumer instant gratification is not akin to encounters with collections in museums. Krystof Pomian declares that it is ‘precisely because objects have absolutely no use that they gain their power as objects full of meaning: the less use, the more meaning’ (cited in Arnold 2006:167). Stephen Greenblatt ties the inability to own the objects viewed in the museum to the arousal of wonder: ‘Museums display works of art in such a way as to imply that no one, not even the nominal owner or donor … can actually possess the wonderful object’ (1991:52). This said, a too proscribed use of technological interactivity can be viewed as
appropriating the consumer need for certainty and in doing so reinscribing the narrow pedagogical function of the rational museum. The move to touch screens in museums is a case in point, they are a controlled experience that limits what they let a user do, closed texts providing answers. They disincline imaginative play because their teleological underpinning requires narrative closure. I suggest that highly technologically driven devices in the museum actually serve to highlight a primary experiential distinction between the passing gratification of a consumer-driven activity, and the direct sensation of an encounter with a museum’s collection. The same might be said of the ubiquitous museum shop and café. A transformative encounter with artefacts in the museum actually makes starkly evident the façade of certainty attached to instant gratification that is the promise of the retail outlet. This contradictory space of the museum can be thought of in terms of an institution’s potential to perform its own ironic means of self appraisal.

**Subjectivity and meaning**

Before pursuing the museum’s autotelic dimension, I will briefly consider how ‘meaning’ generated outside a museum’s interpretive agenda is tackled in the critical literature. There is certainly consensus in the new museology that ‘wayward’ interpretation does occur. Witcomb’s observations of the quality of experiences generated through different types of interactivity show that the meanings that are intended are not necessarily either conveyed or appreciated by audiences, particularly for the more dialogic and spatial types of interactivity. As Michelle Henning observes,

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73 A line can be drawn between museums whose purpose is to collect and exhibit material artefacts, and Disneyland and the numerous thematic museums which are unashamedly capitalist ventures intended for profit. The latter rely on a kind of visual authenticity where the senses are overloaded in an uncritical way and where, as Umberto Eco notes, ‘everything looks real, and therefore it is real; in any case the fact that it seems real is real’ (1986:16).
while it is obvious that museums will attempt to organise visitors and to direct their
attention ‘we cannot assume that the … sensory and emotive effect of a display will
be complicit with the overt messages or content of the museum’ (2006:3). A
deliberate effort to present an interpretation may in itself be a stimulant for that
interpretation to be contested. Sharon Macdonald’s research at the Science Museum in
London concludes ‘not only that visitors made connections between exhibits that were
neither spatially nor conceptually linked according to the [Museum] Team’s own
plans, but that they specifically interpreted the exhibition contrary to a “message” that
the Team had hoped to convey’ (2002:227). While these few examples highlight
awareness by critics that contrary interpretation does occur, their approaches do not
engage with alternative meaning-making based on re-thinking the relationship
between museum visitors and material culture as an evolving formation of the human
and nonhuman. More common is Richard Sandell’s approach to contradiction in his
study of the social agency of museums to counter prejudice. Sandell refers to a
‘boomerang effect’ when ‘intended meanings are not simply resisted but turned
around by audiences in ways which result in the construction of entirely oppositional

A ‘boomerang effect’ describes Gaynor Kavanagh’s experience of a ‘fundamentalist
Christian school group’ visiting the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC
who concluded after walking around the Museum, that it ‘provided the evidence that
the Jews had received punishment for their failure to accept Jesus Christ as their

74 Henning compares instances where visitors are more engaged by the technology underpinning a
display than the display itself, with the gawping of early spectators of cinema who rather than being
duped by the cinematic illusion ‘were responding to the marvellous illusion’. If the simulated
experience of an exhibit becomes more enticing than the real thing, the experience of pleasure may be
antithetical to the didactic message that is intended (2006:58). For instance, the pleasant experience of
visitors to a city zoo, where they encounter primates in a lush, tropical rainforest, eschews the
unpleasant reality (and intended message) that these primates are an endangered species
saviour’ (2000:158). A complexity for the museum is that such ‘counter’ readings reflect a negative or positive outcome according to the perspective taken. Oppositional readings can be viewed as racist and discriminatory, as in the example of the school children visiting the Holocaust Museum, or ‘heroically obstinate’ which might apply to the case of modern art lovers moved by the emotive power and quality of the ‘outlawed’ art in the Nazis *Degenerate Art* exhibition. Sandell confronts this relativism: ‘If individual visitors are understood to generate and actualize their own highly personalised and variable meanings from the same exhibition encounter, what role, if any, might museums play in facilitating the generation of meanings that counter, rather than reinforce, prejudice?’ (2007:15). For Sandell the answer is found in the very status of the museum as an authoritative knowledge-provider, as a cultural authority (16). He notes that: ‘It is interesting … given the widespread academic and professional debates which have explored the political uses and consequences of museum exhibitions, that audiences nevertheless appear to have regained considerable faith in the museum as a purveyor of objective, impartial truths’ (127).

The question for Sandell is not whether museums become involved in shaping ideas, but how they do this most appropriately (2007:195). He implies that in the contemporary world of multiple media influences, the museum is one of a number of events that provides visitors with versions or accounts of racial and gender tolerance they can use and negotiate in their everyday lives. He argues for dialogic negotiation between the museum and visitor in which critical thinking about difference is advanced. While the ethos underlying this approach is not to be slighted its efficacy can be questioned. Witcomb’s analysis of dialogic interactivity suggests the mode can have a limited appeal because of narrative fragmentation. Additionally, framing the
value of the museum in terms of social equity based upon a politics of identification with race, gender, creed or sexual preference will not move understanding beyond discourse already defined. I argue that in meaningful transformation, the object/visitor relation is not one of identification through recognition, but a disorder of recognition that generates unfamiliar desire. This involves the museum’s propensity for re-invention, a potential tied to its autotelicity.

The autotelic museum

Autotelism, from the Greek ‘complete in itself’, is broadly akin to the idea of art for arts sake. This can be related to the museum as an end in itself, that is, it does not exist to serve an ideological or moral purpose. Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett considers that museums provide an autotelic experience that can be likened to an artform (2004:4). Because of their autotelicity, they offer ‘a refuge for utopian thought’; they are concrete sites for ‘practising utopia as a way of imagining’. An autotelic feature she identifies are spaces of movement and mobility, ‘utopian possibilities lie hidden within the museum’s psychogeography, that is, within the felt quality of its navigated space’ (2004:2,4).

This mobility is not the active spatial affect of Lissitzky’s exhibitions but rather a serendipitous outcome of rhizomatic connections between artefacts and visitors. Rhizomatic connections cannot be reduced to a linear unity. ‘A rhizome has no beginning and end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b:27). In terms of meaning, these connections are not attributable to or subjugated by anything signifying. Perhaps Marcel Proust’s appreciation of the museum can be found in such a felt psychogeography which
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett describes ‘is the museum as “force field” between subject and object, with memory the mediating term’ (2004:2). Kirshenblatt-Gimblett agrees with Proust that museum spaces are disjointed in arranging objects brought from elsewhere, yet like him she finds that the gaps these disjunctions create are not voids but openings. Openings that put ‘people and things into a relationship quite unlike anything encountered in the world outside’ (2004:1). Proust expresses this novel relationship as a sense of the past that is beyond the reach of the intellect, for him this ‘sense’ can be found ‘in some material object … of which we have no inkling’ (1996:51).

The notion of ‘opening’ into a past time through objects serving memory has received considerable attention in museology, the reverse notion that memory serves objects, has not. Marius Kwint identifies a relationship between the approach taken to memory and the way that objects in museums are critically understood. He suggests that giving objects a ‘history of their own’ would ‘offer an important variable to the study of memory’ yet the current attention given to memory does not facilitate this approach. As he observes, ‘many influential accounts of meaning seem locked into models of the psyche or ideology. Whether in psychoanalytic, semiotic, behaviourist, or Marxist scenarios, the variety of material things is often lost among the dramas that are projected onto them’ (1999:4). In the mix of dramas focused on the fixed subject

75 Marius Kwint identifies three main ways that objects serve memory in the Western tradition: (1) they furnish recollection, (2) they stimulate memory, bringing back dormant experiences (this includes Proust’s involuntary memory) and (3) they form records, storing information beyond individual experience (1999:2).

76 An essay by Kevin Hetherington (1997) gives a ceramic object a history of its own so it escapes being lost within these various scenarios. The object, a seventeenth-century slipware owl jug known as Ozzy the Owl, is a highlight of the vast ceramic collection of the City Museum and Art Gallery in Stoke-on-Trent, England. Because the object gained fame on a TV antiques show, was acquired by the Museum and there was no other display space, Ozzy is located in a showcase designed for more salubrious objects. Hetherington reveals how the object’s anomalous presence creates a fold in the narrative of the museum space, in terms of place, aesthetics and connoisseurship. Ozzy’s crude pre
and the object of memory as recognition that which is unpresentable falls outside the parameters of critical theory. What is advanced is a subject/object relation that is set in the past, which connects critical theory to the cause and effect model of recognition based upon the repetition of extant or dogmatic images of thought.

Gregory Flaxman describes that ‘the dogmatic image is conceived in advance of empirical vicissitudes and thereby projects itself into the future as an anticipative matrix that turns any encounter into one of recognition’ (2000:11). Pivotal what is dissipated in this teleology is the intensity that occurs when memory serves objects. Affecting this memory was Marcel Proust’s literary project. While his work is obviously concerned with memory and time past, the ‘feel’ of time occurs as a present interaction, not in the fact of the temporal shift itself. He recognised that time is always doubled in memory or as Deleuze puts it, ‘the past does not follow the present that it is no longer, it coexists with the present it was’ (cited in Flaxman 2000:32). The non-linearity of temporality will be relevant when I consider a parallel between the resonance of museum objects and cinematic images. The significance of the role of objects in memory is not about ‘flashbacks’ within a chronological narrative, but transformed subjectivities in the present; what the object does rather than what it means as an historical documentation of the past.

Like Proust and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Hein conceives the museum as an opening to a form of spatial/temporal awareness. It is a space of philosophical engagement: the bones displayed in a natural history museum are akin to philosophical concepts,
linking worlds that are not one’s own (Hein 2000). Museum artefacts are ideas reified, accomplishing materially what philosophers achieve conceptually. This idea can be related to the Deleuze-Guattarian view that concepts are the specific invention and concern of philosophy and affects are the specific creation of art, concepts and affects are the separate and distinct production of each endeavour (1994b). Yet, Hein’s view that artefacts are ideas reified, suggests that the two distinct productions of concept and affect may actually be linked in the museum experience, a view which evidences my proposition that the museum is an experiential bridge or threshold between what are discursively paradigmatically different human activities. Deleuze makes the observation that the classification of things ‘is the beginning of the formation of concepts’ (2000:368), thus the relation between the museum visitor and the museum collection commences as epistemological but then moves into the realm of the ontological.

Critics who describe the museum and its collections and classifications as a bridge often describe the experience in terms of an in-between or serendipitous space. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett writes of the ‘loosely jointed nature’ of the whole of a museum collection making it ‘not only a reservoir from which to draw but also an active field of infinite combinatory potential, a space of coincidence, accident and incident’ (2004:4). The way to this uncommon space, world, idea or experience, is a disjunction that disallows usual, familiar perspectives. For Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, an eighteenth-century London house museum, Dennis Severs’ House, exemplifies such an experiential bridge, a space ‘premised on an intuitive art of discovery and invention, not one that is transparent to reason’. Rather than operating through discoveries arrived at through a rational lens on the world, the ‘meanings’ that are formed in the
House have to do with absence becoming a felt present. I agree with Kirshenblatt- Gimblett that the crux of approaching such an invention of the present is recognising that ‘the capacity to think is linked to a capacity to feel’ (2004:3).

Dennis Severs’ House is an uncommon assemblage of the visitor and an eighteenth-century silk weaver’s house. Located in Folgate Street, Spitalfields, Dennis Severs purchased the house in 1979 and while living there (without electricity and water) filled each room with antique objects collected from local markets. He staged each room to animate a particular ambiance. Since his death the house, now managed by the Spitalfields Trust, is opened twice weekly to visitors. This museum is not a recreation or restoration of the past but an unfolding that situates visitors in a material environment that is both make-believe and real. While this type of imaginative play can happen in simulated re-creations and historical restorations, both tend to rely upon a chronological contiguity with the past that may be likened to an antiquarian nostalgia. In this respect, Folgate Street might be considered defiantly anti-nostalgic, there is no past that can somehow be revived and returned to. Severs approached his project as the creative endeavour of generating direct sensations. Augmenting the antiques is the house itself; its creaks, cobwebs and smoky walls as well as leftover meal scraps, half full wineglasses and unmade beds. Severs conceives the opening of the past in the present as the ‘space between’ (2002:103); a space that is real and accessed through sensations in the present. From the amalgam of sensations there is an unfamiliarity that is simultaneously fascinating and somewhat disconcerting because 18 Folgate Street does not concede to the reason-able, common sense notion that the past is gone.
Peter Ackroyd describes Dennis Severs House as ‘a living story, with each of its rooms as a separate chapter’ (cited in Severs 2002:viii). Walking into the house off the street, the visitor enters architecture centuries old and is struck by their position within different overlapping milieux created by objects crammed into each room — furniture, wigs, doors, books, chamber pots, letters, goblets, portraits, bonnets. Leaving the house, these milieus extend into the street; the story translates into current Spitalfields. The visitor moves through a space they transform and the transformed space moves beyond them. This ‘event’ or assemblage resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s interest in the creation of ‘milieus’ as a way to understand the experience a species has of their life world. As humans, we are not separate from the various milieus in which we find ourselves, these milieus involve us in a kind of co-evolution (Grosz 2008:40). In this regard, the museum nurtures and makes available co-evolutionary assemblages; milieus of the animate and inanimate.77

**Re-invigorating the fetish**

A second autotelic attribute of the museum that relates to co-evolutionary assemblages lies in Jean-Paul Martinon’s description of the restless art museum as an institution that presents itself through a ‘double bind’ of truths and uncertainties (2006:62). He contends that ‘contrary to common understanding, the museum is not

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77 Macdonald and Basu highlight the fact that, ‘All exhibitions entail the bringing together of unlikely assemblages of people, things, ideas, texts, spaces and different media’ (2007:9). While this is the case, my Deleuzean notion of the museum assemblage is not concerned with the assembly of ‘things’ in a didactic sense. Recent exhibitions of Peter Weibel and Bruno Latour aim to place the viewer in an intellectual quandary by making assemblies of assemblies and juxtaposing unfamiliar things. For example *Iconoclash* (2002) at ZKM in Karlsruhe, Germany, aimed to create the quandary: ‘We cannot do without representation. If only we could do without representation’ (Weibel and Latour 2007:97). My point here is that these impressive experimental exhibitions ‘work’ by adding another layer of didacticism to the museum experience rather than through affecting relations of the human and nonhuman. This is interesting given Bruno Latour’s call for a collective of the human and nonhuman as an alternative to the old dichotomy between nature and society (2004); an alternative that I argue, following Deleuze, will eventuate not through the knowledge acquired via didactic presupposition but through assemblages of affectivity.
an archival institution in the sense of a repository of past events’, but rather sited at ‘the juncture of endings and openings’ and in a permanent state of disjunction, dispute and contestation (2006:66,65). The museum has the potential to revise past associations with linear space and time by generating encounters with temporalities that reassemble its own place in time. I position this revision as a dialectic between history as a production of truth and Nietzschean ‘effective’ historicity rupturing this truth. As Martinon expresses it, engaging in ‘messianicity without messianism’, the art museum carries the potential of unravelling traditional temporal ideology and ‘setting difference into motion’ (2006:65,60). The potential of the museum to effectively revise what it once authorised, is useful to my purpose to elucidate non-discursive affect, not least because of my refutation of Alan Wallach’s claim, outlined in chapter one, that the museum is incapable of providing critical narrative, or of being effectively self-critical.

Martinon suggests that it is ‘never possible to pin-down or determine what museums are’ because they are ‘at the center of their own redefinition presenting themselves only in their estranged momentariness’ (2006:64). Through the lens of new historicism, Stephen Greenblatt views the lack of solidity in the museum as the source of an artwork’s resonance and wonder, it is in the gaps, in hybridity, and the wounds, markings and defacement of its artefacts, that museums act as ‘monuments to the fragility of culture, to the fall of sustaining institutions and noble houses’. He writes for example, of ‘broken-off noses that indifferently record the grand disasters of accidents and the random accidents of trivial incompetence’ (1991:44). The museum for Martinon and Greenblatt is a contingent site for redefining meaning through a process of revision, hybridisation and re-assemblage.
The idea that museums are spaces for redefining meaning through their capacity to estrange their own assumptions about temporality supports James Clifford’s argument that non-western objects in ethnographic museums can be encountered in ways that unravel a museum’s self-evident and dominant taxonomies (1985). For Clifford the value in moving away from the efficacy of the authoritative museum involves a change in self awareness that I acknowledge as a desiring-machine. Citing James Fenton’s poem *The Pitt-Rivers Museum*, the fascination of objects for Clifford involves opening disruptive territories of the self. Such openings are thwarted if there is not an element of fascination which can occur if too much scientific or historical knowledge is applied to an encounter exemplified in Fenton’s poem by,

\[
\text{a dusty semiologist, equipped to unravel}
\]

\[
\text{The seven components of that witch’s curse}
\]

\[
\text{Or the syntax of the mutilated teeth.}
\]

The ‘dusty semiologist’ is not fascinated by the objects s/he expertly examines. On the contrary s/he seeks instead to demystify and to position them within the known schema of a western taxonomy, the outcome being an experiential loss in relation to the objects scrutinised.

Clifford/Fenton’s ‘semiologist’ can be theorised as engaged in a Saussurean classificatory semiology that is bound to scientism, a semiological structuralism that posits meaning such that openings and potentialities are finite. The type of poststructuralist semiotic that Clifford advances in his study of objects and selves is

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bound not to Saussure’s linguistics, but to Charles Sanders Peirce’s notion of a heterogeneous, or infinite semiosis, which instead of closing meaning, opens it to infinitude. Important to this semiotic is the idea that thinking is continuous movement, that ‘a sign acquires meaning only through its interpretation in another sign and so on ad infinitum’ (Rodowick 1997:39). This semiotic stance allows for ‘in betweens’ that affect a peculiar disjunction with the present, for movement into the milieus of the nonhuman, and for ‘deep’ encounters that lie outside the safe realm of human expectation, outside ‘the syntax of the mutilated teeth’. This fascination, or infinite semiosis, may be likened to Plato’s description of the effect of art as a holy terror (theis phobos), an experience that Donald Preziosi claims art history and current museology is neither able to comprehend nor articulate (2003).

James Clifford’s call in the mid-1980s to ‘re-invigorate the fetish’ was not based on a naïve criticality that ignored the relation of culture and power in the rational museum. He acknowledges the discourse that objects housed in ethnographic museums “belong” no-where, having been torn from their social contexts of production and reception [and] given value in systems of meaning whose primary function is to confirm the knowledge and taste of a possessive Western Subjectivity’. But this possession is not a total capture, although museums ‘are institutionalized and powerful, there exist possible standpoints from which non-Western objects can be encountered’ (1985:244).

Rather than grasping objects only as cultural signs and artistic icons, we can return to them … their lost status as fetishes — not specimens of a deviant or exotic “fetishism” but our own fetishes. This tactic, necessarily personal,
would accord to things in collections the power to fixate, rather than simply the capacity to edify or inform. African and Oceanian artefacts could once again be … sources of fascination with the power to disconcert. Seen in their nomadic resistance to classification they could remind us of our lack of self-possession, of the artifices we employ to gather a world sensibly around us. (Clifford 1985:244)

Clifford’s call for a personal, tactical approach to artefacts is echoed in the studies of art historian James Elkins and philosopher John Armstrong who separately argue there is advantage in a more profound engagement with art history and art museums. In a study that seeks to discern why people do or don’t cry in front of paintings, Elkins makes problematic what he views is a disdain for ‘feeling’ in relation to art, a not dissimilar inadequacy that Fenton expresses toward his character, the ‘dusty semiologist’. Elkins provocatively suggests that for ‘tearless’ art historians and academics (himself included), strong emotions are distrusted because they involve being manipulated (2004:210). In seeking to understand why some people are so affected that their response to an artwork is to weep, Elkins reflects upon theories long considered ‘false’ and unfashionable. For example, he resolves that the mostly Romantic idea of the “pathetic fallacy” — that the storms outside mirror the one’s inside — is still a good model of the sheer unpredictable complexity of our responses to major painting’ (69). Likewise he argues that ‘trance theory’ — the idea that a painting can be a bridge to another world — is ‘far better able to explain strong affect than well behaved, legitimate theory’ (73).
Jill Bennett has considered bodily responses to art and affect through a focus on historical devotional art. Drawing on Mary Carruthers’ study of memory in medieval cultures, Bennett writes that the most important feature of the memory-image in both classical and medieval culture was its ‘affective’ nature. An image of a stigmatised St Francis, for example, works through a ‘mnemonic of pain, inducing in the spectator a kind of affective response to the pathos and violence of the scene, it does this by operating on the ‘sense memory’ or ‘emotional memory’ of the subject’ (2001:4). Bodily response is thus imperative to the quality of the memory experience. This relates to Carruthers’ observation of the role of affect in memory: ‘Successful memory schemes all acknowledge the importance of tagging material emotionally as well as schematically, making each memory as much as possible into a personal occasion by imprinting personal associations like desire and fear, pleasure or discomfort’ (cited in Bennett 2001:4).

John Armstrong proposes that objects need to be understood to embody, rather than articulate meaning, to open rather than close meaning. In our contemporary culture of cliché, individuals do not critically engage with the silent, embodied meanings of things (2004). They are too busy grasping for asserted meaning or hype in an attempt to propound and justify the merits of a superficial excitement that is the purview of instant gratification. Perhaps what Armstrong is suggesting is that instead of being genuinely affected by art, what both public and critical discourse is engaged in is affectation, a simulacrum of affect, a finite semiology with little or no impact upon the way that people are actually reassembled by engagement with the object world.
The distinction between affect and affectation revisits Hilde Hein’s concern about the quality of technologically interactive experiences, as well as Fredric Jameson’s claim that traditional feelings have been replaced by a hyper-real type of exhilaration. It also recalls Umberto Eco’s erasure of the real described in his travels in hyperreality (1986). This leads me to consider whether didactic affect is a form of affectation, a relation of recognition that accords with material consumption for instant gratification. As a relation that dissipates genuinely affecting encounters, didactic affect aligns with what Horst Ruthrof identifies as ‘a pronounced sense of politico-cultural resignation’ and with this, ‘the intensification of hierarchization and the possibilities of control’ (1997:246). In his study of semantics and the body, Ruthrof argues that a way out of this impasse involves acknowledging that meaning has ultimately to do with the body, ‘linguistic expressions mean anything or nothing at all unless they are activated by haptic, visual, tactile, gustatory, olfactory, and other non-verbal signs’ (7).

The call for a greater acknowledgement of the role of ‘non-verbal signs’ in the making of meaning can be heard across academic disciplines. Echoing Elkins’, Steven Shaviro for example, writes in The Cinematic Body:

Beneath its claims to methodological rigor and political correctness, it [film theory] manifests a barely contained panic at the prospect (or is it memory?) of being affected and moved by visual forms. It is as if there were something degrading and dangerous about giving way to images, and so easily falling under their power. Theory thus seeks to ward off the cinema’s dangerous allure, to refuse the suspect pleasures that it offers. (1993:13)
I contend that in museum studies, acknowledgement of ‘being affected’ can productively sit alongside discussions of inclusivity and interactivity, thereby allowing the museum to be affirmed as a desiring-machine that creates those milieus of fascination that are acknowledged with such recurrence in popular representations.

*Please Sir, where’s the withered hand?* asks a child visiting Pitt Rivers Museum in Fenton’s poem. As Clifford discerns, to be this child is ‘to ignore the serious admonitions about human evolution and cultural diversity posted in the entrance hall and to be interested instead by the claw of a condor, the jaw of a dolphin, the hair of a witch’ (1988:216). Donald Preziosi recounts that as a child visiting the American Museum of Natural History he would lay beneath the tyrannosaurus skeleton pretending to be wounded, dying prey. He recalls being seduced by the exhibits, of ‘the visceral feeling of being pulled everywhere by the museum, and of not wanting to leave’ (2003:5). The idea of the AMNH as a space for the production of desire is a stance distant from the ‘Teddy Bear Patriarchy’ described by Donna Haraway in her critical analysis of the same Museum. Notwithstanding the rigour and significance of her study, it is tempting to consider whether other children, during the years that Haraway writes about, were similarly affected not by the ‘civilising’ and moral meanings intended by the Museum’s trustees, but by becoming-animal. It is telling in this regard that the fictional museum, whether this is a museum represented in a horror film or in children’s literature, is invariably a site that undoes the certainty of being human and is, through acts of transgression, a space of becoming.79

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79 For example, in Robin Jarvis’ popular children’s trilogy *Tales from the Wyrd Museum* (Collins: 1985) a London house museum transports snooping children along with teddy bears, eccentric adults and demonic entities into a war zone. This rupture accords a transformation in the lives of all involved no matter the type of self-hood they inhabit. Animate and inanimate encounter each other in a space/time that is equal to both, facilitating movement beyond the illusory distance between self and other maintained through common sense.
Megan Hicks has sought to analytically interpret the impact of childhood visits to the Sydney Technological Museum and discerns the importance of an experience for children of what she calls ‘independent discovery’ (2005:76). This involves young people becoming so engrossed by the Museum and its exhibits that they assume they are making discoveries for themselves. While it is outside the scope of her study to pursue the permutations of this form of discovery in terms of the production of desire and the relation this desire has with altered states of self-hood, Hicks does conclude that in this state children found the inspiration to imagine a range of possible adulthoods (77). Such encounters are not necessarily restricted to children. From his investigations into learning in museums, David Carr concludes that: ‘We go to a museum in order to see what unfolds within us when we are there: we are folded up, and we unfold before the object, becoming capable of saying something new about ourselves’ (2006:16).

Gaynor Kavanagh and Calum Storrie’s studies of the museum also support the notion that the experiential appeal of museums does not lie in defined, transparent sets of relationships. Kavanagh qualifies that she does not wish to minimise the ways in which cultural frameworks and political systems condition and influence people, but she recognises that there is a need to place emphasis upon ‘the personal and private as it comes into contact with the formal and official’ (2000:171). In her study of history museums and memory, she argues that understanding the nature of visitors’ engagement is limited if the critical focus is entirely on politics of class and culture: ‘People bring with them to the museum not just characteristics drawn from their class status, cultural upbringing and political environment but also individuality of self, which has the capacity to rupture at least some of the features of cultural patterns and
political assumptions’ (158). For Kavanagh the museum is a ‘dream space’, overlapping with a cognitive, and pragmatic (social) space: ‘The visitor travels in, through and out of these spaces, organizing and threading them together in ways that make meaning and associations in their lives’ (2). Calum Storrie also finds the association of the museum with order and classification restrictive, as it limits ‘either by accident or design, the possible interpretations of the museum’ (2006:2). The delirious museum that he identifies does not replace the museums that we know, like Kavanagh he suggests that it exists in parallel to the traditional museum as it has evolved. The ‘delirious museum’ for Storrie is the museum reinterpreted in terms of the city. Its consistent feature, in antithesis of the didactic museum, is ‘the breakdown of control and classification’. The delirious museum and the street have a conceptual contiguity as both are ‘overlaid with levels of history, a multiplicity of situations, events and objects open to countless interpretations’ (2006:2).

Summary
This chapter has signalled a non-discursive mode of affect that is tacitly acknowledged in the work of critics who engage with the a-signifying potential of the museum but that is not necessarily provided with a theoretical underpinning. A theoretical vocabulary is useful because the intensity of non-discursive affect persuades that the distinction between the capitalist or fascist museum, and deterritorialising the efficacy of such institutions, lies in the non-teleological assemblages of things. The next chapter moves towards giving substance to the abstract quality of this mode of affect which is neither didactic nor tangible, yet is formative in the creation of ways of thinking outside common sense dependence on dogmatic thought.
Interpretations of affect are often limited by the act of interpretation, an act which ends up aligning affect with emotion. This is because emotion operates at the level of the discursive while affect is non-discursive. What is actually being relayed in these theoretical approaches is didactic affect. As soon as affect is located within the discursive it is a tangible something, it is recognition, rather than ‘true’ affect which is becoming. This admittedly makes my task in this chapter somewhat complicated, that is, to present the unpresentable. But be this as it may, I distinguish theoretically between affect as direct sensation, and an after-effect which is a collectively understood emotional response. Didactic affect might therefore be thought of as an effect of affect. The ‘intensity’ that is prior to collectively understood emotional response is the non-discursive realm I seek to acknowledge and through this acknowledgement, potentialise.

In gauging the realm of affect, I am particularly interested in the intensity known as the sublime. The sublime operates as a discursive tradition that explains a feeling of lack. This inexplicable lack exists because it is given discursive actuality and is distinct from the intensity of non-discursive affect which I describe not as a lack, abyss, absence or void, but as a productive unconscious ‘intelligence’. In the chapter I also contrast the abstract quality of affect with more tangible, quotidian types of ‘felt intensities’ or feelings. Again, from this discussion, it becomes clear that affect is not emotion and to conjoin the two is to operate with a concept of affect that does not align with mine. I introduce Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to affect based upon their anti-Oedipal rejection of lack as a motivator of human desire; they acknowledge
the unconscious as open to the production of desire. The chapter contextualises non-discursive or ‘delirious affect’ as a production of assemblages in the museum as a desiring-machine. The museum as a desiring-machine segues to the thesis of chapter five, that museum encounters have a formative impact in the creation of new thought that is not dissimilar to that of the action, perception and affection images of cinema, images viewed by Deleuze as assemblages for the invention of desire.

**What is affect?**

In his study of non-representational theory, Nigel Thrift suggests: ‘Affect is a different kind of intelligence about the world, but it is intelligence nonetheless, and previous attempts to either relegate affect to the irrational or raise it up to the level of the sublime are both equally mistaken’ (2008:175). Thrift’s clarification leads to consider why affective ‘intelligence’ might differ from other types of felt experience including the sublime, and why it is that affect has been discredited by association with expression and an irrational subjectivity. ‘Intelligence’ here is used in an unconventional way, as a sense of knowing-ness rather than knowing. Knowing is something that has happened, knowledge, repetition without difference, and is thus associated with the signifying chain of recognition. Knowing-ness is anticipatory, the felt environment that surrounds something rather than its utterance as ‘I know’.

Philip Shaw offers a succinct description of the sublime: ‘In broad terms, whenever experience slips out of conventional understanding, whenever the power of an object or event is such that words fail and points of comparison disappear, then we resort to the feeling of the sublime’ (2006:2). I propose the sublime is actually a lack created and contained by naming the inexplicable and unnameable power of an object.
Theories of the sublime are invariably attempts to interpret this intensity, to provide it with meaning; they range from the Greek description of the sublime as rhetoric, to Romantic, Marxist and postmodern sublimes.

The ‘sublime’ was first described as a mode of rhetoric in a first-century treatise titled *About Elevation (Peri Hypsous)* attributed to Dionysus Longinus. The Longinian sublime is an experience characterised by taking the reader or listener outside of themselves with startling intensity. It is an experience that cannot be understood, applied or controlled according to rules or didactic instruction. Longinus describes the enthrallment of being ‘scorched, pierced, inundated, blown down, and generally knocked about by the sublime’ (Weiskel 1986:5). This inexplicable *ekstasis* (standing outside oneself) is translated by Longinus into the language of rhetoric so that the sublime is contained and accorded meaning within the language of persuasion.

*Peri Hypsous* was translated into French in 1674. In translation *hypsous* became the French word ‘sublime’ which was associated at the time with the process of alchemy and purification through heating (Battersby 2007:4). Via this French interpretation of a Greek formulation of rhetoric, the sublime was re-formulated in English during the Enlightenment.80 Theories of the sublime were used to explain the inexplicable, to comprehend the reason for a lack of understanding. This ‘lack’ was understood as the ‘divine’ reflection of a creative force in the physical world. This concept of the ‘sublime’ was reformulated by Edmund Burke in his *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757). Burke seeks empirical evidence for the sublime, locating this evidence in the secular realm of male

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80 A flurry of British men developed theories on the sublime including; Thomas Burnet, John Dennis, Joseph Addison, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, and John Baillie.
experience. The sublime thus becomes an intense delight found in pain and danger. ‘[W]hatever is fitted in any sort to excite ideas of pain and danger … is a source of the sublime’ (1987:xiv). Burke’s empiricism, initiates a shift in sublime discourse toward distancing the physical world away from the divine and toward thought and the psyche. Notably, in the process the experience of the sublime is gendered as a masculine trait that did not extend to women (Zylinska 2001; Battersby 2007).

Expanding on Burke’s work, Kant (1790) formulated a distinction between the sublime and the beautiful in the *Analytic of the Sublime* as part of *The Critique of Judgment*. For Kant, like Burke, it is via a sublime experience that ‘reason’ confronts its incapacity (lack) to deal rationally with the infinite. For Burke this is a feeling of delight in terror through the natural object. For Kant, the paradigm shifts. He grounds aesthetic judgment in the subject, not the natural object. Kant raises awareness of the unlimited power of reason as a force that can *overcome* the outrageous sublime. Through this ‘judgment of reason’ the moral freedom of the individual is heightened: ‘ideas of reason [are] provoked and called to mind precisely by this inadequacy’ of what is given to our senses, and ‘the mind is incited to abandon sensibility and to occupy itself with ideas that contain a greater purposiveness’ (cited in Wenzel 2005:107). Ultimately what this amounts to is that through the experience of the sublime a conflict between different human faculties is initiated in which the ‘I’, the ‘subjective’ self, finally surrenders to reason. As Deleuze surmises, Kantian philosophy is ultimately respectful to reason so that ‘knowledge, morality, reflection and faith are supposed to correspond to natural interests of reason, and are never themselves called into question’ (1994a:137). Truncating a complex philosophical tradition for the purpose of argument, what these various sublimes amount to is that
lack equals reason. In the discursive conflation of the sublime, a subject’s ambivalence and loss of ‘reason’ are held to correspond with the lack or uncertainty associated with an ambiguous object or event.

European Romanticism challenged Enlightenment notions of reason, indeed its emergence was partly a response to gaps in the Kantian sublime (Battersby 2007). Romantic writers and thinkers attempted to overcome the split between the realm of ideas and nature, and in drawing upon Rousseau’s elevation of nature and feeling over reason and the intellect gave priority to experiences felt but unconscious. This priority can be understood as a shift toward engaging with the intensity of affective encounters with the outside world. In Friedrich Schelling’s Naturphilosophie (1797) a parallel is established between nature and the mind in which thinking is simply an aspect of nature’s productivity and takes place independent of conscious will (Bowie 2003:133). Schelling and the Jena Romantics sought an idealist expression of the exercise of human freedom above reason. The concern was to give value to the presentation of that which cannot be presented (Lucy 1997). In the writing of Schelling and others therefore, it is not a concern to integrate feelings into the ‘space of reason’. Paul Redding describes the Romantic concern to be with, ‘sensation or feeling … conceived as phenomenal but “unconscious” in the sense of lacking access consciousness’ (1999:23).

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81 Gilles Deleuze is similarly interested in a new thought of Nature. Jean-Clet Martin writes that Deleuze reactivates through his conjunction of the image and thought, a Naturphilosophie, lost since Schelling (2000:61).

82 English Romanticism was influenced by Schelling and other post Kantian German Idealists but was more inclined to view the sublime as an effect of consciousness, rather than the notion of the union of mind and nature. Jena is a town in southern Germany where a group of writers and philosophers lived and worked in the mid-1790s.
The German Romantic tradition became unacceptable for critical consideration post-1945 because of a perceived philosophical contiguity with nationalistic totalitarianism. I suggest that this silencing of the German tradition of the sublime is a factor relevant to the critical trajectory ‘affect’ took during the late twentieth-century. It certainly explains why it was through the ‘analytical’ trajectory of the Kantian sublime that the German and English tradition merged (Ashfield and de Bolla 1996:2). Kantian transcendental reasoning entered the so-called analytical Anglo-American philosophical tradition unmediated by German idealism and its investigation of meanings that are generated outside the structures of reason.

Approaches that understand affect as a type of intelligence or ‘conscious corporality’ inherit this contested German philosophical approach. To put the point usefully though probably too starkly, what this reflects is the well-known academic dichotomy between Continental, and analytic or Anglo-American philosophy. What is significant to my thesis is that analytical theories that make access consciousness primary discredit the ‘non-cognitive’ or pre-conscious embodiment of feeling or expression in the production of meaning. The contemporary rhetoric of the cyber-sublime in which ‘bits’ replace atoms adheres to this analytical understanding. So too, according to Brian Massumi, do most cultural schools. Massumi observes of the cultural realm that ‘there is an underlying assumption that giving credence to

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83 Care is required in making such a stark distinction. I agree with Simon Critchley that: ‘Both Continental and analytical philosophy are, to a great extent, sectarian self-descriptions that are the consequence of the professionalization of the discipline, a process that has led to the weakening of philosophy’s critical function and its emancipatory intent, and to its progressive marginalization in the life of culture. As such, to borrow Rorty’s word, the distinction has become tiresome’ (2001:126).
expression represents an uncritical subjectivity’ (2002a:xiii). While this assumption is undergoing change it does remain a dominant tendency.⁸⁴

Before moving to theories of affect, it is contingent to consider more recent applications of the sublime. Walter Benjamin put forward a Marxist approach to the sublime through the concept of the auratic object, that is, objects only possess a sublime ‘aura’ when they are unique and cannot be reproduced (Savage 2000:44). Although a Marxist, Benjamin was steeped in German Romanticism, and the concept of the aura allowed him to ‘strip the ideological and idealist elements of the romantic conception of the sublime’ in order to allow ‘sublimity to be examined historically’ (2000:44). Benjamin was aware that the ‘truth’ could not be grasped by an intentional intellectual process and sought to develop a form of critique that would accommodate this awareness and augment political change through a new approach to history. Benjamin’s project reflects a complex mix of his grounding in the work of the German Romantics, his familiarity with the Talmud (Handelman 1991), and his interest in surrealism. He was also interested in Proust’s articulation of ‘involuntary memory’ as an experience that seems to envelop the person from their place in the past so breaking the apparent boundary between past and present’ (Savage 2000:42). Benjamin was also informed by the Brechtian theatrical technique of ‘estrangement effect’ (*Verfremdungseffekt*). The point of estrangement in the theatre is to impact

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⁸⁴ Interest in affect is strong in cultural studies, art, design and architecture as well as the fields of affective computing and artificial intelligence. Ian Buchanan observes that ‘largely owing to the influence of Gilles Deleuze “affect” is one of those terms whose critical stocks are riding high’ (2006:92). There seems considerable evidence of this. In 2007 for example ‘Affect Theory’ was a course offered at the University of Illinois. In 2009 research positions were offered at the University of Konstanz in ‘Mixed Feelings’ defined as: ‘The interdisciplinary study of emotion, feeling and affect’ (Appointments *The Economist* 28 March 2009). As well as an increasing appreciation of Deleuze, perhaps interest in the sociology and politics of affect heightened with public and critical inability to convincingly synthesise the global impact of localised events such as collective mourning for the Princess of Wales, the events on and post September 11, 2001 and the affective register of recent American Presidencies notably Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.
upon an audience not to create a detached form of empathy (Einfühlung) but in such a way that real change is augmented. It ‘must jolt us out of the waking slumber of daily life and … cause us to think about what it was that jolted us; but it also has to prevent us from sliding back into that slumber’ (Buchanan 2006:43). There are shades here of the impact sought in the projects of El Lissitzky. The dramatic technique of rupture is a didactic means to de-naturalise the subject in order to make them historically aware Marxists. All these influences deal with a quality of ‘sublime’ experience that appealed to Benjamin whose strategy was always ‘to displace, by questioning the boundaries between past and present, the notion of linear historical time which was sustained by narrative form’ (Savage 2000:40).

The concept of the sublime mutates again with the notion of the postmodern sublime. Steven Shaviro notes that the sublime has become fashionable in relation to postmodernism because it is an aesthetic of immensity, excess and disproportion that aligns with contemporary taste 85 (2002:9). Jean-François Lyotard, who believes that the sublime is the crux of the postmodern aesthetic, argues that the ‘terror’ of the sublime is a feeling that arises from the disappearance (lack) of the self. Rather than referencing a higher power or faculty as with previous Kantian ‘sublimes’, the postmodern absence of self is an attribute of consciousness. In this regard, the disappearance of self does not align with the abandonment of selfhood as a way to detour the repression attached to ‘lack’ that is of interest to me. This is because it is Lyotard’s goal to mobilise difference, but this is difference that requires a dichotomy

85 Shaviro notes that in comparison with the sublime, beauty is rarely discussed, as it is about harmony and proportion which is somehow old fashioned. He describes beauty as implying the loss of aura, as ‘more like a blasé shrug of the shoulders, or like Andy Warhol’s bland and oft-repeated judgement: ‘it’s great’. He describes that instances of the beautiful are examples in themselves, but not examples of anything (Shaviro 2002). There is a growing interest in the idea of ‘extreme beauty’, which, as an oxymoron is a kind of deterritorialisng of the trope of beauty that ‘does not inhibit but gives air to desire’ (Swearingen and Cutting-Gray 2002:ix).
between self and other, it is difference through repetition. There is nothing new here
in terms of desire or thought, rather this is the realm of recognition. This dichotomy of
self and other, which is at the heart of identity politics, does not accord with detouring
selfhood altogether, which is necessary in order to augment the unconscious space
where desire is produced. Lyotard’s ‘disappearance’ of the postmodern self refers to
its replacement by a virtual self. This is not the actual/virtual series of double time,
but the formalising of a fixed, though virtual subject. The subject is virtual through
opposition with the actual, which represents the formation of a linear teleological
progression. The postmodern sublime is of interest to Lyotard because by invoking
what is unpresentable it ‘keeps open that which would otherwise be foreclosed by
information technologies and by commodification’ (Shaviro 2002:9). However, it is
not a means to approach the unpresentable through the direct sensation of affecting
encounters that may create new formations between the animate and inanimate,
virtual or otherwise.

This reading of the sublime suggests that certain types of what might be termed
‘affective interactions’ have acquired meaning as a form of knowledge within a
discursive tradition. The sublime tradition and affect are actually paradigmatically
different. The sublime arises through consciously reasoning an affective event that is
beyond comprehension. Yet, the affective event itself is not beyond comprehension, it
is prior to comprehension.

**Approaching affect**

If affect is non-conscious, non-discursive, un-presentable and not the production of a
knowing subject how can it be critically evaluated? The reality is that it is probably
not possible to provide a concrete sense of affect, even though it is the constant state of affective movements that make the living body an ongoing physiological entity. What can be done is to describe affect in such a way that contributes to new images of thought and hence toward the invention of new concepts. For Deleuze and Guattari the creation of concepts is a quite specific activity:

to connect internal, inseparable components to the point of closure or saturation so that we can no longer add or withdraw a component without changing the nature of the concept; to connect the concept with another in such a way that the nature of other connections will change … [a concept] can have several neighborhoods. (1994b:90)

Adopting this concept of concept to affect, I begin by describing other ‘neighbourhoods’, that is, extant thought about affect.

Charles Darwin believed that affects were part of a left-over primitive survival mechanism. Similarly, for Sigmund Freud affects seem to have been largely indistinguishable from physiological drives, and were associated with a kind of hysteria ‘like the hysteric we are animated by reminiscences whose pathways and modes of inhabiting our bodies we do not know’ (Best 2001:219). This drive, libido or desire is the source for Freud, of identity. Freud situates desire within the Oedipal triangle in such a way, according to Deleuze and Guattari, that it ‘distorts the meaning

86 Freud decided, given that affects were part of a primitive survival mechanism, that negative affects such as anger had a stronger signal than positive affects. Positive affects, such as aesthetic pleasure in art, were a form of sublimation, which, because they resulted from an inhibited aim were ‘ultimately under the sway of the negative’ (Best 2001:208). Best notes that this ‘privileging of the negative’ extended into both psychology and aesthetics. Affect is mostly overlooked in recent art history, as she observes, because pleasurable corporeal engagement in art is either ignored or taken for granted (2001:208). It this it has affinity with the neglected trope of beauty.
of the unconscious, [as it] expresses nothing about desire’ (2009:54). It is a crux of
their philosophy to struggle against reductive explanations based on Oedipal
triangulation. In its place they offer a non-Oedipal life of the unconscious which they
conceptualise as a desiring-machine. In the desiring-machine: ‘Desire does not
depend on a lack, to desire is not to be lacking something, and desire does not refer to
any law; desire produces’ (2009:54). This will be of particular interest in the next
chapter when I consider the museum assemblage in relation to the affective generation
of desire in the cinematic image.

Freud admitted that he struggled with the problem of affect all his life (Demos
1995:20) and in the late twentieth-century the psychoanalyst André Green also
conceded that ‘we still do not have a satisfactory theory of affects’ (cited in Best
2001:207). In the 1960s, the psychologist Silvan Tomkins controversially
distinguished between drives and affects. He argued for the primacy of the affect
system as the motivating force in human life:

Contrary to Freud, I do not view human beings as the battleground for their
imperious drives, which urge them on blindly to pleasure and violence, to be
contained only by a repressive society and its representations within the ego
and the superego. Rather, I see affect or feeling as the primary innate
biological motivating mechanism, more urgent than drive deprivation and
pleasure, and more urgent even than physical pain. Without its amplification,
nothing else matters, and with its amplification anything can matter. (cited in
Magai and McFadden 1995:230)

87 In relation to visual culture Susan Best observes that ‘if affects are still a fuzzy area in the master
discourse of psychoanalysis, the discourse where one would expect to find the most rigorous account of
this aspect of life, then investigating affect in art is surely an even more difficult task’ (2001:207).
The hunger drive, for example, only assumes importance if it is assembled with an affective interest in food. Tomkins argued that we are born with a range of basic affects. Our emotions stem from these nine basic affects that operate on a sliding scale of intensity:

Positive affects ‘interest-excitement’, ‘enjoyment-joy’
Negative affects ‘distress-anguish’, ‘fear-terror’, ‘shame-humiliation’,
               ‘contempt-disgust’, ‘anger-rage’, ‘dis-smell’
Other affects ‘surprise-startle’.

Each affect has its own motivating property. For example, ‘interest-excitement’ is fundamental to orientation and attention ‘it readily attaches to a variety of objects and then draws further engagement with those objects’, while ‘surprise-startle’ ‘has a channel clearing function; it allows us to reorient and thus change intentional investments’ (Magai and McFadden 1995:230). While Tomkins’ basic typology faces the problem of categorising and discursively limiting the scope of affect, it nevertheless acknowledges the operation of an affective as distinct from a cognitive body.  

88 Tomkins placed special emphasis on the face as the primary site of the affective response. ‘The face was “the organ of affect”, much as the lungs are the organ of breathing’ (Magai and McFadden 1995:232).

89 William James (1842-1910) was the brother of novelist Henry James.
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the emotion can be constituted. (cited in Redding 1999:7)

For James, the subjective ‘feeling’ of an emotion was ‘provided by bodily states and processes, primarily conceived as located peripherally within viscera, skeletal muscle and skin’ (1999:7). It is now affirmed, supporting James’ work on affect ‘that the bodily sensations produced by making the muscular movements characteristic of a particular emotional state can give rise to the feelings that are typically experienced in that state’ (Berkowitz 2000:3).

During the 1960s, the idea of a physiological grounding for emotional states was viewed unfavourably by behaviourists, who dominated during the time Tomkins was writing psychology, and by exponents of the cognitive revolution that was just emerging. In this area of theory, ‘It was an era that was particularly antagonistic to the emotions’ (Magai and McFadden 1995:237). This antagonism operated within a post-world war atmosphere that, as I have indicated, eschewed the ‘romantic’ championing of the autonomy of individual feelings because of its connection to German idealism (Continental philosophy). There was a general promotion of approaches that held that only mental (not physical) experiences could be studied with objectivity. This coincided with the ongoing late nineteenth-century schema of giving emotions a numerical identity, a trend that disassociated feelings from their physiological grounding.
Otniel Dror observes this trend arising so that emotions could be studied without disrupting the ‘knowledge production’ of ‘normal’ science, and without threatening ‘the laboratory’s self-representation as an emotion-free space’ (2001:359). This was believed a necessary precaution because ‘emotion was associated with marginal or oppositional social and cultural movements’ and ‘smacked of the feminine, the popular, and sometimes the superstitious’ (370). Thus, by using various gadgets and technologies, emotion was translated in the laboratory into a sequence of numbers expressed in graphs.\(^1\) The result, as Dror observes, was an obscuring of the viscerality of affect:

The numeric, machine-mediated representation of emotion implicitly depleted emotion of its affective content. It depicted emotion as an ordered string of numbers whose purpose and function was to represent — not to provoke or move … In this new mode of representation, emotion was released from the gesticulations of an unrestrained body or the involuntary perturbations of an embodied self. It was positioned not in opposition to, but in the language of, reason. (2001:374)

Antonio Damasio notes that throughout the twentieth-century ‘emotion was not trusted in the laboratory’, and observes a ‘notable absence of a notion of organism in cognitive science and neuroscience’ (2000:39). Twentieth-century science, he contends, basically leaves out the body by relegating emotion to the lower neural strata associated with ‘the ancestors’ [presumably drives]. ‘In the end’, he argues, ‘not

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\(^1\) Dror notes that the contemporary field of Affecting Computing and a parallel universe of online popular gadgets both hark back to the technologies of the late nineteenth-century that aligned emotions with numbers. He cites an online ‘Love Meter’ that reads thumbs on screen to calculate algorithmically the affective possibilities of potential lovers, see [http://predictions.astrology.com/lvm/calc.html](http://predictions.astrology.com/lvm/calc.html) (2001:358).
only was emotion not rational, even studying it was probably not rational.\footnote{The lack of attention given to emotion aligned with distrust in the sciences with study of consciousness. Damasio notes that until recently ‘studying consciousness was simply not the thing to do before you made tenure, and even after you did it was looked upon with suspicion. Only in recent years has consciousness become a somewhat safer topic of scientific enquiry’ (2000:7). He views this phenomenon as a felicitous development that is seeing the ‘traditional worlds of philosophy and psychology gradually joining forces with … biology’ (2000:13).} (2000:39).

Teresa Brennan argues that the impetus behind her theory that people are directly affected by the emotions of others, has lost ground in the official record and philosophical canon. Through her reflections on the transmission of affects through hormonal entrainment and pheromones she traces the ‘demise of affect’ to the rise of the scientific notion of the individual.\footnote{Brennan suggests that: ‘To smell pheromones is also in a sense to consume them’ and, ‘That no direct physical contact is necessary for a transmission to take place. Pheromones are literally in the air’ (2004:69).} She argues that ‘the taken-for-grantedness of the emotionally contained subject is a residual bastion of Eurocentrism’ that has lead to ‘many inconsistencies in theories and therapies of the subject’\footnote{Brennan’s argument is that the construction of the self-contained Western identity depends on projecting unwanted affects such as anxiety and depression outside of ourselves in a process known as ‘othering’ (2004:12).} (2004:2). Her interest in the physical nature of affect as a transference once widely expressed as ‘theological mysteries’ (23) is iterated in James Elkins’ study on art and crying. An example being the Medieval phenomenon of ‘tears of compunction’ in which ‘the Virgin’s tears become your tears’ (Elkins 2004:155). Brennan observes that although the transmission of affects is disallowed in critical canons it continues to be entertained in popular culture (2004:17).

Overlooking theories of emotion and of affective experience coincided with the rise of ‘reason based’ cognitive outlooks, notably mind-brain identity theory which postulates a straightforward identity between mind and brain (Redding 1999:8). At an
extreme, cognitive theories identify ‘mind’ with certain types of organisational patterns and functional states capable of being instantiated in the brain, but also capable of alternative forms of instantiation, such as in a computer (1999:9). Within this sphere, recent research into understanding cognition in human-computer interaction has begun to re-evaluate the role and potential of affects. Traditionally, computing systems understood affect as a transfer of bits of information. A recent study, however, highlights affect not as information, but as an ‘interactional product’:

A social, interactional approach to understanding cognition in human-computer interaction has emerged in the last twenty years in contrast to the dominant information processing approach to capturing, modelling, augmenting and supporting human activity. The recent emphasis on the importance of emotion for cognition further advances these arguments to look ‘beyond the cognitive’ and to understand new aspects of human experience. (Boehner, DePaula et al. 2005:1)

Thus within the field of cognitive computation, affect is currently understood as an ‘internal’ experience that consists of discrete units ‘that can be transferred intact between people and machines’ (2005:5). The MIT Affective Computing Laboratory constructs technological devices to discern and augment affective states. One such device is Emotomail which helps the recipient decode the tone of an email by gathering information as the sender composes the email such as facial expressions and typing speed (MIT 2008).
The new field of ‘affective computing’ does not distinguish between affects and emotions. It views affect/emotion discursively as a culturally mediated interaction that is socially constructed and experienced. It is not devised to critically engage with the potentiality of new subjectivities, but rather seeks to interpret the subject through an understanding of affective transference in order to create consumer products. Félix Guattari expresses concern at the trend to control non-discursive intensities [such as affect] by putting them in the orbit of the economic valorisation of capital. This leads to a standardisation of subjectivity ‘through a communication that evacuates as much as possible trans-semiotic and amodal enunciative compositions’. The effacement of a polysemy of subjectivities is an extreme outcome of turning affects and other modes of existential apprehension into ‘an exchange of information tokens … that are calculable as bits and reproducible on computers’ (Guattari 1995:104).

The ‘potentialising of affect’ as a means to entrench already extant systems and schemas is at the heart of Guattari’s concern. Yet, I anticipate that this ‘potentialising’ will have limited traction, as it is aligned not to affect, but rather to emotional responses. This again raises the point that affects are not emotions (Massumi 2002a). An affect is ‘intelligence’ between the body and the outside world that is more abstract than any emotion. This notion gains evidence if we consider the automatic operation of the body’s internal proprioceptive movements, and the random nature of involuntary memory.⁹⁴ As Damasio observes, we are not conscious of all our feelings,

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⁹⁴ Neuroscience now suggests that a memory may exist as a shift in the strength of the synapses through a protein molecule known as a prion. Jonah Lehrer writes that prions are uniquely liberated: ‘They are able to ignore everything from the instructions of our DNA to the life cycles of our cells. Though they exist inside us, they are ultimately apart from us, obeying rules of their own making’. In this respect, Lehrer picks up on the previously cited comment of Proust that, ‘the past is hidden … in some material object of which we have no inkling’ (2007:95). On this point, Marius Kwint notes: ‘Neurophysiologists, whose work has substantially undermined Freudian psychoanalysis, have … found Proust’s description of memory a remarkably telling anticipation of brain studies’ (1999:3).
and often realise quite suddenly ‘that the particular state of feeling we know has not begun on the moment of knowing but some time before. Neither the feeling state nor the emotion that led to it have been in consciousness, and yet they have been unfolding as biological process’ (2000:36). Additionally, felt intensities are not ‘felt’ as supposed. For example, children find ‘sad’ scenes in films pleasant, probably because they are aroused when sad, and arousal is equated with pleasure. Brian Massumi notes that researchers have concluded that ‘the difference between “sadness” and “happiness” is not all that its cracked up to be’ and what is normally indexed as separate is actually connected; ‘the strength or duration of an image’s effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way’ (2002a:24). This agrees with Antonio Damasio’s observation that assumptions that are made about the six ‘universal feelings’ of happy, sad, anger, disgust, surprise and fear distract from the fact that most of the time we do not experience any of these (2000:285). He identifies a range of other, equally relevant ‘background feelings’ that include: fatigue, energy, excitement, wellness, sickness, tension, relaxation, surging, dragging, stability, instability, balance, imbalance, harmony and discord (2000:286).

As Angela Brennan notes: ‘Feelings are sensations that have found a match in words’ (2004:19).

**Spinoza and Deleuze**

There is a particular ‘translation’ of affect that is associated with Deleuze’s ethological re-interpretation of Spinoza (Thrift 2008:177). Refuting the Cartesian separation of mind and body, Spinoza views human beings, and all other objects, as modes of ‘God or Nature’ and as one unfolding substance. Human ‘psychology’ is a
complex arising out of interaction of many bodies and things. Spinoza describes the active outcome of these encounters as emotion/affect or affectus which is both body and thought. Affectus takes the form of an outcome or an increase or decrease in the body and mind. Affect/emotions are therefore not so much responses as actions or ‘greater or lesser forces of existing’ (2008:178).

Brian Massumi describes Deleuze’s Spinozan use of affect as ‘corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution of that body’s capacity to act’ (2004b:xvii). This acknowledges the operation of a pivotal intensity that is distant from the ‘feeling’ of self-consciousness. Affect is non-conscious, a moment of unformed and unstructured potential. Nigel Thrift describes that, ‘Affect structures encounters so that bodies are disposed for action in a particular way’ (2008:179). That we do not know what the relations may be in an encounter ahead of time is what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they consider affects as ‘the nonhuman becomings of man’ (cited in Thrift 2008:179). Herein lays the ethological extension of Deleuze’s use of Spinoza; that he re-thinks and unwinds the human and animal ethos. Spinoza’s claim that ‘we do not yet know what a body can do’ is the context for understanding the unexplored potential of the brain-body.

Pursuing the Deleuzean translation of Spinoza’s concept affectus, Massumi argues that in engaging critically with affect it is crucial to distinguish between affect and

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emotion because they ‘follow different logics and pertain to different orders’ (2002a:27).

Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognised. (2002a:28)

Lawrence Grossberg gives support to Massumi’s distinction by arguing that ‘unlike emotions, affective states are neither structured narratively nor organized in response to our interpretations of situations’ (cited in Terada 2001:6). Yet despite their randomness and our inability to ‘know’ affects ahead of time, Grossberg claims that affects can be invested, a claim refuted by Eric Shouse who argues, if ‘affect is unformed and unstructured and always prior to conscious awareness how is one to invest in it? (2005:3). The pre-reflexivity of affective encounter would seem to make it outside investment. Perhaps it is more applicable to lay claim to the value of affect precisely because it transforms but cannot be invested?

How are the different qualities that are frequently used interchangeably as emotion distinguished? For Shouse: ‘Feelings are personal and biographical, emotions are social, and affects are pre-personal’ (2005:1). But what does pre-personal mean?

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96 Ronald de Sousa in The Rationality of Emotion argues that the role of emotion is management of the plethora of objects of attention, interpretation, and strategies of inference and conduct (1987:xv). As such emotion and reason are connected. For de Sousa, the ideal of emotional rationality is adequate emotional response, a utopian condition that allows the individual ‘to feel the human world as it is, to experience the emotional equivalent of truth … to feel all that, with one’s whole being, all at once’ (1987:333). An implication of de Sousa’s work is that emotions are a gauge of ‘truth’. He does not pursue the proposition that emotions respond to the constant movement of unconscious affective experience, and herein might lay the essence of what he determines ‘truth’.
These various distinctions are important and far from straightforward. Affect is holistic rather than linear; a non-cognitive intensity, while perceptions, emotions and feelings are cognitive. Affect is a-signifying not a mode of signification. Outside language. Shouse notes the abstract quality of affects arising ‘because affect cannot be fully realised in language, and because affect is always prior to and/or outside of consciousness’ (2005:1). He contends that the abstractness of affect ‘makes it transmittable in ways that feelings and emotions are not’ (3).

Claire Colebrook elaborates a Deleuzean distinction between affects and percepts: ‘Affections are what happens to us (disgust, or the recoil of the nostrils at the smell of cheese); perceptions are what we receive (odour, or the smell itself)’ (2002b:22). She further qualifies affect when she describes it as not sense-ible. She distinguishes between sense and affect noting the importance to not ‘reduce the virtual notion of affect to the immediate experience of sensible data’ (2002b:106). Elizabeth Grosz also asserts that we can differentiate affects from experience, or any phenomenological framework, by ‘the fact that they link the lived or phenomenological body … with forces of the outside, that the body itself can never experience directly’ (2008:3). Colebrook tackles the specific complexity of describing affect as different from sensible data: ‘Affect occurs not just when the eye is confronted by colour, but when this seeing gives us the thought or image of that virtual difference that allows colour to be given’ (2002b:106).

Thinking about art and affect, Susan Best suggests that affective ‘interest-excitement’ is a combination of ‘intellectual, motor and perceptual activity’ that ‘requires signification in order to be experienced as feeling, and in turn this linkage is what
enables signification to be meaningful’ (2001:222,220). This accords with Damasio’s claim that: ‘Without affect feelings do not feel … and without feelings rational decision-making becomes problematic’ (cited in Shouse 2005:2). A more radical approach aligns with Jill Bennett’s theory that ‘the viewer is directly affected through a sensory encounter with the art object’ (2001:6). Bennett champions Deleuze’s view that art is direct sensation. For her the possibilities of this open ‘the way for … reconsideration of pre-modern forms of representation’ (14).

Deleuze and Guattari conceive a work of art as a bloc of sensation comprised of percepts and affects (1994b:164). Put simplistically, percepts go in and affects come out. Different artists have different methods of wresting affect from the materials of art; for example, the writer’s specific materials are words and syntax, these are a bloc of sensations that affect97 (1994b:167). Museums are also poised to wrest affect through blocs of sensation; their materials are artefacts, visitors, space. Emily Kngwarreye’s previously mentioned painting *Big Yam* (1996) is a vegetative system that envelops visitors and the gallery where it is displayed. A jar of whale blubber yellows the space of the whaling museum and tethers the visitor like a mourning shroud. The affects wrest from these artefacts replace interpretation with a connectedness that can not easily be represented. This is a move away from knowing

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97 The direct sensation of affects may be understood in terms such as metallic, crystalline, stony, oceanic and so on. Deleuze and Guattari refer to the creation of affect in *Wuthering Heights*; ‘When Emily Bronte traces the bond between Heathcliffe and Catherine, she invents a violent affect, like a kinship between two wolves, which above all should not be mistaken for love’ (1994b:175). In writing of affect in Francis Bacon’s painting Deleuze says, ‘In Bacon’s bullfights … we hear the noise of the beast’s hooves; in the 1976 triptych, we touch the quivering of the bird plunging into the place where the head should be, and each time meat is represented, we touch it, smell it, eat it, weigh it’ (2005:30). A Deleuzean take on the affect of *Wuthering Heights* is very different to a realist or a Marxist interpretation of the same text. Claire Colebrook notes for example, that for Fredric Jameson *Wuthering Heights* is an allegory of historical development, it ‘expresses the historical transition from aristocratic feudalism to bourgeois familialism in the relations between characters’ (1997:36). Thus, the ‘wolverine kinship’ in a Jamesonian reading would be representative of this familial transition, rather than a direct sensation with the power to rupture all discursive structures, including family.
objects as that which is not a subject, and toward a knowing-ness of human and inanimate realms. For Kngwarreye’s yam and the dead whale skin do transmit something — a specific unspecificity; an acutely distinct yet unfamiliar temporality. This affective penetration, framed in a painting and specimen jar, yet spilling way beyond such containment, is distinct from a formulated emotional response, say of happiness or anger.

Deleuze and Guattari write that: ‘Affects are precisely [the] nonhuman becomings of man … not the passage from one lived state to another but man’s nonhuman becoming (1994b:169,173). The use of the term ‘becoming’ is clarified through their explanation of Captain Ahab becoming-whale in Herman Melville’s novel Moby-Dick. They do not mean that Ahab imitates Moby Dick:

becoming is neither an imitation nor an experienced sympathy, nor even an imaginary identification. It is not resemblance, although there is resemblance. But it is only produced resemblance. Rather, becoming is an extreme contiguity within a coupling of two sensations without resemblance or, on the contrary, in the distance of a light that captures both of them in a single reflection. (1994b:173)

A zone of indetermination is entered, a zone of indiscernability ‘as if things, beasts, and persons endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation’98 (1994b:173). The realm of ‘withering hands’, ‘becoming dinosaur prey’, ‘disconcerting fetish’, vegetal takeover of a gallery. ‘The being of sensation is

98 Deleuze and Guattari are careful to qualify that they are not talking of affect as undertaking a return to origins, ‘as if beneath civilization we would rediscover, in terms of resemblance, the persistence of a bestial or primitive humanity’ (1994b:174).
not the flesh but the compound of nonhuman forces of the cosmos, of man’s nonhuman becomings, and of the ambiguous house that exchanges and adjusts them, makes them whirl around like winds’ (1994b:183).

Teresa Brennan discerns: ‘The transmission of affect means that we are not self-contained in terms of our energies. There is no secure distinction between the individual and the environment’ (cited in Shouse 2005:3). It is her interest to give credibility to the transmission of affects from one person to another. She writes that ‘the transmission of affect, if only for an instant, alters the biochemistry and neurology of the subject. The “atmosphere” or the environment literally gets into the individual’ (2004:1). Brennan’s loosening of the potential of affect directs toward Deleuze and Guattari, however the latter, in their attempt to disengage the common sense logic on which dogmatic thought depends, advance a radical approach to the idea of self when they imagine the complete abandonment of any idea of coordinated selfhood. For them ‘the self is merely the connection point of infinite and random impulses and flows … that overlap and intercut with one another, but that never form any but the most transitory and dynamic correspondences’ (Mansfield 2000:136). The self is, in this sense, rhizomatic; a multiplicity that has neither subject nor object and that can not ‘be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b:11). This philosophy takes Brennan’s notion of affective transmission beyond the confines of human communication to envisage nonhuman ‘expression’. Nonhuman enunciation is frequent in art and particularly cinema where it is not uncommon for other than human entities to transmit affects. Affect facilitates the production of desires and thence new subjectivities. From a different angle, Damasio

99 In saying this Brennan is at odds with the hegemony of the neo-Darwinian notion of the genetic transmission of a predisposed, self-contained self (2004:75).
gives ‘scientific’ credence to the creation of ‘new’ subjectivities, when he admits that in some respects it is ‘astonishing that most of us have only one character’ (2000:225). He finds an evolutionary basis for this, that is, that more than one self is not a good recipe for survival. However, consciousness is adaptive and as environments become increasingly less dangerous so too selves may multiply. For Deleuze and Guattari this multiplicity is already extant with perceptions occurring at many levels of the body, making the body a crowd of mini-subjectivities (Massumi 2002b:xxx).

Deleuze’s concept of affect has been discerned as a reaction to Jameson’s ‘waning of affect’ (Buchanan 2006:93). As previously cited, Jameson’s concerns involve the loss of individual feelings and their replacement by a postmodern type of hysterical sublime; a late capitalist demise of human feelings undermining the raising of historical consciousness (Marxist). However, for Deleuze the idea of such demise is redundant as what has waned are not feelings but beliefs (Massumi 2002a); beliefs that are irrelevant because in Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to disengage common sense logic they imagine the abandonment of any idea of coordinated selfhood (2004a). Affects are anarchical sensations that complicate the unity of identity. Operating not as Oedipal aspects of ego or self, affective encounters are a break in habitual thought that allows objects in the world to be imaged differently; to image rhizomatic connections that link the body and objects into any range of becoming. Intensities of life are not pathologies of the ego or self, such as anxiety, alienation and hysteria, rather they are the shattering of these constraints by the fragmentation of contemporary life. Affective becomings are the production of desire. Thus Jameson’s observation of a ‘waning of affect’ arises from the reification of the ego as extolled by
an entire structural order and a psychoanalysis that the Deleuze-Guattarian desiring-machine supersedes. The ego is an Oedipal construct that is about the production of orthodoxies, morality and judgement and not the production of desire.

**The duality of affect**

There are two components of affect: didactic, *emotional* affect and *delirious* affect. To qualify this distinction, emotional affect is allied to recognition, to finite semiosis; it tends toward judgment, cliché and convention rather than change. This is the realm of Oedipal over-coding that articulates and thereby contains desire within the subject-object dichotomy. Emotional affect provides a lexicon with which to ground delirious affect in reason. Hence, emotional affect is fine-tuned by discursive understandings that contribute to the production of ideological meaning.

Delirious or non-discursive affect also leans towards something being known, or knowing-*ness*, but being a production of desire has a thin ideological armature. ‘Delirium’ derives from the Latin *deliro*, a derivative of *lira*, a furrow. In an etymological context delirium means to move out of the furrow, and thereby away from the path of reason. In the classical episteme described by Michel Foucault, delirious discourse is that which lies beyond the furrow of reason, a ‘savage danger related to the danger of the passions’ that operates to effect marginalisation (2003a:94).

The term ‘delirious’ resonates with the Deleuze-Guattarian concept of schizoanalysis. Schizoanalysis is the means to break the Oedipal hold of psychoanalysis and capitalism. It ‘rejects any idea of pre-traced destiny, whatever name is given to it —
divine, anagogic, historical, economic, structural, hereditary, or syntagmatic’ (2004b:14). Schizoanalysis is not a method to interpret the unconscious but to produce the unconscious:

In both psychoanalysis and its object, there is always a general, always a leader (General Freud). Schizoanalysis, on the other hand, treats the unconscious as an acentered system, in other words, as a machinic network of finite automata (a rhizome), and thus arrives at an entirely different state of the unconscious.¹⁰⁰ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b:19)

The dual concept of affect finds conceptual alliance in Michel de Certeau’s differentiation between systems of representation and the inherent logic that operates in the everyday. De Certeau proposes that everyday logic operates within the dominant culture through paths that trace ‘interests and desires that are neither determined nor captured by the systems in which they develop’ (1984:xviii). The consumer ‘makes’ their own logic out of systems of representation — television, newspapers, a city or museum. In this relation, the presence and circulation of representation ‘tells us nothing about what it is for its users’. It is therefore necessary to analyse the use of everyday logic as ‘only then can we gauge the difference or similarity between the production of the image and the secondary production hidden in the process of its utilization’ (1984:xiii).

¹⁰⁰ The metaphor of the ‘rational’ as a linear furrowed fields aligns with Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of how the tree and root system has dominated Western reality and thought, ‘from botany to biology and anatomy but also gnosiology, theology, ontology, all of philosophy’. Moving away from this system is to move to a rhizomic, a-signifying rupture which may be ‘broken, shattered at a given spot … to start up again somewhere else’. So it is that desire ‘moves and produces’ (2004b:21,15).
De Certeau’s proposition agrees with descriptions provided earlier of visitor ‘behaviour’ being complemented by what an individual actually ‘makes’ or ‘does’ with an exhibition, with an encounter with artefacts, with the unconscious production of desire. There is no place for this output to be credited — its feature is an ‘absence of a proper locus’ (1984:36). As such the production of everyday logic is embodied not in place, but in space. As with the dual nature of affect, place and space are actually inseparable. But de Certeau offers a metaphor for the duality (pre 9/11) by discussing the experience of looking down on Manhattan from the 110th floor of the World Trade Centre as a conceptual experience of the city and unlike being on the street. The experience of the city is not contained from above, within the concept or place of the city, but in the streets which are the territory of everyday logic. De Certeau’s everyday logic conforms with the idea that the message an exhibition is intended to convey is not totally captured by the meanings its producers are intent on generating but are also produced through visitors’ in the ‘placeless’ space where delirious affect is generated.

Andrea Witcomb has drawn on de Certeau’s relationship of place and space as a method of sidestepping the rhetoric associated with the use of Sydney’s Darling Harbour tourist precinct (2003:42). She observes people taking personal possession of both the exterior and interior places that comprise this public site. The exterior, which boasts city vistas, promenades, and terrace cafes, is intended as an impressive panorama of corporate Sydney. However, this exterior is equally an everyday space used as a thoroughfare and for meeting people, domestic activity which ‘simply ignores the corporate pretensions’ (2003:41). The interior of the site, in contrast to its cosmopolitan exterior, is a popular noisy market with tacky tourist shops and take-
away food outlets. Witcomb reads the ‘authenticity’ of this interior space as a takeover of the corporate gaze.\(^{101}\) Such observations concur with de Certeau’s idea that the infiltration of personal space into prescribed place is an output whose meanings are multiple and obtuse.

A task in reflecting on ‘everyday’ meaning in the guise of affect is to acknowledge the particular knowing-ness, or production of desire, that is the product of delirious affect. In relation to Darling Harbour, for example, this might lie in asking what is produced by the public ignoring the ‘corporate Sydney gaze’. For in being ignored this ‘gaze’ becomes something else; a vagueness, an obsolescent presence, an absence, or a lack. Turned back upon itself the corporate intent becomes self-indulgent decoration and as such an Oedipal gesture of egoism and a tremendous waste of money. This resonates with Rosalind Krauss’ expression of a postmodern ‘decorative exhilaration’, and with Fredric Jameson’s architectural hyperspace which no longer attempts to ‘insert a new Utopian language into the tawdry and commercial sign system of the surrounding city’, but rather speaks that very same language in what is a ‘virtually unmediated relationship with the capitalist political economy’ (1991).

**Summary**

Deleuze and Guattari claim psychoanalysis and all pre-established structures as totalising systems of signification, they always look for means to escape the ‘dusty semiology’ of meanings these systems construct. Art, in the creation of affects, of

\(^{101}\) Witcomb makes the wry observation that the everyday culture of Darling Harbour was ‘only made possible by the removal of the original working class population of the area along with its traditional leisure sites, including pubs and brothels. The popular was reinvented in the name of the consumer’ (2003:42).
direct sensations, creates lines of flight away from these systems; new infinite, a-signifying becomings that arise from unconscious desires that have nothing to do with Oedipus or finite semiotic encodings. This can be expanded to the in-between spaces of delirious affect at the Dennis Severs’ House Museum or the American Museum of Natural History. Cinema is particularly enabling in terms of in-between space, inventing affects beyond the structure of signifying semiologies even when used as an instrument of power (as exemplified by the Hollywood machine): ‘the meanings in cinema are not directly encoded in a machine of intersecting syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes’ (Guattari 2009:243). In this sense the museum has a cinematic aspect, an autotelic self reflexivity that allows for disparate, disjunctive meanings to sit alongside one another. The following chapter will consider the cinematic museum and discern the affective museum imagined in film as a space for the production of desire.
The ‘on screen’ museum, the museum of the popular imagination, is frequently associated with danger, the uncontrollable and the irrational; ‘spaces for illicit behaviour rather than the space of conformity normally accorded to them within academic analysis’ (Witcomb 2003:171). This is not really surprising given the inherent contradiction between the museum’s legacy of humanism based in Enlightenment reason, and its function as a storehouse of remarkable artefacts, each with its own duration, materiality and refrain. However, any critical evaluation of the museum on screen will be influenced by the approach taken to viewing pleasure and may have less to do with the museum as a place of contradiction than with its ideological framing. For example, construing viewing pleasure as fixed in the male gaze positions the museum within feminist theory as a patriarchal institution. Underlying this interpretation is the notion that the viewer is a fixed subject and in this fixity there is alignment with the use of critical theory in the new museology.

102 The first museum appears on screen in the 1896 silent comedy Come Along Do in which a couple ‘break the rules’ and eat inside a London art gallery. This sets the standard for the museum as a site of nonconformity. Almost a century later in LA Story (1991) a frustrated weatherman (Steve Martin) defies convention by rollerblading through the public galleries of the LA County Museum. This recalls the scene in Godard’s Bande à Part (1964), re-enacted in Bertolucci’s The Dreamers (2004), of three friends racing the length of the Louvre’s Grand Gallery. Hitchcock’s early film Blackmail (1929) includes an extended pursuit through the British Museum that culminates with a man falling to his death. Un-museum-like behaviour propels the comedy in Bringing Up Baby (1938) which climaxes in the destruction of a dinosaur exhibit in the natural history museum where Cary Grant is a palaeontologist pursued by socialite Katharine Hepburn. On the Town (1949), a Gene Kelly/Ann Miller/Frank Sinatra musical with a dance scene set in the American Museum of Natural History, also features the collapse of the museum’s dinosaur skeleton. In Ghostbusters II (1989) a mad conservator at the Manhattan Museum of Art brings to life the portrait of an evil twelfth-century magician and The Thomas Crown Affair (1999) involves ingenious thefts at the Museum of Modern Art. In Bean: The Ultimate Disaster Movie (2000) Rowan Atkinson causes excruciating mayhem in an ultra-contemporary Getty-esque Museum. I have viewed hundreds of films with the museum as a site of transgression of which this list represents but a small selection. I suggest it is only a matter of time before an enterprising Hollywood film director applies the 3D effects used in Avatar (2010) to ‘make real’ the inanimate artefacts in a film based in a museum.
In contrast, a Deleuzean cine-philosophical approach concerned with the potential of images to unfix any pre-determined ‘gaze’, would approach the unsettled museum for what it does; for affecting, disjunctive connections. This does not mean that ideology is not extant in how a film represents a museum, but that alongside these representations there are alternative positionings. Contrasting readings of the opening sequences of the film *Topkapi* (1964), a comedy/adventure sited in and around Istanbul’s Topkapi Museum, illustrate the distinction that I pursue in the chapter between ideological and structural interpretations of film, and an alternate Deleuzean reading.

Take One  Oedipal phantasy

*In an opening scene of Topkapi, the femme fatale entices the (male) viewer into Istanbul’s Topkapi Museum where she unveils her plan to steal an artefact, a priceless Ottoman dagger. Fetishised and placed in the Orient she represents the castrated other; a thief and seductress whose m(other) desire for the dagger/phallus threatens the Symbolic order epitomised by the patriarchal museum.*

Take Two  Anti-Oedipal affect

*The opening images of Topkapi invent a fantasy world, a montage of colour, music, exotica and comic sounds that merge the gaudiness of a carnival with games of chance and the Orient. A wheel of fortune spins, the numbers transform into faces and artefacts; the whole folds into an overflow of sensations that act to parody the adventure to follow. At the heart of the excess lies the Topkapi Museum.*
The intent behind these two readings is patently different. The museum in Take One is part of an Oedipal phantasy in line with the influence of psychoanalysis on feminist film theory. The museum in Take Two forms part of an excess of sensations perceptible through optical/audio images that may actually decode the Oedipal phantasy in the first Take. This cinematic effect of decoding fixed relations I suggest has parallel in the affective impact of assemblages in actual museums.

I begin with an explicit psychoanalytical reading of the museum in *Topkapi* and the Hollywood ‘blockbuster’ *Night at the Museum* (2006). I qualify that these films are unremarkable at a critical level as artistic productions (apart from Peter Ustinov’s engaging performance as the anti-hero in *Topkapi* and the film’s captivating cinematography of Istanbul). I use the films to present a parallel analysis, not to discuss creative merit. I follow the analyses with the ‘dangerous’ museum in horror film drawing on Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection. The lack of attention given to delirious affect in these psychoanalytical readings introduces Gilles Deleuze’s alternative approach to film images.

Deleuze’s cine-philosophy is explicated in his two books on cinema *Cinema 1: The Movement Image* (1983) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1985). These books are not standard film histories nor do they profess a specific theory of film. Rather they use cinema to explore connections between images, perception and time. These

103 Although D.N. Rodowick claims that the books are informed by ‘an historical idea’ that comes from the German art historian Heinrich Wöfflin who argues that the task of history of aesthetic forms is ‘to understand the specific set of formal possibilities … historically available to different cultures in different times’. The books are also informed by the work of Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers who characterise the evolution of science and philosophy as an open system of change and exchange. These two references are important as ‘Deleuze’s larger objective is not to produce another theory of film, but to understand how aesthetic, philosophical, and scientific modes of understanding converge in producing cultural strategies for imagining and imaging the world’ (Rodowick 1997:5).
connections are of interest to Deleuze who argues that in allowing us to re-think relations to time, cinema has ethical and political implications. As Claire Colebrook describes: ‘It is our way of living time (or our “duration”) which explains the problem of politics: how is it that our desire submits to its own repression?’ (2002b:41). For Deleuze, elucidating problems is a way to undo dogmatic thought and reveal the illusions that support common sense orthodoxies. Colebrook again:

Time creates certain ‘internal illusions’. (We do not need to posit some deceiving enemy outside life – such as ‘patriarchy’, evil or ‘the capitalist’ – to explain our repression). From the complex flow of time we produce ordered wholes – such as the notion of the human self. We then imagine that this self preceded or grounded the flow of time rather than being an effect of time. The importance of overcoming this illusion cannot be overestimated. (Colebrook 2002b:41)

Illusion is pivotal to the suspense in *Vertigo* (1958), a film particularly significant for Deleuze because of its invention of the relation or mental-image. There are two museums in *Vertigo* which I interpret as a psychoanalytical narrative alongside a Deleuzean description of the film’s affect. This introduces a reflection on the museum in the arthouse films *La Jetée* (1962) and *The Russian Ark* (2002). Both films disrupt schemas of common sense movement in time and expose signifying chains of common sense as an illusion based on recognition. They reflect what Deleuze calls an image of time, or time-image. Importantly a museum in each film is a conduit for intervening with the flow of time that signifies ‘ordered wholes’, including the human self.
The Topkapi Imaginary: the Oedipal museum as phallic (m)other

Topkapi’s narrative meaning can be read in terms of the imaginary phase of the male unconscious. A reading based on the assumption that the film screen replicates the mirror stage of the development of the (male) psyche. This mode of analysis arises from Christian Metz’s (1971) separation of the screen from the voyeuristic spectator, a separation formed around Freud’s Oedipal notion of castration anxiety and Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage of subjectivity. Feminist film theory, influenced by Laura Mulvey’s foundational essay *Viewing Pleasure and Narrative Cinema* (1975) reappraised Lacan and Metz and analysed narrative film based upon the notion of the passive female object as the eroticised spectacle of the male protagonist.

Topkapi’s pleasures offered on screen to the male gaze are associated with the imaginary, pre-linguistic formation of subjectivity before separation from the mother and prior to identification with the symbolic order of the father. At the heart of this imaginary narrative is Istanbul’s historical Topkapi Museum. The labyrinth of buildings that are the Museum’s various galleries once housed the sultanate’s harem hence the site is a purveyor of the ‘other’, a signifier of the male viewer’s desire. This viewer is confronted with the ‘exotic’ East, with all the orientalisms this implies, and with the femme fatale Elizabeth Lipp (Melina Mercouri). As the object of the ‘gaze’

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104 Film theory has been influenced by psychoanalytic ideas since the 1960s, particularly feminist film theory. This influence gained traction with Laura Mulvey’s argument that ‘the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form’ (1990:28). Mulvey argues that a main function of woman in film is to symbolise the threat of castration by her absence of a penis; it is woman’s lack that ensures the symbolic presence of the phallus. Expanding on this idea, theorists re-read, often simplistically, the three psychic orders that Jacques Lacan (1901-80) drawing on Freud, argued constitute the human subject: The Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. Briefly, the Real is the pre-linguistic psychic place of original unity between the infant and mother. Once the infant moves out of the Real it can never return, this is an irretrievable loss or lack. Movement out of the Real commences with the idea of self that is created through Imaginary identification with the image in a mirror. This mirror image is the image that the infant mistakes as itself; the psychic place where the child creates the self/other dichotomy. It is Lacan’s idea that desire will always be the desire of this other. When the child has formulated the idea of otherness, it begins to enter the Symbolic order. The Symbolic order is the realm of adulthood, of language, the realm of social codes.
Lipp belongs in the harem/Museum. Her character has an erotic function; traited as a seductress, she is a jeweller and thief obsessed with an emerald encrusted dagger exhibited on a faceless mannequin in the Museum. Determined to possess the dagger she crafts a replica to replace the authentic artefact so her theft will go unnoticed. She acquires the object following a ‘mission impossible’ robbery planned by her occasional lover Walter (Maximilian Schell).

What is pivotal to discern in applying a Mulveyan approach to this film is the dominance of the male gaze. Lipp’s erotic function (note her name) is a three fold scopophilia, that is, her ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ involves three male ‘looks’: the camera as it records, the audience, and the film characters (Walter and the band of robbers). According to Mulveyan theory, a female figure like Lipp ‘connotes something that the “look” continually circles around but disavows: her lack of a penis, implying a threat of castration and hence unpleasure’ (1990:35). Lipp is (m)other, the castrated other. The dagger makes her an additional threat, as it is her weapon of castration. It is quite apparent that Lipp is enamoured of Walter and the other thieves because of their closeness to the dagger. Like the faceless mannequin, they have no function other than identification with the dagger which Lipp, as the object of their (and the male viewer’s) castration anxiety, seeks to possess.

In the opening sequence illustrated earlier, Lipp entices the viewer into the Museum, where she admits her obsession, sharing her desire for the dagger in a swooning admission that it makes ‘strange things happen’. The Museum functions as a signifier

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105 In a curious digression, the Greek actor and politician Melina Mercouri (1920-1994) did actually have a close involvement with museums. In 1981 she became Minister for Culture of Greece where she was a strong advocate for the return of the Parthenon Marbles from the British Museum. Mercouri initiated a competition for the construction of the New Acropolis Museum in Athens as a designated place for their display. The Museum opened in 2008. www.theacropolismuseum.gr/eng/
of her Oedipal desire. The closer to possession of the dagger, the more heightened her arousal and the more dangerous she becomes to the symbolic order. Lipp represents castration anxiety, an un-pleasure dealt with at a psychic level in the film by transforming her into a fetish (befitting the generic conventions of comedy, she becomes a reassuring seductress rather than fearful danger).

Mulvey writes that ultimately in the psychic narrative of a film ‘the meaning of woman is sexual difference’ (1990:35). But the phallus in Lipp’s hands threatens this sexual difference and the entry of the male infant into the symbolic order of the father. A subtext of homoeroticism functions in the film to extend the threat of the other as ‘Oriental’ to the phallic mother — the camera lingers on barely clad men participating in Istanbul’s annual wrestling competition. In extended shot-reverse-shot sequences the viewer observes men looking at men and Lipp stealing into this forbidden gaze. The dangerous other, the threat of homosexuality, is also suggested by a Turkish servant’s fervent affection for reluctant thief Arthur (Peter Ustinov). Each of these events act as a fetishistic displacement to establish and then avoid or mask the threat of the phallic (m)other. Finally, it is necessary for the phantasy to be controlled just as the infant must move from identification with the mother to the law of the father. Observing the mythical dimension of this narrative resolution in film Barbara Creed notes: ‘The ideological operation of the myth (the absolute necessity of controlling the strong, sexual woman) is … achieved by first demonstrating her dangerous power and its frightening results, then destroying it’ (2004:12). To restore equilibrium Lipp is captured and put in prison and the dagger is returned; the rational museum (patriarchal/symbolic order) is temporarily restored.
The crux of this reading assumes that the viewer’s unconscious desires are already formed and that identity is fixed according to a particular theory of the development of the psyche. This ideological structuring determines the signification of the museum. Deleuze rejects such a mode of understanding arguing that desire is created not fixed in an Oedipal unconscious. Desire is not a lack based on Oedipal repression; rather it is a creative invention. New connections are always being made, a standpoint that allows a much more nuanced approach to the museums that appear in film, as examined later in the chapter.

_Night at the Museum: the museum as object a (lack)_

Post-Mulvey there has been reappraisal of the use of Lacan in feminist film theory although analysis remains focused on a narrative of lack. So it is with Jane Scott’s reassessment of Mulvey (2007:41). Scott argues that much feminist film theory misrepresents Lacan because it conflates and confuses quite different concepts. The result is that the notion of the film screen reflecting the mirror stage of psychic development loses the Lacanian insight that it is what the subject does not see that matters. This implies that ‘the gaze’ is an absence and not a ‘look’ directed at an objectified thing, which in Mulvey’s case is the passive female body. The revised use of Lacan by recent feminist film theorists takes up the concept of _objet a_. In Lacan’s formulaic expression _a_ is other and _object_ refers to a lost or missing object, a lack (1977). In this forma, the cause of desire is not a material object but the lack of an object or its absence. Scott’s argument is that temporarily filling this absence is the basis of women’s cinematic pleasure, ‘we pursue this object in many ways to abolish lack, to feel the lack of lack, or to explore the pleasure of the absence of lack’ (2007:58). In framing _Night at the Museum_ as a narrative of lack, the operation of the
male gaze (as in the *Topkapi* analysis) is replaced by an absence of gaze that I expand to encompass viewers of all gender.

*Night at the Museum* is mostly set in a reconstruction of New York’s American Museum of Natural History (AMNH). Unemployed anti-hero, Larry Daley (Ben Stiller) reluctantly takes the position of the Museum’s night watchman to prevent the disintegration of his relationship with his young son. An ancient Egyptian force acts upon artefacts to bring the exhibits to life each night. Monkeys, lions and a dinosaur skeleton roam the museum. Static dioramas become the Roman battles they are modelled upon; miniature legions fight tiny cowboys in wild-west dioramas. Neanderthal man finds fire and so on. There is nightly chaos until Larry resolves the mayhem thereby restoring order and his credibility as father/hero.

In a Lacanian-Scott reading of this film, the living dioramas and artefacts operate as *object a*, a substitute for the absent wife/(m)other and father/son relationship of lack. The mother rejected Daley and remarried, replacing the husband/father. The living artefacts are a substitute for the replaced father, the *object a*, the absence around which desire turns. Absence is displaced onto the phantasmagoria of a ‘living’ museum. ‘The object cause of desire is not a material object, but in order to fill or plug this gap — this lack, this loss — we insert objects to temporarily stand in its place’ (Scott 2007:60). In *Night at the Museum*, desire for the absent renders *object a* into an hallucinatory taxidermic imaginary of living material culture. Absence is fetishised and given expression through sentient artefacts. In this imaginary *object a* is framed around day and night; day is absence and night is *object a*, a substitute for day. Day is where Daley (note his name) is unable to function; a failed inventor, rejected
husband and incompetent father. Daley’s failure repeats daily. Night, however, is when the Oedipal triangle is reformulated through *object a*; the Museum as taxidermic imaginary.

The focus on psychic meaning, rather than affect, in the above reading assumes that the psyche/subject is fixed and will respond in a specific way. The assumptions that arise from a fixed subject apply to analyses of actual dioramas in the AMNH. In various analyses, dioramas are shown to give meaning to a particular dominant Eurocentric view of the world. For example, in her critique of dioramas in the AMNH, Mieke Bal exposes a narratological cover-up. She describes the ‘most obvious problem’ of the AMNH as ‘the collocation in its expository discourse, of animals and foreign peoples as the two others of dominant culture’ (Bal 2001:123).

Bal discerns, (in line with her narratological reading of the museum discussed in chapter one), that the sentence ‘I speak to *you* about *them*’ is deformed because non-Western peoples, *them*, are shown transfixed and *you* is silenced. ‘The *I* that speaks the museum’s story obscures itself, presenting the displays in the museum as if they spoke for themselves’ (2001:17). Bal also considers dioramas serving Barthes’ ‘effect of the real’ (*effet de réel*), ‘an effect in which the meaning “realness” overrules the specific meanings’ (2001:120). Donna Haraway argues that the subject ‘consumes’ the narrative presented by the dioramic image at the AMNH while Michelle Henning notes that in ‘dioramas, the combination of Romantic symbolism and extreme illusionism works to produce a sense that cultural meanings attached to nature are actually innate, and that these meanings are felt rather than read’ (2006:51). Henning concludes that dioramas address ‘a visitor reconfigured as a consumer’ (2006:52).
The assumption that visitors are being ‘sold’ an illusion by their engagement with museum dioramas, allows no critical space for the affectivity of these exhibits to act outside this framing. What if the rapt attention stimulated by diorama (the fantasy as opposed to Oedipal phantasy in *Night at the Museum*) actually ruptures ‘I’ and consequently deforms the intended didactic narrative?

**The unclean museum: abjection and horror**

Before describing how the museum in films mutates narrative meaning, it is notable that the museum as a signifier of Oedipal desire particularly befits the horror film genre. Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection can be applied to the unsettled museum. Kristeva understands abjection as an operation of the psyche that deals with everything that threatens the borders of the self (1986). She argues that all societies employ notions of the abject to define those things that threaten the meaning of what constitutes the proper, human subject and civilised society. This threat to the subject is an abjection that exists: ‘On the edge of non-existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me’ (cited in Creed 2004:36). Accordingly we can interpret the grotesquery (human and nonhuman) that abounds within the numerous museums in horror films as signifying the unclean body at the border of reason and unreason. Barbara Creed notes that the horror genre in cinema is traditionally seen to define what it means to be female, male, and human; to define what constitutes the ‘whole and proper self and body’ (2004:38). The ‘unclean’ museum is thus inhabited by creatures and characters operating at the borders of what is considered a ‘whole’ human. Examples of unwholesome entities include the reptile/human relic in the natural history museum (*The Relic* 1996), Hannibal Lector the psychiatrist/cannibal ensconced in The Uffizi Museum library (*Hannibal* 2001),
the serial killer prowling the Louvre (*The Stendhal Syndrome* 1996), the Joker defacing the Gotham City Museum (*Batman* 1989) and the albino Opus Dei monk who murders in the Louvre (*The Da Vinci Code* 2006).

These ‘other’ characters operate outside the symbolic order of the father. Given that abjection is invariably related to the maternal function, the museum in which they enact their gruesome trades is the abode of the (m)other. Invariably these museums have the characteristics of a womb; cave-like, confined, dark. In these organic, non rational abodes, abjection tests the certainties of the symbolic law. Kristeva argues that encounters with the abject effect a sense of self renewal as they return the subject to the path of reason and sexual difference is restored. The abject (m)other museum, the ‘taboo realm’, is where the (male) viewer recalls imaginary identification with the mother before returning to the symbolic order. Accordingly Hannibal Lector dining on the brain of his living victim, and the decapitated bodies of the Relic’s victims, are functions in a psychic process of renewal.

While there may well be a narrative of abjection operating in the horror films discussed, such analyses are restricted because there is no space in the discourse of abjection to accommodate affect outside the psychic structure. Affecting images that startle the viewer in ‘horror’ films are contained within the discursive structure of abjection. Affect = abjection. There is a corollary with the way that the inexplicable feeling known as the sublime is similarly contained within the parameters of a

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106 The abject museum is not a recent cinematic creation. Sculptor, Professor Jarrod (Vincent Price) murders, waxes, and displays Londoners in his wax museum (*House of Wax* 1953), and Edmond Bancroft (Vincent Price) collects and exhibits deadly artefacts, most memorably binoculars that pierce a woman’s eyes (*Horrors of the Black Museum* 1959). The *Mummy* series of films, commencing with *The Mummy* 1932 also fits the horror museum genre. Boris Karloff played the first mummy brought to life by archaeologists from the British Museum messing with sacred scrolls.
The un-museum: a space of flight

The limitation of psychoanalytical film analysis, and particularly Lacanian analyses in relation to affect, has been noted by critics. François Roustang argues that Lacan had a ‘strange form of reasoning in relation to affect’ (1990:112). That is, since we can only know affects to the extent that they are spoken, they therefore belong to the same species as speech. Roustang elaborates that ‘from the moment that the unconscious is posited as being structured like a language, and turned into a form of knowledge … Lacan … overlook[s] the fact that [affects] have to do with a play of forces, that they have a reality and a dynamism of their own’ (1990:113). While for Félix Guattari: ‘It was a grave error on the part of the structuralist school to try to put everything concerned with the psyche under the control of the linguistic signifier!’ (1995:5). Anthony Elliott makes a similar point, ‘presenting a model of desire as disembodied and pre-structured linguistically, the human subject is effectively stripped of any capacity for creative identity, change or autonomy’ (2002:110). Steven Shaviro is also critical of the Lacanian obscuring of affect through language: ‘Desire is described by Lacanian theorists as a linguistic process, scrupulously detached from any taint of bodily excitation or of affect’ (1993:126). Linguistic applications are particularly limiting for film analysis as they cannot conceptualise affects that bring to light that which is not sayable.

The critical views raised above resonate with how affect is positioned with trouble across critical theory and indeed within psychoanalysis itself. Artist and
psychoanalyst, Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger observes a difficulty in proceeding analytically in fields that do not specifically follow Lacan (2002). She has devised a treatment with patients that she terms *matrixial,* this is where a change in the analyst is a sign of progress in a treatment. She describes ‘a *matrixial* style of relational space existing in-between the patient and myself’ (2002:242). The *matrixial* space escapes Oedipal phallocracy and is a space that she likens to painting. She contends that ‘painting is not an object’ and that as intensities pile up, beyond all intentionality the painting becomes an event, or an interference, that Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘refrain’ (2002:243).

I cited earlier Brian Massumi’s interest in sensation and affect; he observes that invariably there are objections raised when promoting the operation of a ‘romantically’ raw domain of experiential richness. His project is to argue against this objection, and for a reworking of how we think about the body. He tackles the complexity of describing affective experience:

> Something that happens too quickly to have happened, actually, is virtual. The body is as immediately virtual as it is actual … a realm of potential … where futurity combines, unmediated, with pastness, where outsides are infolded and sadness is happy. (2002a:30)

Peter Canning describes the same event, of the present opening the past, as ‘opening past time to an unexpected, unforeseeable future’ (2000:337). Within this intensity viewing pleasure can be located, rather than through already proscribed Oedipal desires. This unexpected space is that of *new* desires; an un-narrativised zone where
what are normally opposites coexist and what cannot be experienced is felt. Claire Colebrook affirms this zone of affect in film when she writes,

I watch a scene in a film and my heart races, my eye flinches and I begin to perspire. Before I even think or conceptualise there is an element of response that is prior to any decision. (2002b:38)

Barbara Kennedy describes the affective ‘space’ of films operating between a subjective encounter and a ‘primordial sense of aliveness — autopoiesis’ (2004:191). Canning calls this autopoiesis or evolution that occurs Eros, ‘a desire and creativity that informs matter from within and makes it live’ (2000:337). It is the negating function of morality, according to Canning, to contain Eros in order ‘to gain control of the social bond and determine all relations by a signifying chain to (re)direct the flows of movement, of bodies, of images’ (2000:343).

These views herald that what is in a shot to construct a narrative is less important than the relations and connections between images. Hence the viewing appeal of Topkapi or Night at the Museum does not lie in psychic process, whether or not psychic processes may be there. Rather the quality of the viewer’s encounter is felt as a connection of affects. For Shaviro it is affective ‘excess’ that provides ‘a rich field for contesting, evading, or eroding phallic power and the global binarization of gender’ (1993:59). Within such a paradigm, the unsettled museum in film is not about lack, anxiety, or an absence that must be controlled, but rather a space that embraces change. Thus alongside the (m)other museum threatening the patriarchal order, alongside the Eurocentric ‘narratological cover up’, there is also the un-museum, a
line of flight exposing the limits of human thought, including psychic, linguistic, and social entrapments.

In *Topkapi*, for example, the Museum, once a harem now tourist site, acts as a chameleon linking old and new Istanbul, sitting high above the city, above the human world. The film is a series of crossings — across countries, cities, rooftops and the law — and a series of intersections — between the Museum and fairground, artefacts and humans. Crossings and intersections are paced in long sequences with minimal dialogue. In one such sequence Arthur drives from Greece into Turkey and into the heart of Istanbul, a journey without consideration of what is to come. Along the way everything is on the move, people carrying loads of goods ply trades as they have done for centuries. A rhythm is established; a kind of generosity of spirit pervades the film and the viewer becomes concerned for the tribulations of the bumbling Arthur. Another extended sequence is a perilous crossing of the sprawling rooftops of the vast Museum complex. High above the city, the non-diegetic soundtrack is replaced by screeching gulls and ship horns far beneath in the harbour. Distance is felt, expanded in all directions; pulling upward in sweeping camera gestures across the sky and descending with Arthur’s vertigo. His fear of falling becomes a spiral of double vision reminiscent of the rooftop scene at the opening of Alfred Hitchcock’s *Vertigo* and its title sequence of a spiral without beginning or end. In another extended sequence one of the thieves, a gymnast, hovers and swings in the air as he lowers himself from the high vaulted roof down into the gallery to take the dagger. As he departs through a small window high in the buttress a bird flies into the gallery, setting off an alarm and crossing the action with the actual world of flight.
The museum in *Night at the Museum* can be similarly engaged outside of psychic narrative. Alongside narrative meaning, including the Hollywood code of family = order = civilisation, the images of action, perception and affection in this film defy narrative closure. The film’s reconstruction of the AMNH acts as a parody of the rational museum, literally knocking nonhuman stereotypes off their pedestals — a dinosaur skeleton plays fetch with one of its bones, a taxidermy monkey slaps humans around. The idea of language as reason is also unfixed; Larry and the Museum’s obnoxious director (Ricky Gervais) communicate in banter reminiscent of the nonsense of Lewis Carroll. Character traits are muddied — a cowboy despairs at his thwarted manhood and a sentimental Attila the Hun weeps. The lame skits in the fantasy overflow the film’s narrative, including any psychoanalytic meaning, to deny any sort of fixed meaning. The affective excesses of the film contradict the narrative; what narrative endorses, affect undermines.

**Bodies not psyches**

Steven Shaviro contends that the power of film, its viewing pleasure, lies not in the viewer’s psyche but in the body. For example, he argues that David Cronenberg’s films generate ‘feelings’ of fear, anxiety and mourning not as secondary consequences of some loss or lack, but positively and literally as affections and transformations of the flesh. Anxiety is not a lack or an existential condition ‘but a churning of the stomach, a throbbing of the arteries, a tension distending the skull, a series of stresses and shock running the entire length of the body’ (Shaviro 1993:148). What these feelings *do* is what is significant, not what they *mean*. Shaviro proposes an active and affirmative reading of the cinematic experience that has to do with the body *affectively* going to the limit of what it can do, beyond the property of a fixed self. In a
Deleuzean sense this is an emancipatory experience, a new relation that shifts the viewer outside the parameters of passive subjectivity, a felt experience with more going on than a male gaze of objectification and control. In the space this opens for analysis, the cinematic museum is a sign of overflow and excess, an un-museum or proto museum where artefacts and people relate in connections that are neither linear nor reasonable, but complicating and desirable.

Deleuze’s cine-philosophy is not a closed Saussurean system, it is closer to Peirce’s theory of signs as ‘modes of sensation’; a rebuttal of Cartesian dualism based on the exigency that ‘mind and matter exist on the same plane and consist in the same material’ (Flaxman 2000:23). Peirce conceived of signs in terms of firstness, secondness and thirdness. Laura Marks describes that certain films can actually drive Peircean semiotics to the very edge; that even before firstness there is a ‘degree zero’ of images, ‘a virtual plane of movement-images (plane of imminence) from which signs take shape’ (Flaxman 2000:30). Zeroness relates to Deleuze’s perception-image (Bogue 2003:68). Firstness is a conception of existing independently of any other thing; a sign of possibility. A quality such as ‘red, bitter, tedious, hard, noble’, a list of first impressions that does not distinguish between subjective and objective perceptions (Marks 2000:196). Firstness relates to Deleuze’s affection-image. Secondness is the concept of being relative to some other thing, where the actual emerges from the virtual. It relates to the action-image, an actual thing or event, the ‘brute fact’ where qualities become attributes of objects and events. Laura Marks calls this the realm of the real and notes that this is the level of power, ‘for as soon as there is action there are relations of power’ (2000:196,198). Thirdness is the concept of mediation wherein the first and the second are brought into relation with one another.
(synthesis or mediation) (Rodowick 1997:56). This is when signs take part in mental operations that make general statements about qualities and events; the symbolic, the relation or mental-image (2000:198).

Martin Schwab does not find the relation between Deleuze and Peirce entirely convincing, arguing that Deleuze’s ontology is not ‘of semiosis or signification, but a general ontology of the universe of images that is more appropriately Bergsonian (2000:110). As Deleuze describes:

> It is no longer a question of following a chain of images, even over the voids, but to get outside the chain or the association … It is the method of the BETWEEN, between two images, that exorcises all cinema of Oneness. It is the method of the AND, ‘this and then that’, which exorcises any cinema of Being = is. (cited in Canning 2000:360)

D.N. Rodowick explains Deleuze’s approach as a re-reading of Peirce that allows for cinema’s moving ‘signaletic material’ as ‘an ensemble or set of logical relations that are in a state of continual transformation’ (1997:6). Following Henri Bergson, images for Deleuze are not separate from thought, they exist together. As Bergson notes in Matter and Memory (1896) prior to any consideration or analysis, reality presents itself in images, there is a continual flow of images, each reacting upon the others,

> a system of images which I term my perception of the universe, and which may be entirely altered by a very slight change in a certain privileged image — my body. This image occupies the center: by it all the others are
conditioned; at each of its movements everything changes, as though by the turn of a kaleidoscope. (cited in Martin 2000:63)

From the Bergsonian notion of images and thought, Deleuze makes a distinction between two major categories of cinema images, that of movement and time. Movement-images follow a conventional sensory-motor chain of human perception. The recognition formula that underlies the human sensory-motor schema fit together as moral law in a signifying chain empowered with what Canning terms the force of compulsion and aggression (2000:332). The movement-images of the sensory-motor schema that Deleuze identifies represent dogmatic images of thought. They mechanically reproduce common sense and in doing so reveal the signifying chain of perception and response that follows from this production. A crux of the schema is that the linkages between images are deemed to be rational; this is because they follow a predictable chronological order of time. Gregory Flaxman describes: ‘The sensory-motor schema is the mechanism of our relation to the world of images, the result of which is narrative, but this narrative must be understood as having been underwritten by a moral exigency, the promise to make good, common sense’ (2000:5). The process of recognition provides a ‘cinema of health and wholeness’ that is formally constructed on the basis of a moral contest in which ‘hatred gives a focus to vague fear and anxiety and an object to unfocussed aggressivity enabling formation of a united community’ (Canning 2000:328).

Within the signifying chain of recognition and moral ‘truth’, the normalisation function of traditional history can be located. Here is the notion of ‘history’ that Nietzsche problematises, history based on presenting rational linkages through
chronological movement of actions through time; a staking out of origins and conclusions that leads to repetition and stasis not singularity and transformation. This is akin to the movement-image proceeding by linking through rational divisions to project a model of Truth in relation to totality (Rodowick 1997:12). The value of the cinema is that it allows the images and signs of this normalised regime to be mapped and ‘thus to understand the way forces arrange themselves in our world … thereby catalysing a kind of thought that diverges from strict determination’ (Flaxman 2000:26). Here too, lies the potential of the museum; limitless mappings of artefacts interrupting the continuities and chronologies, the duration of the human. And what site is better for rethinking linkages between human and nonhuman, given such assemblages are the museum’s institutional heritage?

After 1945, beginning with the films of Italian neo-realism, Deleuze is interested in the appearance of images that cease to make common sense, that are no longer recognisable and therefore do not provide the consensus between the faculties that we call reason: ‘The lapse of the sensory-motor schema marks a point at which … brains and bodies begin to be deterritorialized from rigid identities’ (2000:29). These new time-images ‘are encountered at the very limit of the sensible’ (12). Deleuze notes a shift away from recollection toward disturbances of memory and failure of recognition. In the European cinema this is expressed ‘by a group of phenomena; amnesia, hypnosis, hallucination, madness, the vision of the dying, and especially nightmare and dream’ (Deleuze 1989:55). In the time-image the social and political seemed suddenly tied to affecting images that confront the notion of what it is to be human. Deleuze is profoundly interested in this potential of cinema to affect transformation. Yet as Shaviro and others note, the influence of direct sensation and
affect continues to be generally neglected in film theory. Film analysis is dominated by ideologically driven critique that overly focuses upon the subject to the neglect of cinema’s material affect. The cinema in film studies, Flaxman writes, is understood as a system of re-presentation ‘that calls upon the inherent conventions of the human mind … Such an understanding of cinema appeals to the conventional division of subject and object, spectator and image, that is, the very “strata” … that Deleuze and Guattari condemn’ (2000:8). It is unsurprising therefore that Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema is problematic for film studies. Claire Colebrook identifies the same issue:

When Deleuze looks at cinema his approach is diametrically opposed to the usual methods of cultural studies or literary theory. To begin with, his method is not interpretative. We should not, he argued, look for the meaning or message conveyed by cinema images. Second we should not look at cinematic images as representations. (2002b:47)

Colebrook explains, for example, that the strategy that ‘unrepresentative’ types of woman [such as Elizabeth Lipp in Topkapi] can be remedied by the cinema showing more realistic types of woman, fails to acknowledge that the cinema, at least for Deleuze, is ‘not about representing a world we already have; it creates new worlds … it is about recognising the potential for transformation and becoming in all life’ (2002b:47).

A thinking cinema

Why was there a post-war breakdown of belief in the ‘truth’ of the sensory-motor schema of human perception? Peter Canning contends the rupture comes down,
ultimately, to a crisis of confidence in the heroic struggle of good over evil\textsuperscript{107} (2000). This crisis sees the emergence of a cinema that involves a new type of image that is based not on sensory-motor action but on time. Deleuze conceives that the time-image ‘goes beyond the purely empirical succession of time as past-present-future. It is … a co-existence of distinct durations, or of levels of duration; a single event can belong to several levels: the sheets of past coexist in a non-chronological order’ (1989:xii). In the time-image, the signifying chain in which accepted notions, such as those conditioning traditional history, undergo revision. There are cross-disciplinary implications in this revision that gesture toward a new aesthetic-ethical alignment. For Barbara Kennedy, for example, a thinking cinema offers space for a post-aesthetics of cinema, which she believes can advance feminist film theory and overcome the limitations of its binary framing around the gendered subject and subjectivity.

Kennedy clarifies that she is not negating the significance of a film’s semiotic and structuralist planes of being. (Just as I do not deny psychoanalytic or ideological meaning embedded in a film text). What she is seeking is ‘an understanding of film aesthetics as the in-betweenness of a bio-aesthetic of sensation’ (2004:150). She expands that her ‘neo-aesthetic is premised on a biological notion of a pre-existing sense of existential integrities, outside of subjectivity’. Ultimately, Kennedy is seeking an understanding of becoming-woman, a state of intensity that operates through “unthought” … which imbricates the material of the brain/body/mind at a

\textsuperscript{107} The good and evil paradigm as the ground of ‘civilization’ is explicated in Samuel Beckett’s realisation that ‘it is always possible to bind a group together with love, as long as there are some left over on whom to vent its aggression’ (cited in Canning 2000:330). According to Canning the ‘failure’ of the good and evil paradigm arose from a crisis whose origins lie in the Holocaust and in the impact of de-colonisation. Canning notes that it was not possible to fit the Holocaust into democratic capitalistic morality or common sense: ‘Why exterminate a race that was serving a useful (economic) purpose?’ Equally inexplicable was that in the process of decolonisation the victims of racist imperialism began to speak (2000:329).
deeper level than the subjective encounter’ (2004:150). I advance a not dissimilar understanding of delirious affect and museums; a shift in the tenor of museology’s use of critical theory to approach museums from the perspective of intensity’s created through connections outside the closed subject and object. Deleuze believes that when we watch a film, we actually experience a different way of seeing; a film makes ‘sensible within the visual what common sense regards as invisible — affects, energies, rhythms, vectors, ideas and mental relations’ (Bogue 2003:105). Museum encounters are similarly not text with visible, finite meaning, but assemblages of affects, inventions particularly potent to assembling the past as a felt present/future.

What of the museum that appears in art and experimental films? These museums are sites that image the doubling of time mentioned above, that is, they open past time to an unforeseeable future. We first see this in the mental images of *Vertigo* where museums are sites of amnesia. *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (1959), *La Jetée* and *Russian Ark* are three films that also image a museum as the force for an untimely experience that generates a sense akin to déjà vu. In each film, the museum functions as a material past that simultaneously renders a present future. The museum *is* the time-space paradox that informs each film. The paradox or double time effectuated in the museum in experimental films is a conduit to an alternative temporal awareness. In mainstream films, be it *The Relic* or *Night in the Museum* the potential for the image of the museum to generate this kind of ‘untimely’ affect exists, but is never realised because these films structure time as a common sense, linear progression rather than as a co-present layering or series of images. The images in these films are dependent on the sensory-motor schema at the same time as they render this schema visible.
**Vertigo, seen both ways**

Before considering the relation between the time-image and the museum in experimental films, a psychoanalytical reading of *Vertigo* alongside a Deleuzean reading is useful as *Vertigo* straddles the divide between the sensory-motor schema, and making this schema visible through the time-image. *Vertigo* ‘goes beyond the action-image towards the “mental relations” which frame it and constitute its linkage, but at the same time returns to the image in accordance with “natural relations”’ (Deleuze 1989:162). *Vertigo* will direct my argument towards the operation of a time-image in experimental films that resists Lacanian analysis.

In *Vertigo* John ‘Scottie’ Ferguson (Jimmy Stewart) is a retired acrophobic cop deceived into following Madeleine; they fall in love and she dies. Devastated he then meets Judy, who played a fake Madeleine in disguise. She also falls to her death echoing Scottie’s fear of heights or vertigo. Two museums feature in *Vertigo*: the art gallery at the Palace of the Legion of Honor in San Francisco, and the Mission San Juan Bautista, a mission museum 90 miles south of the city. Both are sites for false remembrance of the past and complex illusions of identity and desire. Since *Vertigo*’s release, the film has been widely interpreted as a psychoanalytical text: as ‘a tale of male aggression and visual control; as a map of the female Oedipal trajectory; as a deconstruction of the male construction of femininity and of masculinity itself’ (Barr 2002:19).

In Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Hitchcock’s films, the central role of deception relates to the symbolic order, to the realm of cultural signifiers governed by the dominant sign, the name of the father. The realm is framed by lack that is temporarily assuaged then
destroyed. Žižek notes that in spite of the utter improbability of plots about ladies who vanish or do not exist there is something “psychologically convincing” about them — as if they touched some chord in our unconscious’ (1991:80). The person who disappears in *Vertigo* is ‘The Woman’, the fantasy woman who could fill the lack in man, ‘the woman who according to Lacanian theory, does not exist’ (Zizek 1991:80). In *Vertigo*, the impossible Woman does exist thus the lack assumes positive existence. Žižek calls this ‘the sublime object’ (83). The sublime object [Madeleine] presents the paradox of an object that is able to subsist only in shadow, in an intermediary, half-born state, as something latent, implicitly, evoked: as soon as we try to cast away the shadow to reveal the substance, the object itself dissolves’ (84). The fantasy of the sublime object explains Scottie’s obsession with the character of Madeleine/Judy and the need for her death. When Scottie gets the ‘real’ Madeleine back (Judy), the figure of Madeleine the sublime object disintegrates, the ‘fantasy structure that gave consistency to his being falls apart’ (86). This accords with the notion that at the very moment we get hold of the sublime object in reality it dissolves. Thus Madeleine’s ‘second’ death falling from the bell tower of the mission museum, functions as the ‘loss of loss’: Scottie loses the fascinating dimension of loss that captivated his desire.

The two museums in *Vertigo* are sites where, firstly, this desire is fascinated and secondly, loss of loss occurs. Scottie follows Madeleine to the art gallery and watches her view a portrait of Carlotta Valdes, a long dead woman with whom Madeleine identifies. His obsession for Madeleine begins. The gallery acts as a mirror, commencing the imaginary identification or doubling of Madeleine/Judy through Carlotta. In the film’s final shot Madeleine/Judy falls from the bell tower of the mission museum and dies. Scottie looks down from the brink of the tower into the
abyss that has engulfed her. His vertigo is cured and he can look into the precipice at the same time as he is finally broken, having lost the fantasy that gave consistency to his being, ‘the abyss Scottie is finally able to look into is the very abyss of the hole in the Other (the symbolic order), concealed by the fascinating presence of the fantasy object. This abyss is figured in the shots accompanying the titles of *Vertigo*, the close ups of a woman’s eye out of which swirls a nightmarish partial object’ (Zizek 1991:86).

*Vertigo* has been comprehensively discussed in terms of its explication of sexual difference, and within this scenario the two museums function as a void or a lack. Marian Keene argues that when Judy looks directly at the camera for the first time, the viewer and Hitchcock becomes the object of another’s gaze and unknowable desire. The female object becomes a looking subject who undermines the very basis of film representation. Robert Samuels describes how this reversal actually presents the failure of masculine mastery and contradicts many of the claims of recent feminist film theory that depend on the binary opposition between masculine visual control and the objectified female body. ‘By having the feminine object look at us, we no longer remain comfortable being the one that watches and represents the Other’ (Samuels 1998:79). A lack and loss that exemplifies Scottie’s vertigo, his fear of height, his fear of the mother (represented in the film by Midge, a mother-substitute in love with Scottie).

Within this narrative, the museum for Samuels represents the constitutive emptiness of a church or graveyard: ‘there is a homology between the church, the art museum and Carlotta/Madeleine/Judy – they are structured by the void left by the absent Thing
(God, the natural figure, the original wife). It is this environment of lack that in the end seduces Scottie’ (1998:89). Tania Modleski argues that Vertigo ‘throws masculine identity into question and crisis’ in such a complex way that it can be see as a ‘limit text’ (1988). Ultimately she suggests, despite the sexual fluidity apparent in the film, the psychoanalytical imperative involves the way woman is ‘used and cast aside or tortured and finally killed off, as man desperately tries to sustain a sense of himself that necessitates the end of woman’ (1988:100).

The fact that two of the characters in Vertigo, Scottie and Madeleine, suffer from a disturbance of desire enhances the credibility of reading the film as a psychoanalytical narrative. But such an approach distracts from its viewing pleasure in terms of its use of the mental-image. Deleuze’s interest in Hitchcock and the shift from movement to time-image is that the agents themselves in his films turn into spectators of their own acts (1989:3). They choose their desire; they are desiring-machines. Explicating the autonomy of their desire the connections in the film are external to the objects that relate to each other in the film’s diegetic space. Deleuze describes a camera-consciousness in Hitchcock ‘that is no longer defined by the movements it is able to follow or make but by the mental connections it is able to enter into’ (1989:23). Because it is the camera — its shots, framings, movements — that discloses relations, the viewer enters into the desiring space and ‘often the audience knows more about the relations than do the characters’ (Bogue 2003:102).

108 Scottie’s inability to sustain self identity, his repressed psychological state, is reflected in his name ‘Scottie’, a diminutive form which replaces his own name ‘John’. ‘Scottie’ is a term of endearment that acts to infantilise his character and serves to accentuate his state of loss. We frequently see him being treated like a child by Midge, whose name is also a diminutive form (of Marjorie). Her diminutive casts her as ‘ordinary’, plain and uncomplicated compared to the illusive other ‘M’ character, Midge’s competitor for Scottie’s affection, Madeleine. The latter is not given a diminutive as she is aloof, special, impossible, the sublime object of Scottie’s loss.
The invention of the relation or mental-image in Hitchcock’s films conveys Deleuze’s interest in the reality of the virtual, in the real effects and consequences of the virtual (Zizek 2004:3). This arises from Deleuze’s notion that the ‘transcendental is infinitely RICHER than reality – it is the infinite potential field of virtualities out of which reality is actualized’ (2004:4). Here is the core of reading Hitchcock’s films as an excess of relations, an excess beyond the linear network of causal relations, an excess of effect over its cause, of relation or mental-images that enable the possibility of the new. Laura Marks comments that this form of reflexivity has become a trope of documentary, even in television news, so that reflexivity itself has become a cliché. Deleuze recognised this propensity in his comment that, ‘the world has come to resemble a bad film’, to which Marks responds: ‘In our present Thirdness/symbol-saturated era, it seems urgent to look back for that source of renewal that is Firstness, to try to get past discourse to “things themselves”’ (2000:200). An urgency relating to my discussion of the importance of discerning between affect and affectation; to discern didactic affect as a model of recognition that does not cooperate with the transformative possibilities of delirious affect.

The excess of affect in Vertigo is not clichéd reflexivity. Affections are disconcertingly connected to the mental world of the protagonists. The procession of time in the film is linear, but the linearity is undercut by the affect of the spiral which connects to the film’s fascination with time as an arbitrary aspect of the subject and with desire. The affect of the spiral is a desiring-machine. The past, present and future do not align for the characters in the film, or for the audience. Vertigo shows ‘how we inhabit time, how we move in it’ (Deleuze 1989:82). Non-linear temporality, or a direct image of time, is enacted in the spiral sequence during the opening credits, and
in Scottie’s disorientating dream sequence that foreshadows Judy’s death. Two events that frame the duration of the film as time out of joint, even though the narrative appears to proceed in a linear fashion.

*Vertigo* commences with the spiralling affect-image. From the credits there is movement across a face, to an eye that opens wide. The viewer is taken into the subjective space of characters and becomes lost in the same space/time. The character/viewer is a seeing, knowing protagonist yet as the camera zooms further in, and endless spirals emerge from the eye, the illusory nature of this self knowing, fixed subject is enacted. The spiral is a movement toward a distant focus that is continually shifting. A point that can never be reached yet that simultaneously is an endless return reflected in the bookend structure of the film with Scottie hanging from the edge of building at the beginning re-iterated with Judy plummeting to her death at the end. In Scottie’s dream, time and space is also disjointed; he is conscious of his body as a silhouette falling toward the roof of the mission museum. This roof disappears, and he experiences his body receding into a white void.

The affect of abandoning the fixed subject is key to *Vertigo* continuing to intrigue viewers, and is why Deleuze emphasises the de-substantialisation of affects in cinema such as the affective image of the spiral. Žižek notes: ‘An affect (boredom, for instance) is no longer attributable to actual persons but becomes a free floating event’. Arising from this de-substantialisation is a philosophical question: How ‘does this impersonal intensity of an affective-event relate to bodies or persons? … Either this immaterial affect is generated by interacting bodies as a sterile surface of pure becoming or it is part of the virtual intensities out of which bodies emerge through
actualization (the passage from becoming to being’ (2004:21). The answer to this apparent illogic is double movement: ‘First positive reality itself is constituted through the actualization of the virtual field of “immaterial” potentialities; then, in a second move, the emergence of thought and sense signals the moment when the constituted reality, as it were, reconnects with its virtual genesis’ (2004:25). Claire Colebrook elucidates the problematic asking: ‘How can we think pure becoming that is not the becoming of some thing?’ (2002b:52). Apparent non-sense is precisely what is pivotal to Deleuze’s view of the invention and possibility of thought and his approach to the time-image of cinema, ‘if the cinema goes beyond perception, it is in the sense that it reaches to the genetic element of all possible perception, that is, the point which changes, and which makes perception change, the differential of perception itself’ (2002b:54). This separation or doubling is the event of delirious affect and the impossibility of this affect being discursive is its potential. The possibility of this impossibility, the affect of this paradox (the spiral), saturates the mental images of Vertigo. A similar doubling configures the affective power of the following films I examine.

**The timeless museum**

Chris Marker’s 29 minute film *La Jetée* is oft cited yet little is actually resolved because the film does not contain meaning, rather it affects the disconcerting paradox of not being in time. Trying to find meaning in the film is irrelevant to what the film does. *La Jetée* is shot in black and white and consists almost entirely of still photographs. The only colour or movement occurs in a single image of an eye that ‘looks’. Like the spiral eye in *Vertigo*, this image/look pierces the entire fabric of the psychoanalytical gaze, because it steps outside the screen imaginary. *La Jetée*
involves a war survivor sent back in time to locate a key to humanity’s salvation. The still shots of the film are frozen moments of his memories including his death. The man meets a woman and they visit a natural history museum. They are within this memory/museum, between where something ends and something begins. They are timeless exhibits, as the voice-over observes:

Around the fiftieth day, they meet in a museum filled with timeless animals.

Now the aim is perfectly adjusted. Thrown at the right moment, he may stay there and move without effort. She too seems tamed. She accepts as a natural phenomenon the ways of this visitor who comes and goes, who exists, talks, laughs with her, stops talking, listens to her, then disappears.

In *La Jetée*, virtual/actual are rendered indiscernible as they cross into one another; she is actual, he is virtual but what does this separation mean when both are together as an image? The image enacts perception, pure perception, a state which is not possible, actually. Although it exists as desire. Similarly the man watches the moment of his adult death as a child, a twice lived fragment of time. The paradox reflects Henri Bergson’s understanding of the doubling of self; that we are an actual present perception and at the same time a virtual memory of the present — that there is ‘recollecion of the present, contemporaneous with the present itself’ (Deleuze 1989:79). *La Jetée* discloses the coexistence of actual present and real past in every moment;\(^{109}\) the affect of virtual difference, of not explaining the past and the future from the actual present but from the open character of the virtual. In the affective

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\(^{109}\) Neuroscientists believe that the experience of déjà-vu may be realisation of this real doubling of the present.
space of the image, the virtual is as much open to revision or transformation as the actual.

*La Jetée* generates an image of thought as a means of seeing that issues from a particular perception outside the linear progression of events in common sense. ‘Time no longer derives from movement; “aberrant” or eccentric movement derives from time’ (Rodowick 1997:4). An earlier use of making past time visible is Alain Resnais’ film *Nuit et Brouillard* (1955) in which the ‘mental’ time of Auschwitz is accessed through abandoned objects and places. Similarly, in Resnais’ film *Hiroshima Mon Amour* two conceptions of time coexist as two characters struggle to disengage from their pasts and ‘construct a hybrid memory space that belongs to neither’ (Bogue 2003:144). In the virtual connection, the newly built Hiroshima Museum is a hybrid, a memory through exhibits collected since the bomb — scorched bricks, and melted bicycle frames embody the past coexisting with the present as the future. Rodowick suggests of this film: ‘There is no “truth” to uncover. Instead there is a set of transformations where narrations continually falsify one another … we follow transformations in time as becomings in space’ (1997:101). The interval between images does not facilitate the passage from one image to the next in any decidable way, ‘instead of differentiation and integration, there is only relinking by irrational divisions … Inside and outside, mind and body, mental and physical are no longer decidable qualities. This is another theory of mind and another logic of sense, defined by a decisive break with the earlier model’ (1997:14,5).
The museum as crystal-image

In the film Russian Ark the sense of ‘any-moment’ is created through an absence of montage. It is usually in gaps or intervals that the ‘irrational’ and unknown is seeded, and that we move outside common sense. (This is why in sensory-motor images the ‘gaps’ are hidden, they are covered by a seamless linkage of one image to the next). In Russian Ark, there are neither ‘gaps’ nor are there linkages, rather the film, or more specifically the museum in the film, is ‘the gap’. Instead of meaning articulated through montage, via conflict and contrast between shots, the image of the Museum embodies its own meaning. Action, perception, affect is restrained to the coordinates of a single image, a 90 minute camera shot.

Russian Ark is filmed entirely in the Hermitage Museum in St Petersburg. The viewer accompanies a nineteenth-century French diplomat (played by Sergei Dreiden) as he meanders eccentrically through thirty-three rooms of the Museum and 300 years of Russian history. Characters, director, and camera point of view, exist in ‘any-moment’; a space that is neither the present nor the past, a space made possible on film, because, like the Museum that it images, film is a material entity. And yet, simultaneously in ‘any-moment’, the image moves inexorably forward, to dissipate in an image of water and air, motifs of imagination and the infinite. Russian Ark is an image of the Museum and the cinema ‘creating’ singular memory. It appraises that both entities act in non-linear time while remaining within a linear time frame. By unfolding this contradiction, déjà vu or doubling of time, Russian Ark discloses the museum as inherently cinematic.
There has been criticism of *Russian Ark* for its nationalistic and nostalgic view of history for example, ‘it harkens back to a nostalgic vision of Nicholas II the last Romanov tsar, as the saintly forgiving father – not as the Bloody Nicholas whose troops fired upon unarmed demonstrators calling for end to an unjust war, economic exploitation and bureaucratic arbitrariness’ (Kachurin and Zitser 2003). This is a reading resisted by Dragan Kujundzic’s analysis of the Museum in *Russian Ark* not as a nationalistic Ark, but ‘a ship which is not hermetically sealed’ (2005:87). He observes a reference in the film to the sinking of the Kursk,¹¹⁰ ‘discreet but insistent sounds of grinding metal remind one throughout the movie of the noises a ship or submarine would make under stress, sinking’ (2005:87). Kujundzic’s interpretation of the Museum is based on the film’s affecting what he calls ‘the sovereignty of melancholia’. He writes: ‘*Russian Ark* leaks the lack that it tries to contain’. William Johnson observes a similar affect, which he ties to the making of the film itself, which was an experiment: ‘The sheer precariousness of the project – could it have survived, financially and psychologically, if there had been a major accident during this third take?¹¹¹ – reflect the precariousness of history and of life itself’ (Johnson 2004:51).

I think what is pivotal in *Russian Ark* in a Deleuzean sense, is the film as an image of common sense reassembled. It cannot be read using an historical linear standard, for the time warp that it enacts, through the Museum, discredits history as a series of events in linear time. The viewer experiences events, but their impact is only known

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¹¹⁰ Submarine K-141 *Kursk* was a Russian nuclear cruise missile submarine that sank in shallow water in the Barents Sea on 12 August 2000 following an explosion. The Russian admiralty declined assistance in rescue attempts claiming the crew of 113 had all died in the explosion. Notes on the Captain’s body indicate that 23 sailors had survived and waited in the dark with him for a rescue that never came. Eventually they died following a fire. www.abc.net.au/m/breakfast/stories/2002

¹¹¹ The crew had only four hours to complete the shoot, involving nearly 1,000 extras. The Steadicam operator had to stop twice because of assistants’ technical mistakes and by the time the crew started for the third time they barely had enough daylight left.
as their memory in the present. This is why they are fragments; odd parts of a story are shown, such as the Romanov family at dinner, not as indomitable sovereigns. Before the film’s solitary image of melancholy leakage commences, before its eyes are opened, the screen is creased by a thin, white line: a fracture. Then a voice:

*I open my eyes and see nothing. I only remember there was some accident. Everyone ran for safety as best they could. I just can’t remember what happened to me.*

This is the voice of the director/narrator Alexander Sokurov waking into the image with the viewer; an act that begins a memory of something uncommon. What is forgotten is some kind of disruptive event; a common occurrence in Russian history, but more than this, what is affected is the quality of a new connection; a new relation with time past and future. This said there is a continual and relentless movement. Although the film moves in and out of different historical periods there is no sense of temporal shift; ‘everything in the film that refers to the past takes its place in the steady forward motion of our present’ (Johnson 2004:50). The image glides across the Museum’s collections, canvases, smooth marbles, frescoes, brilliant emerald Sevres dinnerware. The relationship between artefacts in the museum as a source of living memory and the film as a living body is ever present for the viewer as the image wanders the Palace of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and the doomed Romanovs. Camera-consciousness becomes increasingly embodied; the image spies on the spies, it passes by historical events as transparent slices of time, climbing back stairs and grand staircases in a drift through rooms and centuries. And indeed Sokurov describes the event that is Russian Ark as ‘one breath’.
Tim Harte has observed how *Russian Ark* uses real frames — door frames, picture frames — to move the viewer into a new, unfamiliar realm of experience (2005). These frames denote a threshold, over which the viewer must cross to reach the other side. However, he does not take the next step which is that the ‘reel’ film frame actually absorbs the ‘real’ space/time frame. The ‘threshold’ is the movement from one realm to the other. An impossible possibility that ruptures Keats’ frozen Grecian urn moment, for it inveigles within the impossible space of the poet’s yearning. The threshold is the viewer become time itself suspended; like Zeno’s arrow, neither here nor there. The missing montage in the film resists the logical progression of the sensory-motor schema, defying the narrative formulation of images that are linked in a semiological chain. *Russian Ark* exemplifies the time-image that Deleuze describes as crystal: ‘the coalescence of an actual image and its virtual image, the indiscernibility of two distinct images’ (1989:127). This doubling of time and failure of recognition is the mechanism of the production of new thought.

The frisson that produces thought is delirious affect; the interval between perception and an action (emotion) whence a new mental relation is made; ‘when the thing and the perception of the thing are one and the same thing’ (Buchanan 2000:61). There is no fixed subject here; this is the zone of the subject becoming object and vice versa. Out of this sameness images relate to other images, some are retained and others reacted to, and ‘we perceive the thing, minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs’ (2000:61 my emphasis). I suggest that this corresponds with what Silvan Tomkins describes as the affect of ‘interest-excitement’; and what I describe as occurring *before* translation into the emotion (happiness, anger) that will make common discursive sense of the interest-excitement based on recognition.
Connecting the cinema and the museum via the affective doubling of time gives expression to the ethical potential of the museum for cultural enquiry.

**The unsettled museum: an ethico-aesthetic assemblage**

Much of the copious amount written about museums since the 1980s has been concerned to expose the shortcomings of the museum’s Enlightenment legacy of exploitation and to engender policies and practices of inclusivity to enable equality of class, ethnicity, creed, sexual orientation and gender. The new museology has been strongly influenced by Marxist thinking, feminist notions of patriarchy, psychoanalysis, identity politics, semiology and semiotic structuralism. Donald Preziosi argues that the ideological strictures of thinking that are required by these critical approaches and theories have not been effectively applied in museums and therefore have had limited contribution to real social and political change. He notes that ‘professional museum literature in the past few decades’ focuses almost exclusively on ‘technically more refined versions of public education and infotainment’, or ‘more “responsive” and “representative” versions of whatever forms of social and cultural diversity seems to be required in increasingly more diverse communities, cities, and countries’ (2006:70). These practices are a ‘façade of change and progress’, and museum professionals have not taken on board the issues of critical theory except in a cursory way; ‘the disjunction between the critical, historical and theoretical literature on museums and professional practices and methodologies remains vast’ (72).

I agree with Preziosi that there is often façade rather than change, but suggest that the problem actually arises from critical theory. The museum’s use of didactic affect to
convey ‘inclusivity’ has been an attempt to represent the progress formalised
discursively in critical theory, yet this has subsumed delirious affect, the *tour de force*
of the museum. The reason for increased didactic affect in exhibitions is that
didacticism accords with the assumption axiomatic to critical theory that the subject
(the museum goer) is an ideological construct. This has resulted in an over
didacticism that fails to ignite anyone; an over didacticism that is affectation not
affect. What has happened, somewhat ironically, is that the museum’s signature role
in the assemblage of unlikely, surprising formations of subjects and objects has been
subsumed by the requirement to facilitate identification; for example, identification
with working classes, with Indigenous peoples, with children and with victims. This
form of didactic identification relies on recognition and the expression of an empathic
emotion. Emotional empathy contains the subject in a collective cocoon in which ‘the
other’ remains separate, when in essence everyone lies outside institutional
representational strategies. Using didactic affect to create a ‘sense’ of the Holocaust,
for example, may generate empathy but this is absorbed into identification with an
event that is over, and not with what the event does in the present and into the future.
The event is past and contained through recognition; contained within a collective
narrative of victimhood and identification.

Jack Kugelmass observes that in America there is an increasingly positive valence
attached to victimhood that ‘sets the stage for public displays that in an earlier era
would have been scorned or shunned’ while Peter Novick refers to a culture of
victimisation in which ‘the status of the victim has come to be prized’ (cited in Brand
The phenomenon of the victim is a contentious topic. Jane Caplan criticises ‘identification mechanisms’ proliferating ‘victim status in US popular discourse’, particularly in reference to victim’s identity cards distributed to visitors of the Holocaust Memorial Museum (cited in Brand 2008:166). Roy Brand notes that ‘some recent media theorists have claimed that the media promotes victimhood by virtue of turning us all into passive spectators. Jean Baudrillard (in)famously remarks that television “is the perpetuation [of Auschwitz] in a different guise … The same process of forgetting, of liquidation … the same absorption without a trace”’ (2008:166). Along these lines, Dominick LaCapra believes that the convention of ending an enactment of a second-hand traumatic event with a ‘spiritual uplift’ is an inappropriate response. He cites the closure in films such as Schindler’s List (1993) and Life is Beautiful (1998) and writes that ‘Anne Frank is a recent figure who has been subjected to representation that attempts to bring to the reader or viewer unearned and incongruous spiritual uplift’. A problem he finds with such uplift is that it perpetuates an unfounded ‘confidence about the ability of the human spirit to endure any adversity with dignity and nobility (LaCapra 2001:42).
present as a past that repeats without change. This reflects Dominick LaCapra’s notion of ‘empathic unsettlement’ — ‘being responsive to the traumatic experience of others, notably of victims, implies not the appropriation of their experience but … empathic unsettlement’ (2001:41).

Part of the problem for museums is that the didactic focus on inclusivity through increasingly interactive exhibits has overlooked delirious affect, the sensation of not knowing. The ‘unsettled’ museum on screen accommodates this sense of not knowing. This cinematic museum is a contradiction; emerging from a rational Enlightenment structure it is the body-without-organs of institutional rationalism. However, in discourses of the ‘actual’ museum the potential of this contradiction is restrained or smothered. The empirical relation that operates between the audience and museum is prevented from spilling into an ontological mode, yet the museum will always operate between the epistemological and ontological. The containment of this assemblage in the new museology is contrasted by the Deleuzean institution; a machinic assemblage, an embrasure of multiple subjectivities, the schizophrenic museum.

Beyond fixed subjectivity, the schizoid museum accommodates rational alongside irrational, producing surprising connections between entities that causes slippage in the binary thinking that separates, with such pronounced exclusion, the human and nonhuman. Michel de Certeau’s affirmation of writing is useful here when he says the practice of reading a story produces a different logic to the story itself (1984). In this sense the museum is a story that museum goers and artefacts assemble anew with each encounter. The museum is a frame for delirious affect; accommodating the
unsayable, a space where for Walter Benjamin history can jump a track, mess with the chronological order of time and shock bourgeois presuppositions. A Nietzschean space of history without cause and effect; where dogmatic thoughts are obvious illusions. A Deleuzean space of difference without repetition.

Deleuze argues that most philosophers have subordinated difference to ‘identity’ or the ‘same’, they ‘put difference into the concept itself, thereby reaching a conceptual difference but not a concept of difference’ (1994a:xv). Much of his project is to create a notion of difference that is not subordinated to opposition and resemblance and that is not mediated by representation, identification, or collective memory. His interest in cinema is the creation of thought of difference. New thought always occurs in refrains outside of what is said, in a non-representational space where the parameters of the fixed subject do not exist. Until recently it has been uncommon in cultural studies to engage these possibilities as the autonomous subject lies outside of ideological discourse. Yet, in a Deleuzean sense, this is the crux of a new conceptualisation of difference, that is, difference requires a new idea of what it means to be a subject. In film studies there has been tendency to fix the subject, in part because dominant discourses cannot accommodate the subject outside patriarchy or the psyche. However, in applying psychoanalysis to interpreting the museum in film, the museum can ultimately only be positioned within a fixed power structure or repressed unconscious. This over determination discursively swamps affects and the production of desire. Cine-psychoanalysis might tell us what a museum in a film signifies as part of a psychic narrative but fails to exact what the museum does as an affecting space. There is no room in such analysis for the ‘un-museum-like’ spaces that recur in films; no autopoesis, Eros, no space to affirm the ethico-aesthetic museum.
John Rajchman describes Deleuzean connections as a search to find a map that is closer to life, a mapping that is necessary because human sensation and cognition are today tied together in ways no longer conducive to an ethical life (2000). Within this map perhaps the sublime as an inexplicable experience can remain inexplicable, rather than framed discursively as a lack or inability to accommodate reason. My intention here is important, because in the process of discursively giving meaning to the inexplicable or unknown, be it the sublime or difference, the inexplicable is removed and replaced with a discursive explanation based on recognition and a politically ineffectual emotional empathy.

Multiple subjectivity thus involves a shift from structural paradigms of the subject. It is this shift that I potentialise in the ethico-aesthetic museum; a museum of unfixity, of disjunctive synthesis between objects and subjects. The important outcome of such an institution is reformation of human and nonhuman relations. This creative production accords with the ethical possibilities for Deleuze and Guattari of moving away from the shadow of Freudian and Lacanian repression and introducing a schizoanalysis that operates with the complexities of an aesthetic paradigm for change. The very act of Deleuze and Guattari collaborating not as authors, but as multiple subjectivities is a statement about the possibility for new connections and mappings beyond orthodoxy. Their call to move away from a fixed subject of discourse gives space for delirious affect to roam the museum; a space for thinking what is unthought. This ethic does not require a revolution or return to a primordial past for it already has its place in the museum. Museums have always had fluid boundaries created by the constantly shifting assemblages of collections, by the non-discursive configurations of other durations, of multiple pasts co-extant with the
present; a site in the present that holds endless possibilities for the future. Just like the museum in the movies.
Some people smell flesh here.

I’m on a tour of Whale World Albany, an industrial museum at the site of a once operational whaling station. The script the guide follows is mostly one of adventure and industry, a story of progress I can’t help feel is silenced by the space itself, the last whaling station in Australia.

The station/museum, about a twenty minute drive from Albany, has its own eloquence yet layers of human emotion mask its unsettled intensity. These emotions confirm a collective memory of whaling presented in sheds converted to photo galleries, and in texts and audio recordings that tell of male camaraderie, fortitude and skill. This collective memory reflects a tenacious local bonding. For when the station closed, the Albany fishermen who worked here from 1952 until whaling was banned in 1978 considered themselves a lost race.

They built the station on flat granite rock that slopes into Frenchman Bay, part of King George Sound on the southern coast of Western Australia. It looks more tumbled up than carefully planned, a motley bunch of structures flimsy in the ancient rock landscape.

In an often economically depressed area, the oil from the Cheynes Beach Whaling Company’s station was the region’s gold. Mostly the station rendered Sperm Whales, Humpbacks and Southern Right Whales to lubricant. Using flensing tools, men expertly peeled the skin from whales in wide and bloody blankets. The tools of their trade were crafted to perfection through generations of skinning. Today these artefacts are labelled and displayed alongside photos that reveal their purpose. The
skin they flensed was precious — skin on the chest of *Balaena glacialis* alone is 40 cm thick and holds barrels of oil.

The grime from flensing spilled into the water and crimson waves lapped the wooden deck throughout the whaling season. Tourists and locals parked on a dirt road above the station to check out the carnage. Often a Holden or two could be seen up there — children squealing, flies swarming, Mum pouring cordial. Dad with binoculars focused on the flensing deck.

By the time the station closed there were no live whales to admire in the Bay or the Sound or along the southern coast. No living Humpbacks or Southern Rights or Pygmy Blues. No False Killer Whales. *No Balaenopteridae megaptera* swimming on their backs, flippers akimbo, singing and playing.

At the height of the whaling season about 120 men worked the station — fishermen and abattoir workers from the local meatworks but also students, bikies and drifters. It was hard-earned money, particularly given the grime, the cold and the constant wet. A chill wind blows from the Antarctic. The local Noongah people call the area Kinjarling — place of rain. The worst thing was the appalling stench.

The stench was partly why the station was built outside Albany, although when the wind blew through town so did the smell. Deep, strong and fatty, gagging the throat. Workers couldn’t scrub it from their skin, whale skin became their skin, and they sat in their own bar at the King George so as not to offend. Here they are, grinning at the camera huddled in a makeshift corner beside a boiler, beanies pulled down over their ears, trying to keep out the chill. They sit on wooden planks grasping enamel mugs of coffee through woollen mittens.

I’m standing in the open air on the main flensing deck. The guide points out a flat granite island in the Bay, close to shore — a convenient morgue where the
station’s whalers chained their daily kill. A kill that attracted sharks, an event that attracted the onlookers with binoculars. An event not unlike a scene described by Ishmael in *Moby-Dick* after whale cuttings were tossed over the side of the *Pequod* — a shark massacre, a frenzy of desire with sharks snapping at each other till their own bodies end up swallowed.

Whale sightings in the region continue to increase, says the guide, though sharks are now threatened — too many fins used in soup. She follows this fact by activating an electronic device on her belt and an audio recording echoes a jolly narrative through loud speakers — a sea shanty, chains clunking, gulls squawking, shouts of whalenmen at work and a bellow from the mast-head,

*Thar she blows!*

The shore station relied on whale chasing ships to deliver them regular whales. As the whale population declined, so did the delivery, and each season the whale chasers had to hunt farther out in the Southern Ocean. One of the ships, the *Cheynes IV*, is permanently moored today at the Museum. Children clamber about the cramped vessel playing at pirates, poking faces through portholes and shimmying across narrow catwalks that run high above the deck. An audio recording intermittently blasts out a mini-drama to delight them — a whaleman who has spotted a whale shouts to the crew and a harpooner responds ready to fire at the creature which he does with a noisy BANG.

Early each morning during the whaling season, a spotter plane set off from Albany aerodrome to assist the whale chasers. The whales followed the deep sea channels of their traditional migration route from feeding grounds in Antarctica to
breed in the waters of King George Sound. The mammals were harpooned when they surfaced for air. The harpoon grenade held explosive powder, and was attached to a line that unwound to stretch almost a kilometre. Until it died, the wounded whale pulled the ship through all kinds of seas.

From the Pequod’s masthead, a gigantic Sperm Whale is spotted lolling in the water ahead like the capsized hull of a frigate. The crew quietly lower rowboats and set after the beast. A harpoon is hurled by Tashtego and the vibrating line whooshes … striking the beast. All hands begin pulling the boat at the same time the boat is pulled by the stricken whale. A red tide pours from the monster and a crimson pond in the sea reflects into excited faces … the men glow to each other. Alongside the whale now, they churn lances deep into the mammal and after cracking, agonising respirations and clotted gore spurting from its spout-hole, the creature’s heart bursts.

Once the whale’s outer skin was flensed on the lower deck of the Albany station, the chained whale was dragged by a mechanical winch up a ramp to a second deck. Here a sharp-toothed metal saw cut off the whale’s head. The tool was seesawed by two men, one at each end like cutting down a tree. Once ‘decapitated’, the beast was hung in the open on a giant hook while cut into strips that fell about the floor. The pieces of blubber were cut small enough to be pushed through holes that drop into large boiling vats below that boil the meat to pulp and liquid.

Photographs show school children and their teachers experiencing local industry in action. Standing behind a viewing rail they watch men, who were more often than not their fathers, uncles, brothers or cousins, in spiked boots drenched in blood and blubber atop a whale. They stand expert at their dangerous work by the pungent sea; proud astride their whale, rubber boots above their knees, black stubby
footie shorts, chopping tools in their hands. How come more were not injured? Perhaps they were but no-one told.

Aboard the *Pequod*, Tashtego loses his footing and topples into a whale corpse slung to the side of the ship. He nearly drowns; which in the end happens anyway. The crew succumb to Ahab’s madness, and in a collective oath of revenge his feud becomes theirs. Seeking vengeance, Moby Dick the great white whale repeatedly rams the vessel and all the crew perish. All drown except Ishmael who is sucked round and round by the sinking ship’s whirlpool, but the whirl subsides to a creamy pool and he manages to cling to a coffin that bobs to the surface.

So too, Albany fishermen and tourists are regularly lost. Washed out to sea by king waves or sucked into wave-worn blowholes.

Ishmael dwells on the manifold mistakes made throughout history in representing whales; an error arising because the living whale has never floated himself for his portrait. As he puts it: ‘Though elephants have stood for their full lengths, the living Leviathan has never yet done so’. He concludes that the only way precisely to see a whale is to go a-whaling, an adventure with merit apart from the considerable risk of being ‘eternally stove and sunk’.

Today, a shop at the entrance to the Museum sells books, maps, t-shirts and piles of cheap trinkets including staplers with whales glued into transparent plastic. I buy a water dome for my collection, the miniature whale see-saws up and down as I jiggle the souvenir. Much of the merchandise boasts the Museum’s logo — a whale grimacing through sharp teeth, poised to fire a harpoon. Next to the shop is the Whaler’s Galley Café Restaurant with a spectacular view of the Bay. Between the shop/café and the industrial site there’s a picnic area and a playground with fibreglass whales that kids can swing from, or slide down the inside of (so says the Museum
No one seems to be utilising the BBQ facilities or conveniently positioned ‘whale tables’.

The tour ends and I wander the site alone. I’m in a large engineering workshop with a massive skeleton that has been trussed and glued; its enormous old bones are bleached and yellowed. The label says this whale died on 20 November 1978, the last whale killed on the last day of whaling in Australia. Its oil was pumped into one of several oil silos and then piped to a sea tanker in the Bay. And so the whale was returned to the ocean as lubricant, stored in an iron hulk that churned through the water with a chugging sensed below in the sea channels where once it swam. Such was the fate of over 16,000 whales.

The oil silos today are converted to cinemas. In one silo, I climb metal steps that wind around the inner wall to a raised viewing platform. Though scrubbed clean the brownish tin walls exude a patent oiliness that I sense through my skin. I am inside the whale; this silo was filled with whale oil for decades. In this disembodied space once I would have drowned. The lighting is dimmed, and a screen flickers below on the floor. A film about whales begins. The images floating on the ground draw me into a deep sea channel, and I slip into the undulation with the living sea creatures … undrowned, I am a fish …

As I drive back to town I glimpse the island morgue in the Bay. I suppose today it’s more accurately a memorial rather than a mortuary. I dwell on my time at Whale World not in terms of an imaginary identification with whales but something else, some other re-composition that has to do with the idea of the indomitable human being disgraced. This is the eloquence of the nonhuman things we gather in our museums. No matter the stories and emotions we give to the things we collect, they
reassemble us with their own expression, they hold the potential to undo us by revealing that the way to become more human is to become less so.

* * * *

I’m in Berlin. It’s a warm day and there’s a vague odour from the sewers that I find oddly intoxicating. I turn into Ebertstrasse. In front of me stretch thousands of concrete stelai lined into geometric rows, each artefact smooth and unmarked. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe encompasses an entire street block of the city.

I enter between two rows that descend gradually. The artefacts become taller until dense and close around me. Not a labyrinth or maze because I can see outside, but I’m unsure where to turn in the new terrain; a space out of time. Other people are passing through, they’re wending their way to the other side and I’m glad to not be alone.

Beneath the Kubrick-like blocks an underground memorial has been carefully engineered; a consecrated bunker, part of the vast underworld beneath Berlin. I read the policies of Nazi extermination and move on. The walls have long friezes listing numbers of dead, and maps that outline sites of persecution, deportation routes and death marches, places of mass executions and camps. All displayed in crepuscular lighting.

Adolf Hitler’s bunker is near here; where he ordered his generals to raze what was left of Berlin, where he ate his last vegan meal, where Frau Goebbels fed her six children cyanide. The site of the Führerbunker is unmarked for its fascination would be hard to contain and this city of excesses is careful now, mindful of careless desires.
From the memorial I walk through the city to the Reichstag. The glass dome encasing the three levelled roof terrace provides an exhilarating view across the sky above Berlin. A permanent display of photos circles the first level. The images reflect the collective memory that measures everything in this city. The Third Reich is presented as a chronological history across the photos, while below, in the building’s Chambers, sits the reunified German Bundestag. The pictures show grim-faced members of the doomed Weimer Government, Goering as a gloating Reichstag President, SA Brownshirts occupying a large block of the Chamber. And so a tyranny was legislated beneath my feet. I stand in a fractured moment in the sky, in a re-democratised space; in a cupola of glass where the fragility of peace is tangible.

Across the sky, defiant and tall is the Siegessaule; Berlin’s Victory Column with the Greek Goddess Viktoria strident at the top. In my snow dome of Berlin, she’s lost some of her glitter, a minuscule figure. Actually she looks more like a devil than a God, the helmety thing on her head resembles a set of horns. I set her by the computer next to my see-sawing Albany whale. I like to configure my snow domes into my thinking; they shrink huge notions to a manageable size.

Walter Benjamin declared the Victory Column a funerary emblem of history, a celebration of Prussian militarism. As a child he watched Berliners high on the viewing platform, silhouettes against the sky. There are striking images in Wim Wender’s film Wings of Desire of two angels, Damiel and Cassiel, resting against the monument’s golden wings. They are tuned to the incessant babble of the mortal and watch as lives fade … a dying motorcyclist, mothers searching bombed rubble, a falling man. What would Benjamin make of the pair up there observing Cold War Berlin with its Wall and no-way streets? Adults are too blinded by desire to see angels but Benjamin would have seen, it was his way to avoid the common sense of history.
He would have been unsurprised by Sachsenhausen, the Nazi death camp close to Berlin. Sachsenhausen was the blueprint for other Nazi death camps. It was initially devised to take the overflow from Berlin’s prisons which were crowded with ‘political’ prisoners but soon became a model death camp, overseen by Heinrich Himmler. Today the Camp is a memorial and museum.

To reach Sachsenhausen I catch a train from central Berlin to Oranienburg Station and from there it’s a short walk. This is the same route taken by perhaps 200,000 prisoners; the precise number remains unknown. The Camp is at the edge of an unremarkable residential district. There’s an air of neglect; houses with peeling paint, broken fences and careless gardens though once the area flourished by servicing the Camp as well as the SS and constant visitors who came to observe Himmler’s achievement.

My walk from the station collapses time … I’m neither here now nor there then. These streets don’t conform to Spielbergian emotions qua Schindler’s List that I almost expect, perhaps even desire to feel from memorials to the Holocaust. Here, in this place, is a different intensity. Not the emotional impact of Auschwitz — horror at the vast pile of human hair continuing to grey behind glass, all those names and addresses written by the dead on emptied suitcases, the endless lists and signs of pinpoint organisation. These are impacts I recognise through films, documentaries and literature; a collective memorialisation processed as images already thought. Here in the street, my unsettling has to do with something felt in the present; I only realise later that what I felt was the everydayness of it all.

Sachsenhausen is a cultural artefact — a vast stretch of flat earth with neat rows of low wooden barracks surrounded by brick walls regularly dotted with guard towers. Few of the Camp’s smaller items remain, apart from some battered tin mugs,
spoons and bottles. Within the inner wall there are tumbles of barbed wire, the remains of a gas chamber and crematorium. Although I expect these objects, I don’t expect the incongruities. For on this piece of earth the Nazis strung up lights on the gallows pole to make a Christmas tree. And following the war, Soviet soldiers used the crematorium as a BBQ, stomping in ash.

The Camp guards resided in an outer zone and the buildings where they lived have been converted into exhibition spaces. The exhibits trace community life in the district, there are school photos, sporting trophies, wedding albums, newspaper articles, brochures of cultural events and photos of grinning Hitler youth. Collective desires communicated through families, clubs, congregations and institutions. Without declamation, what is conveyed is that fascism evolves somewhere.

The Camp extends in a triangular configuration; a lonely expanse without the tourist crowds to merge into at Auschwitz or Dachau. It is coloured a desolate European summer brown. The area the Camp covers was once forest at the edge of the district; it was clear-felled by prisoners overseen by the Camp’s drunken commandant. There are photos of his wedding to a guard held in the forest in a strange Teutonic ritual. Apparently he was quite mad, even by Nazi standards, and Himmler had him executed for embezzlement.

To augment the pure Aryan, experiments were performed in one of the barracks which served as a pathology ‘ward’. My audio-guide tells me that Jewish children were brought here from other camps and injected with diseases. Eight year old Joseph Liebermann was pumped with hepatitis and observed until he died. He lay on this white tiled slab. The slab with its drainage hole is thoroughly practical. The square tiles that cover it are white and antiseptic. Upon the slab an earlier visitor has placed a red rose that has just begun to wilt.
Beneath the building is a mortuary. A large, cold space, low with wooden arches, reminiscent of a medieval wine cellar. Bodies were trundled down on a simple, hand-pushed wooded cart. Here is the cart; carefully crafted. Perhaps made by a prisoner; or perhaps a replica? Either way I’m bombarded by images of plague victims piled in such carts, of rats and of people taken to be guillotined. All these images lurking somewhere coalesce. I realise quite suddenly that my stoicism is gone and I leave. Nothing will be quite the same again; not that I feel sorrow or fear. These affects are too softly named.

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The first thing I notice about Berlin’s Jewish Museum is the zinc clad façade and windows that recall the slits of a bunker. The second is that the building has no street entrance. It is located on Lindenstrasse but accessed by a staircase from within a stately baroque building. The area was bombed heavily, but somehow the baroque façade survived and in the 1960s was restored to become the Berlin Museum. Daniel Libeskind designed the new Jewish Museum to attach to the nineteenth-century building like a concrete fold. It’s actually hard to get a sense of the configuration between the two buildings, where one begins and the other ends, but this seems apt. Neatly framing anything in Berlin involves a host of complexities, part of the weight of memorialisation.

I’m through the electronic security screening and downstairs in a space of underground corridors. Two of the corridors end at oversized concrete voids, the third ascends gradually to culminate in a garden at street level. The corridors are sparse; a vascular system that has been emptied.
The corridors are named — Exile, Holocaust, Continuity. At the end of the corridor of Exile a door opens onto a slanting grid of concrete pillars. The tall pillars lean in unison like a windswept grove. Each contains a willow tree; the central tree grows in soil brought from Jerusalem. The site slopes uncomfortably and I walk with a dragging gait; the most familiar of movements has become uncomfortable. This surprises me, and then I’m surprised at being surprised. I’m affected by the weight of my movement, at steps that are outside my usual rhythm, at a movement that requires a new attentiveness.

Along the corridor of Continuity I’m moved by the tenacity of the few items on display — a book, a teapot, a suitcase. These simple items are far from simple. I wonder what they have seen. Their silent eloquence is the witness that I can never be. They have a duration and durability that unsettles my own solidity.

The Holocaust Tower has an unnatural dimension. An attendant opens the heavy steel door and with a small group of strangers I enter the Tower; a dim, narrow space four stories high. The door closes. Someone whispers. The light cannot be discerned clearly. It’s not entirely unpleasant, rather it is part of a drama and we are waiting in the wings.

Of course, all along I know we will be released. There is something liturgical about being in this hollow with its too far away light and about sharing its manufacture of intense feeling with strangers. There is a requirement to labour at empathy; the responsibility for memorialisation that weighs this city. But it is not real even if I fully embrace the pretence of being captive. I am captivated. Not forced here by deportation and selected at some bleak industrial railway siding. As I write, much later, the moment remains connected; one of those feelings that linger long after an event is supposedly done.
A second void in the building is occupied by an installation that the artist has intended to be walked across by visitors. Menashe Kadishman has cut ten thousand faces from flat steel and layered the faces to form a carpet between high concrete walls. Each welded face has holes for eyes and a mouth. All these eyes and mouths are open wide in a collective scream that is given expression in the metallic crunch beneath my feet. It is impossible to cross the space quietly; my footsteps grate as a loud, ostentatious movement.

A crossing that takes away my curatorial complacency, wraps it in acid-proof paper, packs it in a solander box and stores it upon a high shelf. Not that the scream is somehow transferred to me, rather the space that is opened is some other connection. The act of walking upon the vulnerable is an act of stopping our ears, of closing our eyes, of avoidance. Here though, right now in the moment I cannot hide. I am watched, by visitors, museum surveillance, by ghosts underfoot. Of course, these are silent witnesses and no-one remarks at my loud tread. The whole encounter goes entirely unremarked. But I still recall the grating metal beneath my boots: the sound reassembled me, guarding my words against false witness and complacency.

I leave the underground section of the Museum and venture up a wide staircase to the part of the building that can be seen from the street. As I climb, light flickers through the glass slit windows in the outer wall.

Upstairs is different. Here artefacts of Jewish culture are the main exhibits whereas downstairs the architecture is the object of attention. There’s a warmer mood and quite a few people milling around. There are screens and TV monitors and the various technologies sit comfortably amongst the artefacts. I sit down, don headphones and listen to a long interview with a lawyer at the Nuremberg trials who reveals the impact that the unrepentant bombast of Hermann Goering had upon him.
Fear is the most important injury, the prosecutor says and you can tell from his old-man eyes.

Vinyl footsteps are strategically placed on the floor to guide visitors through rooms of exhibits. But I don’t feel the need for a clear itinerary. At random I open drawers that contain items pertaining to German Jewish culture and history. Around me are images, maps and portraits. There’s quite a lot of text which I scan rather than closely read, though in the process I find myself formulating a chronology. It begins with Jewish people entering Germany with the Roman legions. They become travelling merchants, and flourish in communities along the Rhine, at Speyer, Worms and Mainz. Many communities were wiped out by the Crusaders and the Black Death; they were blamed for the latter. Few survived the Holocaust to remain in Germany, but following the Cold War, the Jewish population started to increase and today there are 200,000 Jewish people living in Germany, mostly from the former USSR and refugees from Africa and the Middle East.

* * * *

Walking back to my hotel, I’m struck by the beautiful day, and the warmth on my skin. I’m struck how artefacts have their own intensity; intensity to rupture the expectation of collective memories and the emotions that keep us circling in the past. For in the materiality and duration of artefacts so different to our own chronology the aesthetic and ethical possibilities of transformed human-nonhuman relations can be thought and therefore realised.
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